Furthermore, it stands to reason that the Germans will have as little fancy for a French guarantee of the constitution of their Diet, as for a Russian guarantee. The anonymous author of the Memoir knows indeed a number of services that Russia may enumerate as rendered to German freedom. If we were to acknowledge them all without inquiry, no necessity would follow for a Russian Protectorate. It would be useless therefore to waste words on the subject, if the Germans had not, at the same time, been reproached with ingratitude,with the most despicable ingratitude. We must be allowed to offer a few words in reply to such an accusation. The author goes back to the time of Catherine the Great, to her "guarantee of the Peace of Westphalia." Was the mode in which she supported the Bavarian proposal of exchange in the spirit of the Peace of Westphalia? It must have been unheard of, inconceivable blindness on the part of the German electors that they did not, in 1790, throw themselves in a body into the arms of Russia, as in the following year one of them (the Elector of Trier) did by his "remarkable declara tion." Are the Germans then considered as infants or superannuated dotards of the shortest memories, that they are spoken to on such matters in a tone like this? Are the writings of our time destroyed? Are the chronicles and the facts extinguished? On the contrary they are accessible to every man, and in a convenient form in a current work. Whoever will take the smallest trouble will find all the arguments on this subject in the 37th and 38th parts of Reuss' Staatskanzlei.' The Peace of Westphalia was, as usual, renewed and confirmed on the Peace of Teschen, (May 13, 1779). Russia guaranteed the Peace of Teschen, before the Emperor and the empire of Germany acceded to it, and without being called upon on their part for the guarantee; the Imperial decree on the accession contains (March 2, 1780) a protestation against disadvantageous consequences; in addition to this the ratifications of the guarantee do not appear to have been exchanged. On this was founded the pretension of the Russian cabinet to meddle with the affairs of the empire, a pretension which it thenceforward made good. Was it to be wondered at that the Germans did not welcome an interference of this kind in their affairs from abroad? Johann Jacob Moser had warned them already on the occasion of the Peace of Teschen. "The more foreign guarantees, the more will foreign powers have "occasion for mixing in our internal affairs, with "grounds, or, at least, with apparent grounds, of right." How prudent, how mild was the language of Johannis Müller, after the Bavarian act of Exchange, with regard to Russia: "If the Russian Government, as a preponderating Power, will liberate Asia from tyranny and barbarism, and stand forth amongst Europeans as "the Protectress of the weak, and guarantee of "the good, Europe has a new and strong pillar "of strength. But princes are men, their maxims "are changeable; the cause of freedom is too mighty, its dangers are too numerous to allow us "to be tranquillized by the hope that any Cabinet "whatever will at all times know its most glorious "and useful career." It remains to be shewn how this conviction became more excited, more decisive, and by what circumstances. Russia had guaranteed the Polish constitution as well as the Peace of Westphalia. It was not the enemies of Russia, but the Russian cabinet itself that drew the parallel in the Manifesto of May 18, 1792. "C'est ainsi qu'ils ont eu la perfide adresse d'interprèter l'acte, par lequel la Russie garantit "la constitution légitime de cette nation, comme "un joug onéreux et avilissant, tandis que les plus 66 grand empires, et entre autres celui de l'Allemagne, loin de rejetter ces sortes de garantie, les "ont envisagées, recherchées et reçues, comme le "ciment le plus solide de leurs proprietés et de "leur indépendance." (!) This was considered ominous. Häberlin concluded his "Staatsrecht" (1797), after alluding to guarantees and their consequences, with the words. "The first step to managing the German Diet, as "formerly the Polish Diet at Grodno, was hereby "taken." Complimentary writings and resolutions of the Diet (from Swabia and Franconia) of course ensued; to say nothing of the notes of Oct. 1799, on which the author sets great value, but which, however, did not proceed from many, but only from some (six), and those the Ecclesiastical, Diets. Then followed the mediation and plans of indemnity which were discussed by France, Prussia and |