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in the discusat 5, that as Mostra

This is particularly a problem in relation to Japan. In recent discussions with the Japanese Foreign Minister18 we gained the impressionagain this is very personal—that there are some tendencies in Japanese politics that believe that we should base our China policy on Taipei and that Japan should base its China policy on Peking. We would take care of the defense of Taiwan, and they would take care of the relations with mainland China and form a sort of détente. And they would kindly offer in that situation to act as a broker.

If such a shortsighted policy were being pursued then perhaps we might see the large industrial capacity of the one together with the more subtle views of the other, which would be a formidable combination. And this development could even have an orientation based on racial grounds rather than political grounds. If that were to occur, we believe a serious situation could arise for both of us.

We believe that it is in both of our interests that Japan's relations in the Far East not be tied exclusively to one country, but also to others such as the Soviet Union. This is why investment in resources has a certain political significance and not only an economic significance.

So we will, of course, continue our relations with the People's Republic and have periodic exchanges and periodic visits there-less frequent than in the past year—and periodic exchange of views. We are in no sense synchronizing our policies and in no case will we conduct our policy in a manner that could be directed, or indirectly considered to be directed, against the Soviet Union.

We are prepared to exchange views with you on the long-range tendencies that might affect the peace of the world and the security of our two countries.

Mr. Brezhnev: Well, we must, of course, sober-mindedly assess the situation here, and it is a fact that developments in the world situation, and first and foremost in our relationships, are influenced by the Chinese question. We sometimes mention China directly; more often we keep it in mind mentally. We have certainly duly assessed the statement made by the President and other Americans' statements regarding the priority of US-Soviet relations in American foreign policy, and that is indeed our impression. At the same time it has to be said that China is certainly not enthusiastic over the improvement of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States.

[Dr. Kissinger interjected that "that was putting it mildly"—this was not translated.]

They do not like our taking the line of our developing our relations to mutual advantage in friendship and cooperation. If one assesses the

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present policies of the Chinese, they are primarily aimed against the positive processes now underway in Soviet-American relations. From all that is published in the press and from the information provided by our ambassadors, Peking has taken a negative attitude to the recent Soviet-American summit meeting in Moscow. According to Peking's comments, our relationships are nothing but collusion between two superpowers, and this line can be seen not only in the direct assessment of our direct relations but also concerning the European Conference, German affairs, the Middle East, etc. In short, any bilateral contract is interpreted by them to be collusion.

Dr. Kissinger: The Secretary General may want to know ... (not translated).

Mr. Brezhnev: If I might just continue.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes, it's better.

Mr. Brezhnev: The entire trend of Chinese policies is directed toward ranging the United States against the Soviet Union and is aimed at our becoming involved in confrontation with one another. I recall a slogan uttered by Mao here in Moscow the last time he was here for an international conference. [Quoting the Chinese saying] “I sit on the mountain and watch two tigers fighting."

That is the precise policy the Chinese are pursuing. They are claiming to play a dominant role in world politics. But there are various slogans the Chinese use to justify their position, such as their slogan about the world village against the world city.

Dr. Kissinger: That was Lin Piao.

Mr. Brezhnev: All this reaffirms that same trend. On the other hand, we have not been, nor are we now, for isolation of China in the world. The position taken by the Supreme Party organ, the Party Congress, is that we favor normal Soviet relations with China. Nor are we against the development of relations between the U.S. and China. Of course, we are not indifferent to the basis on which these relations develop.

I am happy to accept the statement that you made, Dr. Kissinger, on this score against the background of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States on the one hand and the United States and China on the other hand. All sorts of guesswork is involved in various quarters. Some people talk about various triangles and quadrangles and various other geometric figures. Some people endeavor to act on the sly concerning these problems. It is a certain fact that China's policy is mainly spearheaded against the Soviet Union. A great deal is due to the various internal problems and instability in China.

This is confirmed by events connected with Lin Piao. I wish to say here confidentially a few words about Lin Piao's fate.

Lin was in disagreement with Mao's policy and when things had come to a head he tried to escape from China aboard an aircraft. We have made a thorough investigation of all the circumstances surrounding the plane crash. Perhaps the plane ran out of fuel or there was engine trouble or perhaps they had time to shoot at it and knock it down ... anyway, it fell on the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic, and the Mongolians invited our experts there. We made an investigation—we have all the expert photos and documents. Our people investigated the whole thing.

Actually in China his daughter betrayed him; when the conflict came to a head he was betrayed by his daughter. As for this information on his daughter, we don't take that at face value—that is Chinese information.

Dr. Kissinger: The rest is yours.

Mr. Brezhnev: We had treated Lin Piao earlier when he came to Moscow for medical treatment; we have documents in the files; X-rays of his teeth, etc. It is confirmed definitely that the body is Lin Piao's, probably together with some members of his family. It proves beyond a doubt that Lin Piao was in the plane that crashed. Some in China now try to spread incorrect versions of what was supposed to happen. The crash was a fact and so was Lin Piao's

presence. I mention this to show that there is very serious internal dissension in China. It is still a country with an unstable internal situation. There is a need for us to follow closely the events in China, both the domestic situation and the foreign policy. But we are at the same time endeavoring to pursue principle, to follow a policy aimed at friendship with the Chinese people.

