TO THE

INHABITANTS OF CONSTANTINOPLE.

HOWEVER little we may feel ourselves justified in encouraging the Turks to believe in our support, disheartened as we are by the inconceivable apathy manifested by our Government, and viewing indeed with alarm, the consequences which may arise from the disappointment of the expectations hitherto entertained by the Ottoman Nation, still we cannot help imploring the Sultan and his people, first of all, not to underrate their own strength, and secondly, not to be deceived as to the character of the designs of Russia.

It is natural to expect that in consequence of their present disappointment, they may turn round with a feeling of self-destructive bitterness towards the very power which has reckoned on the present result, and which has formed but too correct an estimate of the torpor—or apathy-or insanity, which prevents the Government of England from attending to its own interests, and casting the shield and moral support of Great Britain, round our natural, commercial, and ever-faithful Ally.

To bring home to the Inhabitants of Constantinople, the true character of the friendship entertained towards their patriotic Monarch, by the Allies of Russia, we publish the following Extract, from the work of General Valentini, which appeared in 1822; at the moment when the Russian Cabinet was endeavouring to enlist the support of the European Governments, to favour her plan of putting down the Greek Rebellion, which she had excited in Turkey.

very

We must bear in mind that no Prussian officer would be allowed to publish a political work without the sanction of his Government; and that every paragraph must have previously obtained the approval of Prussia, and by a natural consequence, that of the Protectress of Prussia. And, besides, the work is chiefly a compilation from Russian official documents.

VALENTINI

ON THE

MILITARY OCCUPATION OF CONSTANTINOPLE.

THE study of the past is only truly useful in so far as we know how to derive instruction for the present and the future. Although the war that we have just described ought not to serve as a model, it teaches us at least the nature of the country and the means of penetrating into it, as well as the character of the people, and the best means of combating them; and we may thence draw conclusions as to the conduct that ought to be pursued by those whom Providence may select to emancipate these fair regions from the yoke of the barbarians.

Such a study ought not to be classed amongst the useless speculations, even if the execution of our plan should be reserved for future generations.

The road which leads to the centre, and which goes straight to the capital, must doubtless be preferred; however great the advantages that any less

direct route appears to offer for the safety of the enterprise. Nevertheless, there is one idea which naturally presents itself-it is that of effecting a disembarkation in Asia Minor before coming to the attack of Constantinople. Such a measure would produce the happiest effects in a military point of view, besides hindering the Grand Seignior from quitting the seraglio and fleeing into Asia with his treasures, which must serve to indemnify the expenses of the war.

At the same time, then, that the army by land advances by Adrianople, the fleet must follow its movement along the coast of the Black Sea, and must convey directly to the entrance of the Bosphorus the troops that will disembark in Asia, under the protection of the vessels of war, and whose first care will be to entrench themselves properly. Although the defence of the coasts is reputed to be ill organised amongst the Turks, one might fear that the points in the neighbourhood of the Euxine would be better defended than the rest; but the most recent descriptions speak only of the two castles constructed in 1773 by Baron de Tott, one on the coast of Europe and the other on that of Asia. These castles, which could not much

annoy the ships of war, would be easily reduced to silence by the superior fire of the latter, and the batteries beside them would soon be turned by the troops after having landed in sufficient numbers.

Be

With regard to the old castles, known under the names of Roumili and Anatoli Hissar, built by Mahomet II. before the siege of Constantinople, they are situated two leagues from the entrance to the canal, at the narrowest spot, and consequently they could offer no obstacle to the disembarkation. sides, they would not long resist a well-directed attack from the land side; and as soon as they should be taken possession of, the Turkish vessels which would oppose the disembarkation would find the passage absolutely prohibited; these vessels would also have to contend against the current which comes from the Black Sea, and against the winds of the North, which habitually prevail; circumstances which would favour, on the contrary, the manœuvres of the Russians.

As soon as a footing should be gained on shore, one would push forward the Cossacks and Chasseurs on foot to some elevated spot, whence they might discover the march of the Asiatic troops, who would arrive to succour the capital.

It

It will then be of the highest importance to get possession of Scutari, a kind of suburb of Constantinople, built like an amphitheatre, on the coast of Asia, opposite the Seraglio. This town, protected by a bad enclosure of great extent, would be an easy conquest, in spite of the seventy thousand inhabitants, most of them true believers. is commanded from the neighbouring heights, and presents on the side of the hills a narrow point unprovided with walls, which the besiegers would surround with advantage. Masters of Scutari, the Bosphorus may be considered as a large wide river that one must pass to attack the capital.

Nevertheless, the latter must be straitened as much as possible on the side of Europe. It is important to establish oneself very near the walls, and to cut the aqueducts which conduct the waters from sources at the distance of two leagues. We have already seen above, that the most easy mode of vanquishing the Turks is by thirst. Thus a strict blockade will suffice to force the city to surrender, without the necessity of a formal attack, and without the effusion of blood.

It will be well to entrench strongly the posts