Mr. Brezhnev: I too feel that the shortest road to achieve the goals that we have set for ourselves would be to formalize all we discussed the day before yesterday, yesterday, and today. Of course, our earlier talks have been useful but, if we could formalize them, it would be a useful step. Then the forthcoming visits, not just one but several, will create the atmosphere we wish and seek in our relations.

Dr. Kissinger: As the General Secretary said yesterday, we have never failed to come to agreement in these talks, and we won't interrupt this record now. As for repeated visits, and I say there's an element of selfishness in this, the President feels that the sooner the General Secretary comes to the United States, the sooner the President can return to the Soviet Union.

Mr. Brezhnev: That is indeed so.

Now I think we have certainly dealt with sufficient bilateral questions in the past two days, but we must be both alive to the fact that we conduct bilateral relations not in the stratosphere but in a world where quite a few states are looking at us and assessing our actions and assessing the general world situation. We must realize that all we do is against a background of events in Europe, the Middle East, and Vietnam. We cannot abstract ourselves from all of these events. Otherwise we would be misunderstood by the world at large.

Therefore, I want to say a few words about the Middle East and Vietnam. I don't want to repeat the acute but nevertheless just assessments that we said to President Nixon on Vietnam and the Middle East, even though it was perhaps unpleasant to say what we did.

But in concise form I do want to point out it is our earnest view that it serves the best interest of the United States and the U.S. Government and President Nixon, particularly in light of the forthcoming election, if Vietnam could be resolved as soon as possible because it has been going on far too long. Obviously it is one of the most unworthy, unpleasant, dark spots on the United States record. In all the years it has gone on it has yielded the United States nothing. Nor can it yield the U.S. anything as it goes on. I am sure you are aware of that fact. It is also necessary to point out to the President that, though he said at the election four years ago that he would negotiate an end to the Vietnam war during his first term, he is approaching the election with the war still on his hands and this circumstance is being exploited by his domestic opponent in the U.S. I don't want to interfere in U.S. internal affairs but it is a fact that the United States public is not indifferent to how things go in Vietnam. You are quite familiar with our position on Vietnam and there have been no changes. I recall our conversation with President Nixon.

President Nixon observed that Dr. Kissinger should do more thinking on Vietnam and that you should come up with something. We

saw this not as a jocular statement but a serious one. I know you are meeting with them soon and have met with them in the past. If you can inform us on the progress of the talks, I would be grateful and I can give you some of our thinking on the eve of your visit to Paris to meet with the North Vietnamese. It is a fact that the war in Vietnam and the actions there of the United States and the plan which the United States obviously has adopted, which is to settle the problem militarily, even though we have said 100 times that this is completely impossible, all this sometimes sadly complicates the relations between us and impedes the solution of certain issues for both of us. I do not reveal any secret if I say that.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, I am grateful for this opportunity to talk to you about Vietnam. We recognize you conduct your policy on a principled basis and therefore you are opposed to our course in Vietnam. Yet the Vietnam problem concerns us both, because not only are we both directly affected, but it also forces us to take steps regarding other countries which we otherwise would not take. It is not only a United States problem, but also a problem which concerns the whole world. I am prepared to talk with great frankness and in some detail, but I just wonder how much detail the General Secretary would like to hear.

Mr. Brezhnev: Just as you see fit. The important thing is not the history but the way you contemplate ending the war as President Nixon avowed that he was going to close this shameful chapter in your history.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me give you an explanation of where I think we stand concretely and then, if the General Secretary has any questions, he can raise them.

There are a number of things to keep in mind. First, the United States domestic situation. The General Secretary pointed out that the Vietnam situation affects our domestic situation adversely. As it turns out, it has proven to be a liability for our opponents. That is to say that the margin of support for the President is two to one. In May it was 44 percent to 41 percent, today it is 60–30. If one asks specific questions, the margin is even greater. For example, 58 percent to 18 percent disapprove of McGovern's statement about the bombing, and 51 percent to 26 percent disapprove his criticism regarding my travels on negotiations, and 76 percent to 21 percent believe President Nixon is doing everything possible to end the war. This is an example of our domestic situation. It does not affect our judgment. We were not affected when the polls were unfavorable, and we will not be affected now that they are favorable. We are not under pressure to end the war. The reason why we want an early end to the war is that it has become a senseless war

with the sacrifices out of proportion to what is being achieved. Therefore we are serious about ending the war.

Now let us go into the negotiations, and I will tell you exactly where we stand. First, I will discuss the basic problem. I have thought a great deal about why these negotiations have failed, why precisely this negotiation has failed, which we are most eager to conclude, while others with other countries have succeeded and many of them on more difficult issues.

When we talk to the General Secretary for example and with Soviet leaders, they are very tough, they defend their interests with great passion, but it is possible to set objectives and work towards them in stages. These objectives are allowed to animate the discussions themselves. By contrast, when we talk to the North Vietnamese, they behave as if we are settling a traffic accident in a police court. I understand the political issues are paramount to them, but they constantly try to close loopholes and they miss the strategic opportunity. I can't understand why as Marxists they cannot leave anything to the historical process. On May 31, 1971 we proposed a withdrawal within 9 months of a ceasefire and exchange of prisoners, and that nine month period was negotiable. It could have been six months. Instead we had a long philosophical discussion about the connection between political and military matters on which we wasted four months and they never seriously talked to us. I give this only as an example, and then I will go into the current negotiations.

