nize Kissinger. I am not sure he is here. He wants me to take him to Lake Baikal. How easy it was to get his agreement. Kissinger: Now I am in trouble with the military men and the President. I have one thought about postponement. We might combine your idea and our idea. I have not checked with Washington, but we might want to consider a certain number of consecutive postponements. You would still pay by the year 2001. In the agreement we could write a clause saying if postponements were taken in the first ten years, nevertheless the global sum would be paid by 2001. There could perhaps be one payment and three consecutive postponements followed by one payment and then take the fourth postponement. The whole would be paid off by 2001. This would establish a compromise between your position and ours. We would be proceeding from a global sum of $750 million. Brezhnev: I thank you for these additional considerations. We can certainly think things over. However, the total sum looks very big. If there is nothing new after the break, all to the good. We will take time to talk things over. Kissinger: One thing, it would be helpful to me to know what you plan to discuss this evening. I need to know this in terms of assigning my colleagues. Brezhnev: We could discuss non-use and European matters as a minimum, certainly, the Security Conference. We are hoping to finalize this matter too. Kissinger: You will defeat us in the last three seconds. (Referring to Russian defeat of U.S. Olympic basketball team.) Brezhnev: I now know that there is a God above. Brandt must be feeling very bad. Kissinger: Yes, he was very upset. I don't know how they let the terrorists slip through. The Germans are given to extremes. They are now so concerned not to show too many in uniform. In 1936 there were too many uniformed people. This time, too few. Brezhnev: Generally, they have been a very well disciplined nation. All through the war their discipline was good. When their leader said advance, they advanced. Retreat, they retreated. (Gesturing) It is true that after they surrendered not a single shot was fired at the back of our soldiers' heads. After one battle I went to a Division area where some of my friends were and I was returning to my command post down a road strewn with vehicles. I did not have my ADC, just my driver and myself. And as we approached a little forest area about half a kilometer from the roadside, I saw a squad of armed Germans. They were coming in my direction. Night had fallen. I didn't know whether to turn back but I finally decided to go along nonetheless. I saw they were headed by an officer. As they approached, they said, "Good evening, General" and all came to attention, (Brezhnev stands up gesturing) and clicked their heels. (Brezhnev imitates.) They asked which way to surrender. I told them that it was five or six kilometers away to the south. No one will touch you if you proceed in an orderly manner. The Germans stood up and saluted and I drove off. I thought some SOB would hit me in the back but instead they simply lined up and marched in the direction I had indicated. I crossed myself. Kissinger: I had a similar experience. A German division surrendered to our unit. The problem was how to get them one hundred miles back. I told my commander to let me handle it. I told the German Division Officer that if he would give his word of honor, he would be allowed to proceed without escort. The German responded that he hadn't spent thirty years in the Army to disgrace himself now. And as it turned out he didn't lose a man. All he had with him was someone to show him the way. Brezhnev: Let's take a break. Kissinger: Should Lynn talk about other aspects of trade in the interim. He could review our other proposals? Brezhnev: Certainly. Talk over the other aspects. This evening we can perhaps first cover the economic problem and then shift to the nuclear problem, European Security, troop reductions. Kissinger: May I ask our Ambassador to join us for the European subjects? Brezhnev: Sure. Kissinger: Then tomorrow we would discuss SALT, Vietnam, and other topics. Brezhnev: Maybe we could move more quickly. We really need to speed up. Kissinger: I agree. Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger must agree with us. Kissinger: I appreciate the opportunity to talk to Mr. Brezhnev. Brezhnev: We have spent four hours on the single question. At this rate it will take thirteen days. I will put this in my telegram to President Nixon. He will do it then. Kissinger: You are trying to destroy my confidence. Brezhnev: That is what I am worried about. Kissinger: When I get in trouble because of you, maybe I can get a job in the Soviet Union. Your Ambassador tells me it will not be in the office of foreign affairs, perhaps defense. Brezhnev: I will find something better. 39. Message From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)1 Moscow, September 12, 1972, 0155Z. Hakto 13. After over seven hours with Brezhnev this evening on lend-lease we have following situation.2 1. He says he absolutely cannot go above global figure of 725 million dollars. 2. He says their balance of payments problems due to grain purchases, shipping and other commitments for balance of their present five year plan are so severe that he cannot accept compressed pipeline payments of 24 million each in 1972 and 1973. First question is whether 725 million global figure would be feasible for us. Payments would still be arranged to conclude in 2001. As regards second problem above, two possible compromise suggestions have occurred to us: First possibility. 