delay caused by some default of the ship. The shipper is held v. The New York N. H. & H. R. R. Co., 24 Blatchf. 448; The Boston, 1 Low. 464; Choate v. Meredith, Holmes, 500. I 1. Davis v. Pendergrast, 16 Blatchf. C. Ct. 565; The Glover, 1 Brown Adm. 166; Re Two Hundred and Twenty Tons of Fish Scrap, 5 Hughes C. Ct. 141; Four Hundred Tons of Iron Ore, 18 Fed. Rep. 94; The Boston, 1 Low. 464; Choate v. Meredith, Holmes 500; Manson v. The New York N. H. & H. R. R. Co., 24 Blatchf. C. Ct. 448. 2. Fish v. 150 Tons of Brown Stone, 20 Fed. Rep. 201; Williams v. Theobald, 15 Fed. Rep. 465; Cross v. Beard, 26 N. Y. 85; Sleeper v. Puig, 17 Blatchf. C. Ct. 36; Philadelphia & R. R. Co v. Northam, 2 Ben. 1; Gronstadt v. Witthoff, 15 Fed. Rep. 265; Randall v. Lynch, 2 Camp. 352. Generally consignee takes risk of roads and means of transportation from the wharf and is bound to take cargo as fast as delivered. Sprague v. West, Abbott Admr. 548. Where a vessel is seized by the custom house collector, if the seizure was legal and occasioned by any act or neglect on the part of the master, the consignee will be liable for freight, only, subject to a deduction for such damages as he may have sustained by reason of the nondelivery of the cargo because it was not then delivered. If the seizure was legal and occasioned by any act of the consignee, such as a neglect to pay duties on the cargo, then the consignee will be liable for the full amount of freight and perhaps demurrage, but if the seizure was illegal the consignee is liable for the full amount of freight, but no demurrage. Brooks v. Minturn, I Cal. 481. A charter party allowed eighteen days for loading. The charterer did not begin to deliver the cargo until five days after ship's arrival, but after he commenced to deliver it to her it was delivered as fast as the ship loaded it. The court allowed the ship five days. demurrage, notwithstanding it took thirty days to load instead of the eighteen. The cargo was to be delivered within reach of the ship's tackle, but as the master did not object to this delivery at the time he was deemed to have waived his right in that respect and accepted the delivery. Arreco v. Pope, 36 Fed. Rep. 606. 3. Williams v. Theobald, 15 Fed. Rep. 465; Cross v. Beard, 26 N. Y. 85; Sleeper v. Puig, 17 Blatchf. C. Ct. 36. It was provided in a charter party "to discharge at a wharf as ordered by charterer's agents, or so near thereto as she may safely get," and "to discharge with customary dispatch." Held, that the charterer was liable for detention caused by his selecting a wharf that was already occupied. Lindsay v. Cusimano, 12 Fed. Rep. 504. A vessel was to be discharged at the rate of 100 tons per day, and by a computation the court determined that nineteen working days was to be allowed as lay days. She was ready to be discharged October 24th, but was not entirely discharged until December Two days of this time the boat used in taking stiffening. The court held that the lay days began to run October 24th and included November 14th (allowance being made for three Sundays), and that she was held on demurrage from and including November 15th, and that after deducting the two days stiffening was taken the consignors were liable for fifteen days' demurrage. the charter party provided that the vessel was "to proceed to the port of San Francisco, or so near thereto as she can safely get," and was to be discharged "alongside any craft, steamer, floating dock, wharf or pier as may be directed by the consignees." The consignees directed her to deliver cargo at the wharf of the San Francisco Gaslight Co. The cause of the detention was that other vessels were unloading at the dock and she had to wait her turn. Williams v. Theobald, 15 Fed. Rep. 465. and their boat is then delayed only by waiting for her regular turn, and there is no stipulation of dispatch, the lay days will not be considered as running while she is thus detained.1 If it is stipulated that in discharging the vessel she is to have "dispatch" or "quick dispatch," the consignee is liable for any time not used in discharging the ship after he has received notice of her arrival, and he may be liable for some of the time used in discharging her if he does not receive the cargo with all the dispatch possible; ordinary dispatch is not always sufficient. The only time that can be considered as lay days is the necessary time used in unloading. A contract of this kind overrides any customary mode by which they are to take their turn at the wharf.2 But if the stipulation provides that the loading or unloading is to be with customary dispatch or in its regular turn, then the usage and custom of the port will control.3 Where it is stipulated that a vessel is to be ready and that the lay days are to begin at a fixed date, if the ship is not ready by that time the lay days do not begin to run and the charterer is not 1. 