Now let me discuss the current situation. The General Secretary said we want a military victory. This is not true. We want a negotiated settlement. The one thing we cannot accept is a proposition whereby we do the political work for the other side. Hanoi wants us to end the war, not by withdrawing our forces, which we are prepared to do, or by ending our military operations, which we are prepared to do, but by overthrowing the existing structure for another structure. Now they have a slightly different formulation, but I can show you how their political proposal would have the objective consequence of immediately imposing their preferred form of government on South Vietnam. We want to separate the military outcome from the political outcome, and we want to withdraw and start a political process whereby the Vietnamese can express themselves. We want the outcome to reflect Vietnamese conditions and not a United States imposition. If the DRV had any confidence in its own political strength, then it would not reject our position. No self-respecting country can accept what they are proposing. I will explain in detail how this comes about.

2 See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972, Document 207.

Now in addition, and I'm being very honest with you, they do many things which are extremely infuriating to us without doing them any good. They are releasing three prisoners of war to a peace group. If they had released them to us, it would have created a moral obligation on our part to reciprocate. Instead they are releasing them to a group with no significance in the United States. They are releasing them to this group which is a disadvantage to them because everyone knows they are doing this to exploit the situation for propaganda purposes.

The release will be, we think, on a Soviet plane, which is a disadvantage to our relations. If they release them to us, I can assure you we would have had to reciprocate.

Mr. Dobrynin: It is just a regular Soviet flight.

Dr. Kissinger: I know, but people won't realize that. If they had put them on an ICC plane to Vientiane, this would be a positive transaction.

For months they said we haven't responded to their seven points.3 On August 1 we responded point by point. We accepted six of them and we advanced a compromise formulation on the other. They didn't react at all. They in turn put forth ten points and seven principles.

On August 14 we accepted the seven principles and suggested they be signed as a document between us.5 They refuse to sign the principles we accepted and they had advanced as their own proposals. Then they say there is no progress. Now I understand their strategy is to pretend that there is a stalemate so that there is public pressure on us, and at the same time to have real progress in the negotiations. They have made it really difficult. Negotiating with the North Vietnamese is very difficult. I just wanted to explain this and then I propose to tell you about the negotiations, where do we stand and what we propose to do.

I want to make clear that on July 196 we proposed exactly what the President told the General Secretary we would propose, namely, a ceasefire and a resignation by President Thieu two months before the election, and they haven't even answered that. Now there is the following contradiction in their position: on the one hand they say we should withdraw and on the other hand they say we cannot withdraw until we have done their political work for them. On the one hand, they say we want a military victory, on the other hand they reject a ceasefire. They have rejected a total ceasefire; they have rejected an unconditional ceasefire; they have rejected a temporary ceasefire; they have rejected a

3 See ibid., Document 226.

4 See ibid., volume VIII, Vietnam, January-October 1972, Document 225.

reduction of hostilities. We are realists. We know that if we stopped certain activities, it would be hard to resume them.

Thirdly, they accuse us of not recognizing the PRG. Let us be realists. If a ceasefire took place, there would be de facto recognition of the PRG. It would establish clear areas of control, one for the PRG, and the other for Saigon. The most effective way to gain recognition of the political forces would be to do what the General Secretary suggested in May, namely, a ceasefire. If I may say so, if the North Vietnamese had accepted your idea and our proposal of a ceasefire which we made, they would be in an incomparably better position today than under existing circumstances.

Now where do we stand? I will tell you what we are going to tell them Friday in Paris, except for one point. We will propose a withdrawal of all our forces within three months of a settlement, that after a settlement Vietnam be neutral, a ceasefire and that after a settlement we are willing to accept a limit on military and economic aid in some relation to the military aid they accept. But we are also prepared to have a private undertaking with them afterwards about the extent of our aid. And we will table sweeping political proposals. We cannot do what they ask, which is to install their government. I will tell you frankly, we have spent a month of enormous controversy with Saigon about what to table on Friday, and it would be a mistake for the DRV to say that it is nothing, because neither public opinion nor President Nixon will have any further patience for negotiations. I will give Ambassador Dobrynin the full text Monday of my opening statement, but I feel morally obliged to table the proposal with the DRV first. You'll be able to judge for yourself. We have gone to the absolute maximum and accepted many of their principles.

Now what is the real issue? The real issue isn't the paper that will be signed. They want guarantees, but what are the facts? Dulles didn't go into Asia because of how the Geneva Accords were drafted. He went in because of the objective tendencies of our policy and because he drew lines against his concern over the Communist world. The United States is not looking for an excuse to go into Indochina; we are looking for an excuse to get out. It is absurd to believe that if we can coexist with Moscow, that we cannot coexist with Hanoi. If we can work out agreements with the General Secretary of the world's largest Communist party and one of the most powerful countries in the world,

7 September 15; See ibid., Documents 262 and 263.

8 John Foster Dulles, U.S. Secretary of State, 1953-1959.

9 The Geneva Accords were a collection of agreements rather than a single document. For these agreements, see Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, volume XVI, The Geneva Conference, pp. 1505-1539.