EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM GENERAL VON BORSTELL. Wisbaden, the 31st July, 1832. Now, if the sending a force is made to depend sub a. on the events of the three days of July at Paris, and in the provinces of our frontiers, and the excited parts of southern Germany, I venture to intreat your Excellency to communicate to me, not only every thing from the commencement of these events, but your enlightened opinion on the instruction regarding the propriety of sending a strong first echelon, either altogether or by divisions; whereby we should certainly have in view, besides those events, the state of ferment and revolt in the interior of the states of the Confederation, and against the Aus einem Brief des Generals v. Borstell, aus Wiesbaden, vom 31 Juli 1832, Wenn nun die Absendung abhängig gestellt ist, sub a, von den Ereignissen der Julitage in Paris und in den Provinzen unserer Grenzen, und dem aufgeregten Theile von Süddeutschland, so erlaube ich mir, Ew. Excellenz zu bitten, mir, gleich nach Eingang dieser Ergebnisse, nicht nur solche mitzutheilen, sondern auch dieser Benachrichtigung Ihre erleuchtete Ansicht über die Zulässigkeit der Absendung dieses starken ersten Echelons, ganz oder theilweise, mitzutheilen; wobei allerdings auch ausser jenen Vorgängen, der Zustand der Gährung und Auflehnung der deutschen Bundesstaaten im Innern und gegen die Beschlüsse der decrees of the German Diet; and whether after this it is to be expected that, within a short period, a Prussian auxiliary corps of two or three thousand men might not be requisite ? LETTER FROM THE KING OF PRUSSIA TO GENERAL In the event of the necessity arising, according to the decree of the Diet, of a claim of military aid in Prussian troops in favour of the neighbouring states of the Confederation, in addition to the troops of the 8th corps of the army, the 32nd, 37th, and 5th Regiment of Reserve deutschen Bundes-Versammlung zu berücksichtigen seyn dürfte, und ob es hiernach zu erwarten steht, dass binnen Kurzem eine preussische Hülfeleistung von einer nahmhaften Stärke über 2 bis 3000 Mann erforderlich werden dürfte ? An den General der Cavalerie von Borstell. Für den Fall, dass nach Bundesbeschluss das Bedürfnss eintreten sollte, noch preussische Truppen zu militärischen Hülfsleistung für die benachbarten Bundesstaaten in Anspruch zu nehmen, sind Ihnen zwar für diesen Zweck, nächst den Truppen des 8ten ArmeeKorps, noch das 32ste und das 37ste Infanterie-Regiment (5te Reserve-Regiment), so wie das 6te Uhlanen-Regiment zur Dis Infantry Regiments, as well as the 6th Regiment of Lancers, are placed at your disposal. If, in the mean time, a larger force should be necessary, you are authorized to take it from the troops of the commander-in-chief quartered nearest to the destined point; and, in so far, as in consequence of this regulation the garrison of Cologne must be so disproportionally weakened as to require a reinforcement, the General of Infantry, von Müffling, is ordered by me to detach at your demand a part of the 14th division to garrison Cologne. Berlin, the 22nd August, 1832. (Signed) FREDERIC WILHELM. position verblieben. Sollte indess auch eine grössere Truppenzahl gebraucht werden, so haben Sie solche immer von den dem Bestimmungsorte am nächsten stehenden Truppentheilen Ihres General-Kommandos zu entnehmen, und sofern, in Folge einer diesfälligen Anordnung, die Besatzung von Köln unverhältnissmässig geschwächt werden musste, dergestalt, dass das Bedürfniss eines Ersatzes eintrete, ist der General der Infanterie, von Miffling, von Mir angewiesen, auf Ihre Requisition einen Theil der 14ten Division zur Besatzung nach Köln zu detachiren. Berlin, den 22 August 1832. (Gez.) FRIEDRICH WILHELM. OPINION OF GERMANY ON THE INFLUENCE OF RUSSIA. [We are happy to be able to contrast with the preceding documents the following Letter from an eminent German writer.] SIR, To the Editor of the Portfolio. Banks of the Elbe, June 22, 1836. In looking over a recent number of Blackwood's Magazine, I perceive an article entitled "Foreign Results of Democratic Ascendency." Whenever any palpable error has been committed, or a mistaken course of foreign policy has been adopted, it is natural enough for one party to shift the blame from their own leaders, and fasten it if possible upon their opponents. In the present instance, as far as the alarming progress and ulterior plans of Russia are concerned, it must be clear to every unprejudiced observer that the question at issue has been hitherto very little understood by any party, and that, as soon as its merits began to be at all appreciated, it was brought forward as a question not of political party, but of national and European interest. It is not my intention, nor would it be worth your while, to dwell on this subject after your repeated declarations, which will not fail of giving satisfaction in the quarters for which they may have been intended. But, in the article in question, I meet with a strange misconception of German affairs, which I cannot leave unnoticed. The domestic policy of the Reform administration is there described as having been instrumental in alienating the affections of the German people, and compelling them, from an instinctive dread of "revolutionary principles," to throw themselves into the arms of Russia. It would surely be a work of supereroga tion if I were as a foreigner to meddle with this charge as brought against the principles of the English Reformers; but, I may be allowed to offer a few remarks as far as regards the disposition of the majority of the German people. And since the writer in Blackwood treats (or affects to treat) Germany as "the most effectual barrier against Moscovite ambition," it may be presumed that the Conservative party in England will not consider the actual extent and real motives of Russian ascendency in the German States as a matter of indifference. It is of no use to talk of Germany in the aggregate, in the same way as the names of England or France are familiarly introduced to denote the system of government or the interests of the nation. These States, however distracted they may have been by domestic parties, have at no time experienced any thing like the provincial division, which is part and parcel of our political existence. It is necessary before all things to advert to the distinction which cannot but strike even the most superficial eye. There are on the one hand the two leading States, in which there exists no visible opposition to the government, or in which the police has as yet been sufficient to put down any thing that may have threatened to assume that shapeAustria and Prussia; and on the other, the Constitutional (or minor) States, in which the existence of a body of opposition more or less compact is legalized by the representative form of government, and manifested in spite of the restrictive regulations of the censorship by the tendency more or less pronounced of part of the public press. With regard to the people of the latter, the Constitutional States, it may safely be asserted that, far from betraying any inclination towards Russia, they have upon one or more occasion exhibited most unquestionable symptoms of the contrary. I need but allude to the deep sympathy manifested |