K: How can you give it to Scowcroft? No, give it to Eagleburger. K: I think we should play this with restriction. We are not going to have (consultations) with Greek Colonels. D: Really, my government asked me to tell you that they recognize that the United States is for the independence of Cyprus and you do not support Greek actions that are against the lawful government of Cyprus. K: I think the first is correct. I would get carried away. D: I understand. At some time they expressed that... not take any political steps to stop intervention ... that you do not do it from your side and they hope your representatives of the Security Council will... K: He didn't say anything? D: You didn't want to take any political steps to stop this interference. They would like to hope that you and the President will consider what we mentioned before and you will take the to support the lawful government in Cyprus headed by Makarios. This is what they express. K: May I make this suggestion. Anatol, I think the course of events, if we all behave in a restrained manner, will lead in this direction, but if anyone behaves provocatively it will get mixed up in the whole East/ West debate. D: I understand. K: We have no interest in changing the situation as it was on the island last (month). Our problem is how to position it so that the natural balance is not affected. This you can tell them. D: So, I can say that you hope the course of events will lead to a little-by-little restoration. K: Certainly. To a restoration of a constitutional government. K: I don't want to make a decision on names but we have no fixed view on that. D: OK. This I will mention to Moscow. K: Tell them if they send messages to send the second draft, not the first, since you are not here to mediate. Give my warm regards to Brezhnev and Gromyko. D: OK. K: And I am planning to be there in October. D: I sent a telegram yesterday to Brezhnev. K: We ought to make some progress. Senator Fulbright is here and we are planning détente hearings August 8 when I'm going to testify. It couldn't happen at a better time. D: I understand. K: It turned out to be the best time for it. Well, have a good vacation and give my warm regards to everyone. D: And to Nancy3 please give my best wishes. K: Thank you and I may call you once to ruin you in Moscow. Tell them to get all the recording equipment ready. D: Alright. (laughter). K: Thank you. 3 Nancy Kissinger. 204. Note From the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt) to Secretary of State Kissinger1 Washington, July 21, 1974. SUBJECT Latest Brezhnev Letter2 The message, on the whole more pained than threatening, reflects Soviet awareness that developments in Cyprus are likely in the end to leave the USSR less influential in yet another place in the Middle East. There is of course as always the paranoid reaction of assuming that some sort of larger game, masterminded here or somewhere, is underway. The two basic Soviet proposals-withdrawal of Greek military personnel and restoration of Makarios-were to be expected. They both continue to be reflected in Soviet UN positions, where the Soviets interpret the SC resolution as requiring Greek withdrawal. It is not perhaps surprising that the Soviets don't associate themselves with the proposal for talks in London, nor indeed with the call for a cease fire. In part this reflects Moscow's strange dissociation from the process now underway diplomatically and in the UN; but it also reflects its recogni 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 75, Country Files-Europe—USSR, Kissinger Conversations at Zavidovo, May 5-8, 1973. Secret; Eyes Only. 2 The July 21 letter from Brezhnev to Nixon is ibid., Box 70, Country Files-Europe USSR, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 24. tion that the outcome of these activities is likely to leave the USSR worse off than before (including, incidentally, with regard to Turkey which by its invasion has probably assured itself of some kind of improvement in Cyprus compared with the past which will leave it less in need of Soviet support). The only threatening element in the Brezhnev letter is the reference in Point 1 to "our two powers" acting "not only under the roof of the UN but also through other means" to get Greek withdrawal and cessation of interference. I think you will need to say something, preferably orally at this stage, to Vorontsov on this. It could be very simple: —we agree that the UN is not the only means for exerting influence toward restoration of peace and constitutional arrangements; -we are already, and have been, exerting utmost influence through diplomatic efforts with all concerned; -obviously, other forms of intervention on the island, unilaterally or bilaterally, cannot be envisaged; they would also contravene the London/Zurich agreements; -we are of course prepared to continue close consultations with the USSR. The Soviet point on restoration of Makarios, while heartfelt, seems mostly for the record. The last part of the point "restoration of the status of Cyprus as an independent state as it existed before the military intervention of Greece" seems to allow for a different personality. (I have already said to Vorontsov