175 Tons of Coal, 9 Benn. 400. Under a charter party where a cargo of timber was taken from Riga to the Canada dock in the port of Liverpool and a stated number of days was allowed for unloading, it was held that according to general law the lay days began from the time the vessel entered the dock, but that it was competent for the owners of the timber to show, notwithstanding the fact that the ship owner was a foreigner, that it was the usage in the port of Liverpool that with ships loaded with timber the lay days began only from the time of the mooring of the vessel at the quay where by the dock regulations she was alone allowed to discharge. Norden Steamship Co. v. Dempsey, 1 L. R., C. P. Div. 654; 45 L. J., C. P. Div. 764; 24 W. R. 984. But when the charter stipulates that the ship is to be brought to a particular dock, or so near thereto as she can safely get, and she is prevented from coming to her primary destination by any permanent obstacle other than an accident of navigation, the ship owner is entitled to damages for the detention by reason of the charterer's refusal to receive the cargo at the alternative place of delivery, although the obstacle which prevented her getting to the dock (viz, their crowded condition) was not an obstacle endangering her safety. Nelson v. Dahl, 12 L. R., Ch. Div. 568, 583; Ford v. Cotesworth, L. R., 4 Q. B. 127; Cross v. Beard, 26 N. Y. 85. Where the cargo was to be delivered at a certain dock but the dock owners refused to allow her to discharge at said docks, the charterers are not liable until she finds a proper berth in which to discharge. Carsenego v. Wheeler, 16 Fed. Rep. 248. 2. Davis v. Wallace, 3 Cliff. 123; Keen v. Andenrid, 5 Benedict; Thache v. Boston Gas Light Co., 2 Lowell 361; Smith v. 60,000 Feet of Yellow Pine Lumber, 2 Fed. Rep. 396; Kearson v. Pearson, 7 Hurl. & N. 386; 1,100 Tons of Coal, 12 Fed. Rep. 185; Choate v. Meredith, 1 Holmes 500; Bjorkquist v. Steel Rail, 3 Fed. Rep. 717; Sleeper v. Puig, 17 Blatchf. C. Ct. 36. The charterers are liable for any delay in causing the vessel to be discharged over and above the necessary lay days, although the detention was caused by the custom house rule that regulated when and where the vessel should discharge, and if the parties intend that the customs and rules of a port shall control as to the time of discharging, they must so provide in the charter party. Sleeper v. Puig, 17 Blatchf. Ĉ. Ct. 36. 3. Gates v. Ryan, 37 Fed. Rep. 154; Leideman v. Schultz, 14 C. B. 38; 24 Eng. L. & Eq. 305; Taylor v. Clay, 9 Q. B. 713; Hudson v. Clement, 18 C. B. 213; 36 Eng. L. & Eq. 332; Nichols v. Jewett, U. S. D. C. Mass., Boston Daily Adv., March 23rd, 1857; Nichols v. Tremlett, 1 Sprague 361. obliged to fulfil his part of the agreement, for time is the essence of the contract.1 The burden is always upon the libellant to prove a fault causing the delay.2 (c) Discharge in Two Places.-At a port where it is the usual custom for a vessel to discharge her cargo within the port in two separate parcels and at two different places, and the time arrives when the consignee is bound to accept a part delivery, the voyage is ended and both places taken together constitute the usual place of discharge and the lay days commence to run from the arrival of the vessel at the first.3 But it is otherwise where she is obliged, for the purposes of navigation, to discharge some of her cargo at the entrance of the port before arriving at the usual place of discharge. The lay The lay days begin only when she arrives at the latter.4 And it is a question for a jury to determine in each case, from the terms of the contract and the usage of the port, whether the unloading of a part of the cargo is a partial discharge or a mere lightening.5 III. COMPUTATION OF LAY DAYS.