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example and advise him (Manzhulo) when to advance and when to fall back.

Dr. Kissinger: I have not been doing much advancing.
[Brezhnev nods to Mr. Lynn to proceed.)

Mr. Lynn: On the question of arbitration, we need a clear signal to our bureaucracies on both sides that international arbitration machinery can be located in third countries.

Brezhnev: I do not know what third countries should be involved. If there are matters [to be settled), we will take it to Dr. Kissinger. Why should Holland decide for us? This may not be necessary. Do we need third countries?

Lynn: We want this item so that businessmen can support the agreements.

Brezhnev: If the experts agree, I have no objections.

Lynn: Second, we should agree that MFN applies to exports and imports, except those items that fall under national security.

Also, Mr. Manzhulo had difficulty with our reference to GATT. We have handled this by a reference to GATT that I think he would find satisfactory.

The next point concerns diplomatic immunity for trade representatives in the Soviet Union and in the U.S. I believe this can be handled satisfactorily.

In working out MFN reciprocal treatment of goods, there are contained in side letters references concerning quantities of goods. This is the so-called market disruption clause. We need a mechanism to advise ...

Brezhnev: I am beginning to see that we will be able to get a protocol by this evening. So we can get into other matters.

[At this point Minister Guzhenko came into the room and began reporting to Brezhnev in Russian. After a conversation in Russian, Brezhnev said that his Minister claimed that we wanted to exclude Soviet ships that called on Cuba; since this was 90 percent of the ships, we could not implement the agreement. Brezhnev said that we claimed no sailors should take part in loading.)

[Dobrynin intervened in Russian to explain something, and then Guzhenko continued, apparently informing Brezhnev that there had been a communication from the Americans through Ambassador Dobrynin solving these problems. Brezhnev seemed unaware of what he meant, but Dobrynin reassured him that the issues were resolved.)

Brezhnev concluded that Lynn had the responsibility for reaching an acceptable agreement.

Dr. Kissinger: Let them continue working on details. I think all the problems are solved. If necessary, Lynn can stay.

nd when

Brezhnev: Our work has succeeded.
[Lynn departed and the meeting turned to other subjects.)

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* Kissinger subsequently wrote to Haig regarding the meeting in message Hakto 18, September 12: “After further ninety minutes of discussion today, tentative agreement was reached on lend-lease package based on global figure of 725 million and generally on first alternative compromise suggestion sent you last night. Brezhnev also agreed that total trade package should be expeditiously completed and Lynn currently meeting with Soviet counterpart to get as far as possible. Brezhnev has promised his support for a forthcoming solution.” Kissinger continued: “Please tell President that October 10 is target date for completion and signature of comprehensive trade package and lend-lease settlement." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 24, Trip Files, HAK's Germany, Moscow, London, Paris Trip, Sep. 9–15, 1972, HAKTO 1-35) The agreements were not signed until October 18. See Document 65.

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Moscow, September 12, 1972, 1:20–6 p.m.

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PARTICIPANTS

Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU
Andrei A. Gromyko, Foreign Minister
Anatoli F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to USA
Georgi M. Korniyenko, Chief of USA Division, Foreign Minister
A.M. Aleksandrov, Assistant to the General Secretary
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter
Soviet Notetaker
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, NSC Senior Staff Member
Winston Lord, NSC Staff
William G. Hyland, NSC Staff
Comdr. Jonathan T. Howe, NSC Staff

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SUBJECT

Non-Cse of Nuclear Weapons

Dr. Kissinger: I delayed so long on the other subject (trade and lend-lease] to avoid discussing this.

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Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 74, Country Files-Europe—USSR, HAK Trip to Moscow, Sept. 1972, Memcons (Originals). Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting took place in the Council of Ministers Building inside the Kremlin. Brackets are in the original. Brezhnev: But this is a very important matter. No other question could do so much to improve the situation and political atmosphere as this. No agreements on gas, on maritime shipping, can do so much to restrict war. No other leading statesmen will go down more in history than the one who signs this (agreement). The question is how to approach it. Our draft is a good one. We could go to lunch if you accept it. We took into account your draft;? I decided to send you a draft' so you could discuss it with the President before you left.

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Dr. Kissinger: I have no draft from you.

We had an opportunity to discuss the issue with the President, and we sent you some of our considerations, prior to coming here.

Brezhnev: In fact we began discussions on this here in Moscow.
Dr. Kissinger: In April ...

Brezhnev: After preliminary discussion with you and at the summit, we sent you a draft treaty. We have confirmed that there is general agreement and a desire to reach a solution. It is one of the decisions of paramount importance for our relations. It will be a great contribution to world détente and greater security not only for our people but worldwide. A good beginning was made in Moscow. Now the task is to elaborate and finalize a treaty. You gave us a draft and we gave a draft and received modifications from you. Now it is clear that our countries will never allow the use of nuclear weapons against one another, but we must give a clear-cut commitment on the way to act in possible situations.

[Noting paper in his hand] I was reading your paper and thought it was ours!