I would agree with what you say, that we should follow events closely and endeavor to prevent too great a rapprochement. The combination of Japan and China, a combination which could rest on nationalistic, racial principles, such a combination could indeed play a pernicious role in that area of the world.

I also want to say that the development of good relations between the Soviet Union and Japan would not in any way run counter to the interests of the United States. Considering our attitude toward Japan specifically, our policy cannot and will not be against the interests of American-Japanese relations, and we will continue negotiations with Japan regarding the treaty between the two countries with that principle in mind.

It is quite clear that China will attempt to do all it can to impede our relationship with you and also with Japan, and we will certainly have to act proceeding from these facts.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me make a few comments on this, if you permit me. We know curiously little about the domestic developments

you will

in China. In all our visits there we see only a particular group of leaders. Therefore we are very grateful for the information you have provided, and you can be sure that it will be treated in the strictest confidence and told to nobody but the President. Whenever you believe that information is useful, it will be treated in the same way and with the same people.

Secondly, concerning the two tigers fighting. It is a settled principle of our policy that this will not happen. On the contrary, we have discussed sufficiently at these meetings how we want to adopt an exactly contrary course and not permit any country to put us against each other. So we are very much aware of this.

Thirdly, we are occasionally asked by other countries what their course should be. For example, Bahr, which I very confidentially mentioned to the Ambassador, asked us sometime ago what our view was on the Federal Republic of Germany's relationship with the People's Republic. We answered, of course, that this was a matter of domestic jurisdiction and sovereignty for the Federal Republic. I added that we thought that the weight of their interests lay in Europe and not outside of Europe. We thought that we made that basic view fairly clear.

Concerning Japan, we agree that the improvement of your relations with Japan will not be at the expense of our relations with Japan. We therefore encourage not only the development of economic relations between you and Japan, but also a peace treaty between Japan and the Soviet Union.

And finally we will, of course, continue normalizing relations with the People's Republic at a not extremely fast rate. We will do nothing to discourage an improvement in their relations with you, and we will consider that a positive development and not one we have any interest in impeding.

I want to thank the Secretary General for having spoken with such frankness, and we will always reciprocate in the same spirit.

Mr. Brezhnev: The Chinese have a very tight, small group of leaders. If anyone tries to meet you without authority ... (Brezhnev gestures as though he were cutting off his neck with his hand.] During the time of the Cultural Revolution they ranged twenty men in the public square and executed them in public. It is a country where marshals could be put in cages and carried around and beaten up.

Dr. Kissinger: Really? I didn't know that. [Not translated.]
Mr. Brezhnev: Of course, this is for the President's information.

Dr. Kissinger: Only for him. You can be sure that it will not be given to anyone else.

Mr. Brezhnev: There may come a time when we wish to make a public statement on this.

Dr. Kissinger: That is your privilege. You can do with the information what you wish. Until you publicize it, we will keep it confidential.

Mr. Brezhnev: I hadn't anticipated that we would be discussing the case of Lin. Next time you come, I will show you all the documents and photos.

Dr. Kissinger: That would be very interesting.
Mr. Brezhnev: It would seem that our discussion is nearing a close.
Dr. Kissinger: Correct.

Mr. Brezhnev: Just a few words on Korea. The last time we had a discussion on this subject, and we communicated to the Koreans that this time they should not raise the issue at the UN. I am not going into the details, but recent information from the Koreans is that they insist on the Korea issue being on the agenda of the UN General Assembly but they agree that the issue be debated after the United States elections, that is to say during the second half of the General Assembly. Perhaps you could consider this and convey it to President Nixon.

Dr. Kissinger: I will and I will study that constructive position.

Mr. Brezhnev: Finally, perhaps not for the record, I was very sensitive to the facts that relate to the Jackson Amendment regarding the Moscow treaty. It appears that his actions were concerted in advance. I am speaking in a personal way. Then there is another fact that deeply affected me. You appropriated large sums of money for new strategic arms at an accelerated pace. I am not saying this for discussion, but I hope that in future talks some attention will be devoted to this matter because we have a freeze and an agreement to make the interim agreement a permanent one. When we agree that one agenda item will be on non-use and then comes the United States decision to spend increased money on arms—it is only tomorrow that I will tell my comrades that I raised the matter with you. It is not proper to discuss it now but it is just my feeling that this runs counter to the spirit of earlier talks.

I think the talks were useful and I thank you personally for your constructive approach and your patience, and your efforts to make these talks productive. This has been a good meeting and I hope that all we discuss will become reality. In October we will announce the Lend Lease agreement and so forth. In short all that we discussed here will bear fruit. I convey my best wishes to President and Mrs. Nixon and you will bring him a personal memento. As for a personal note, I have not had time to write, and I will give it to you before you leave if I have time.

Dr. Kissinger: First, regarding the Jackson Amendment, to do the subject justice I would have to go into all of its intricacies. If it passes the

19 See footnote 2, Document 23.

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