-When the word "days" alone is used with reference to lay days or days for loading a ship, all the running or successive days are counted. But if the term "working days" is used, all days are counted except Sundays and holidays. If the parties wish to further except days when the weather prevents work they use the expression "working days," "weather working days," or "with customary dispatch," or some other expression which clearly indicates the intention to recognize that days of inclemency from winds and storms are also excepted.8 1. Weisser v. Maitland, 3 Sandf. (N. Y.) 318. 2. A Cargo of Wooden Posts, 34 Fed. Rep. 917. 3. McIntosh v. Sinclair, 11 Ir. R. C. L. 456 Exch. 4. Brereton v. Chapman, 7 Bing. 559; Kell v. Adams, 10 M. & W. 498; 12 L. J. Exch. 101. Compare Caffarein v. Walker, 10 Ir. R. C. L. Exch. 250. 5. McIntosh v. Sinclair, II Ir. C. 456 Exch. L. When the place of the removal of the cargo is within the limits of the port and that removal from that place is so common as to become the foundation of a binding usage to unload and deliver at that place, and if the larger portion amounting to about two-thirds of a ship's cargo is there delivered to the custody of the merchant, a jury may, although the merchants attempt to establish an inconsistent usage as to lay days, hold that there was a part discharge and that where the unloading and receiving of cargoes is usual, is a usual place for the commencement of the discharge. McIntosh 7. Sinclair, 11 Ir. R. C. L. 56 Exch. 6. Pedersen v. Eugster, 14 Fed. Rep. 422; Brown v. Johnson, Car. & M. 440; io M. & W. 331; Brooks v. Minturn, I Cal. 481. If the charter party provides for a certain number of running days to discharge the cargo, the charterer takes the risk of holidays, Sundays and other nonworking days. Davis . Pendergast, 8 Ben. 84. 7. Pedersen v. Eugster, 14 Fed. Rep. 422; Brooks v. Minturn, I Cal. 481. It was held in Pedersen . Engster, supra, that the term had, in commerce and jurisprudence, a settled and definite meaning, and when it is used in a charter party parol evidence will not be admitted to show that at a certain port any usage prevails which would vary this legally ascertained definition. 8. Pedersen v. Eugster, 14 Fed. Rep. By the provisions in a char 422. When the term "running days" is used it means the days as they run day by day from the time the vessel is ready and in condition to load or unload and notice thereof has been given to the charterers or their agents.1 If it is provided that the charterer shall pay, for every day's detention occasioned by his default, a specified sum, day by day, he is liable for demurrage for the whole period that the vessel is thus detained, and the days are to be reckoned as running days, and not working days, including all rainy or stormy days.2 The English courts do not seem to be harmonious as to whether the term "days" means working or running days.3 LEASE (See also ASSIGNMENTS; COVENANTS; DEEDS; EsCROW; IMPLIED COVENANTS; LANDLORD AND TENANT). I. Definition, 976. II. What Not a Lease, 976. V. Parol Leases, 978. ter party the charterers were to have It was further held that where a con- permitting" did not apply to the time that the vessel was detained after the lay days had expired. The Oluf, 19 Fed. Rep. 459. 3. Where a bill of lading stipulated that the cargo was to be discharged in a specified number of days, it was held to mean working days, and not running days. Cockran v. Retberg, 3 Esp. 121, Eldron. Days in a charter party allowed for unloading are to be reckoned consecutively. Sundays are not to be deducted unless it is customary. The word "days" in the absence of any custom and the term "running days" mean consecutive days. Brown v. Johnson, Car. & M. 440; 10 M. & W. 331. 4. "Lead to the apprehension and conviction of thieves." See title REWARD. Lead Manure. In an action of case for disturbance of a way, plaintiffs claimed a right for themselves, etc., on foot to go, return, etc., and also to lead and carry away manure, but proved only a grant of way on foot and for horses, oxen, cattle and sheep. It was held that there was a variance; for the term "lead," so used, implies a drawing on a |