1. Soviets pay their regular pipeline installment of 11 plus million dollars this year. As you know they have been ready to do so but we have agreed to hold up from month to month pending resolution of lend-lease negotiations. 2. In 1973, they would pay a 24 million dollar pipeline installment. 3. Beginning 1974, assuming MFN some time in 1973, they would begin regular payments stream to 2001 on global sum, except that part of each payment would be on account of pipeline. Second possibility. 1. Pay pipeline installments for four years, 1972-75 of 11.5 plus million per year to retire pipeline debt. 2. Balance of global sum, after deducting pipeline, would be paid in equal installments beginning 1976 through 2001. I suspect in this variant we might ask for somewhat higher global sum. If so, how much should it be? 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 24, Trip Files, HAK's Germany, Moscow, London, Paris Trip, Sep. 9-15, 1972, HAKTO 1-35. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only; Flash. A stamped notation indicates it was received at 9:29 p.m. on September 11. 2 Document 38 accounts for a 4-hour discussion Kissinger had with Brezhnev regarding lend-lease. No records of other meetings on September 11 were found. 3. Because of delayed beginning of regular lend-lease installments, this variant would contain no postponement rights or perhaps only one. I urgently need for use tomorrow morning Peterson's and Flanigan's reaction to these propositions or any other precise alternative he can come up with. I recognize time pressures, but any supporting arithmetic-such as size of annual installments under variants and global figure and rationale for Congress—would be extremely useful. 40. Message From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) in Moscow1 Washington, September 12, 1972, 0712Z. Tohak 47/WH 29377. There follows the proposal worked out jointly by Secretary Peterson and Peter Flanigan. Both agree that it will meet requirements. Begin text: For: Henry A. Kissinger From: Secretary Peterson I have reviewed the following message on lend-lease with Flanigan and it represents joint view. Should you need more prescise computer-type interest rate calculation, please wire back and we will try to get computer operating tonight. On another subject, there are strong indications of a grain elevator strike by maritime unions. While it is not directed at only Soviet Union grain shipments, Gibson thinks if could have been touched off by delays on maritime deal.2 I asked him to get specific reasons for strike by mid-morning. In any event, you should know this puts extra pressure on a maritime deal as soon as possible. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 24, HAK Trip to Germany, Moscow, London, Paris, Sep 9–15, 1972, TOHAK 1-116. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. 2 The Maritime Agreement was signed in Washington on October 14. See Docu ment 61. Also, newspaper story here by Kaiser of Post on Jim Lynn's being with you3 made it necessary for me to meet with bureaucracy today to review situation. It will be very helpful if you can limit announcements on commercial negotiations to most general kind of language and thereby permit us to again reassure bureaucracy that Manzhulo and Alkhimov will be coming back to negotiate in depth. Warm regards. To: Henry A. Kissinger 1. We believe that comprehensiveness of trade package is more important than the differences between any of the options. Cannot tell from your telex how you are handling trade aspects but believe lowering of global sum provides requirement and opportunity to get comprehensive trade aspects wrapped up including market disruption, business facilities, arbitration, copyrights, etc. In short we are concerned about settling lend lease prior to getting comprehensive trade aspects settled, particularly at lower global sum. Congress and lobbyists will forget about rather minor differences in lend lease settlement long before they have to deal with specific trade package. 2. You could try again to get $750 million global sum and still be responsive to five year balance of payments problems by suggesting that $25 million additional beyond $725 million be paid in $1 million annual payments for last 25 years only, with none of these extra payments in the first five years of professed balance of payments problems. 3. Do not like your second possibility. Seems very much like grace period concept which is probably hard to sell to Congress, particularly since we could presumably have made available large Ex-In credits long before the regular lend lease payments began in 1976. Remind you that Congressman Moorhead seems to have hangup on grace period concept. We do not have time to get access to a computer at this late hour, but we suspect second possibility also reduces effective interest rate substantially more. 4. As to your first possibility: A. Can you get the last $11.5 million of pipeline in 1974 since propose handling of this last $11.5 million over remaining years until 2001 is a retreat from what we already are getting on pipeline, or if not, then could you split the last $11.5 million into two payments of about $5.75 million each, payable in 1974 and 1975 which at least completes pipeline payments at same time as current pipeline payments are due. 3 A reference to Kaiser's "Kissinger Arrives for Moscow Talks," Washington Post, Times Herald, September 11, 1972, p. A5. |