We can reply to your questions. Other questions are merely theoretical and will not arise in practice. One could think of 20 hypothetical questions of this kind, but they will never arise in practice. We should avoid those that never arise in practice.

A most important consideration is the use of force against each other and against each other's allies—as expressed in Article III. I agree with the President that the treaty must not look as if the two most powerful nations are dictating to the world. But this is between our two nations. The entire tonality reflects this. We proceed from the assumption that each has allies, you the NATO allies and we the Warsaw Pact allies.

Thus, if you agree we can go through the text. We can constitute an internal drafting commission. If we honestly fulfill our obligations the

3

2 Tab D, Document 30.

Brezhnev is apparently referring to the undated message from the Soviet leadership to Nixon, Document 35.

4 See Document 17.

other nations can be reassured. Your initial draft, as I recall, made an obligation "to create conditions in which use of nuclear weapons was not justified.” This formulation is not specific. After all we could say this and there would still be war. But our own draft says no interference in the internal affairs of the other ...

Dr. Kissinger: This is not in your draft.

Brezhnev: Your formulation is too loose. It is not binding. We need a document to present to parliaments. Of course some countries may not like it. Britain, France, Germany, China, Korea, whatever. But if our two countries agree, the UN will not find reason for criticism. We retain the right of self-defense. These are important pronouncements, in the interest of the U.S. and the Soviet Union that this be preserved. If only “every effort" is made, the results have less value, and give rise to doubts.

One idea came to me yesterday. Even if we sign an agreement on nuclear weapons, we might fight a conventional war. We could have 150 divisions and you 150 divisions and we could fight to a standstill. We could follow up this treaty with a treaty on non-use of force generally. If we two enter into a treaty, there can be no nuclear war in the future. Because no other power would resort to nuclear war. If we do not use nuclear weapons, no one else would dare to launch them. Certainly not France but they are not military allies of yours. If we now can proceed further, we could turn ourselves into editors and make a draft. Let us agree that bargaining is impossible. This does not relate to rubles. This is a matter of four points.

Alexandrov: The interpreter left out an important statement, that France is not likely to attack you!

Brezhnev: I have a suggestion. To enable you to have free time and attend an important function, we might have a break. We could meet at 5:30 and go to 10:00–11:30. We missed a meal yesterday but we felt light without our dinner.

Dr. Kissinger: What else will be discussed?
Brezhnev: SALT.
Gromyko: European Security.

Brezhnev: There was a party official named Svirsky. During the period when we took young people from villages to go to the countryside, not all were enthusiastic, and each gave reasons for not going. They came in for a hearing and explained their reasons. Svirsky said, I am in favor and you are against; we agree; you will go!

[The meeting adjourned until 6:00 p.m.]
Brezhnev: Why did Gromyko take so long to feed you?
Dr. Kissinger: He gave us a preview of his UN speech.
It took only two minutes.

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Brezhnev: We will not send him and save money.

Dr. Kissinger: He also agreed that when he makes the speech, he will wear a Nixon hat.

Brezhnev: He cannot wear a Nixon hat unless he gets paid. We will make some money. (To Gromyko:) Split 50-50.

We are in a better mood. When we get a settlement the mood improves. Why don't we follow this procedure: You say that all the questions that came up you agreed to. We are serious, not selfish; we do not seek any advantages.

Dr. Kissinger: But I make simple problems complicated.

Brezhnev: I have noticed that you have a special talent. If any question needs solving we can call on Dr. Kissinger to make it complicated and then settle it.

Dr. Kissinger: In that way I get the credit. You invent problems and then remove them. This is a political art.

Brezhnev: The complications are never explained, but the solutions are. I am happy to see Dr. Kissinger looking so well as when we started. I remember our discussing this with you the first time.

Dr. Kissinger: Those were important discussions.

Brezhnev: Yesterday and today ... When I went down to see you (last night] I thought I couldn't come out (without talking to you] ...

Dr. Kissinger: We were very close. We had to find ways to start a new initiative in all fields.

Brezhnev: We feel that the basic principle is to lay a foundation, that we began in the course of our bilateral discussions. It would have been quite improper to embark on the summit without looking ahead to see what the prospects were. We were right in splitting up the tasks and having separate discussions. In May we decided to have this question (non-use of nuclear weapons). The question is quite complicated. There have been many decades in building up tensions, and it is leading to bring matters back to normalcy, or better.

I endeavored in a rough way to set out the basic principles on the non-use of nuclear weapons. Let me not make a secret of the fact that it would not be justified to delay too long. I am not humoring you. But to add this to what has already been achieved would enhance the prestige of our two nations.

Dr. Kissinger: The President believes that our relations should be, and are, developing on the principle of reciprocity and equality in the interest of the peace in the world. He devotes more time to this than any other foreign policy question. We look at every problem, not only on its merits but on the basis of its contribution to the objective of relaxing tensions and developing cooperation. We have as a cardinal principle of our policy not to take advantage of tactical situations, but

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