that we should not emphasize personalities per se as much as restoration of peace and constitutional arrangements.) In any case, Brezhnev does not call for withdrawal of Turkish forces (he merely says the situation has deteriorated, as evidenced by the Turkish landings.) The Soviets can't believe that the Turks want Makarios restored in the end. Altogether, Soviet conduct is having the effect of reducing rather than enhancing the Soviet role in events. It is not in our interest to correct this, though we should not actively promote it either, since it would be likely to bring about an unnecessary confrontation. You should tell Vorontsov: -we got the letter and studied it; -we of course want to cooperate with the Soviets, in the spirit of our relations and agreements (as the President told Brezhnev yesterday);+ 3 The London-Zurich agreements, signed in 1959, led to a constitution for Cyprus, which provided for its independence from Great Britain. 4 Nixon's July 20 note to Brezhnev, in which he emphasized the need for peace, is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 70, Country Files-Europe-USSR, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 24. -we have no desire for a confrontation of any kind; -we think the major task now is to bring about a cease-fire and the opening of negotiations between Greece and Turkey as proposed by the British; —we want restoration of the status quo ante, including with regard to military forces and the constitutional order; -above all we want to get the fighting stopped; -we are exerting maximum influence on Greece and Turkey by all appropriate means at our disposal; -we hope the Soviets will do likewise; -there should be no interference by additional powers in the island. (see page 2, above.) 205. Letter From President Nixon to Soviet General Secretary San Clemente, July 21, 1974. Dear Mr. General Secretary: I have received and carefully studied your message concerning Cyprus which was delivered to the White House by your Embassy early today. There should be no doubt in your mind, as a result of the views already conveyed to you and the actions of the United States throughout the crisis, that we seek no confrontation of any kind and that we wish to cooperate with you in restoring peace and the previous constitutional arrangements in Cyprus. The United States does not support and has not supported external interference in the affairs of Cyprus. It opposes such interference, whatever the source. The essential task now is to bring about a cease-fire on Cyprus. This is the goal of our active diplomatic efforts with the parties concerned and of our actions in the United Nations. You should know that we have been in contact, literally round-the-clock, with the parties to induce them to accept a cease-fire at the earliest possible moment. Al 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 70, Country Files-Europe-USSR, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 24. No classification marking. A covering memorandum from Kennedy to Vorontsov indicates that the letter was sent from San Clemente. "Deliver to the Soviet Embassy at 6:00 p.m., 7/21/74" is handwritten at the top of the memorandum. 2 See footnote 2, Document 204. though, as I write to you, these efforts have not yet succeeded, we remain hopeful that they will, and in any case we will continue them intensively. I trust the Soviet Union will firmly and actively support the goal of an immediate cease-fire as well. Implementation of a ceasefire will make possible negotiations, as proposed by the UK and endorsed by the UN Security Council, for the purpose of restoring peace, the constitutional order and the independence of the country. I am convinced that this course accords with the purposes set forth in your message. I have noted the positive comments you have just made on our relations in your speech in Warsaw.3 As you know from my own public statements, I share your satisfaction with what is being accomplished in our relations. In the spirit of those relations, it is my hope that you, like we, will exert maximum efforts to pacify the situation, to end fighting and to bring about negotiations so that the independence and integrity of Cyprus can be restored. Sincerely,* 3 On July 21, Brezhnev deliverad a foreign policy address in Warsaw, where he was attending ceremonies celebrating the 30th anniversary of the Communist regime in Poland. See "Brezhnev Urges Parley Accords," The New York Times, July 22, 1974, p. 17. 4 Printed from an unsigned copy. 206. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Nixon1 Moscow, July 23, 1974. Dear Mr. President, I have received your message of July 21, 1974,2 regarding Cyprus and want to give you a reply to it at once, since the situation there remains complicated and dangerous. Your message says about the US readiness to cooperate with the Soviet Union in the matter of restoring peace and the previous constitu 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 70, Country Files-Europe USSR, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 24. No classification marking. A handwritten note at the top of the letter reads, “Delivered by hand at 2145 July 23, 1974." 2 Document 205. |
