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recently elected candidate member of the Politburo, Ponomarev, insisted on the need for a flexible approach in pursuing the international interests of the socialist camp and condemned those who "arbitrarily interpret" the international duty of socialist states. These apologetics were certainly aimed at foreign critics of the summit, but the language was broad enough to be applicable to unconvinced Soviets. Public lectures in Moscow and Leningrad showed the skepticism of many Soviet citizens. In his speech on 27 June during Castro's visit to the USSR, Brezhnev firmly reasserted the Soviet Union's support of revolutionary forces in the world.

Perhaps in part to satisfy the conservatives, the regime continued its push for discipline in domestic affairs that had begun before the President's visit. Several moves concerning the cultural bureaucracies brought greater central and party control over the arts and education. In two speeches before propagandists in June, Suslov prescribed an unflagging battle against bourgeois propaganda and influence and against such social evils as drunkenness, greed, sloth, nationalism, and chauvinism. On 21 June the regime capped the arrests of dissidents earlier in the year with the detention of an important leader of the dissident movement, Petr Yakir.

As in the past, however, the authorities brought themselves no peace by these actions. Immolations and rioting in Lithuania in May were a disturbing sign of minority national feelings in this 50th year of the formation of the Soviet Union, which is being celebrated inter alia as a victory of Soviet nationality policies. Academician Sakharov continued to issue public challenges to the regime on questions of human rights. The fees for schooling slapped on would-be emigrants in August demonstrated the difficulties the leadership is having in coping with the consequences of the growing Jewish exodus, especially as it affects the educated classes.

The concomitant to the peace program announced at the Party Congress was the promise of a new era for the Soviet consumer. Its bases were an ambitious investment program in agriculture, including livestock production, and less precisely defined measures concerning the production and distribution of consumer goods. During the summer, however, it became clear that significant progress in these fields would be delayed. Since Brezhnev is closely identified with these programs, he has a personal stake in how profound and prolonged these economic difficulties turn out to be in the months ahead. In his tour of the Virgin Lands, he was seeking a successful harvest and, no doubt, doing some personal politicking among regional leaders.

Heavy purchases of foreign grain to offset a disappointing harvest will make it more difficult for the Soviet Union to make purchases abroad for other sectors of the economy and may tend to sharpen ri

valry between various interest groups. Gosplan is reported already to have placed restrictions on hard currency outlays for consumer goods. At mid-year, growth of industrial production was sagging, and performance in consumer durables and in soft goods and processed foods was lackluster. According to recent reports, some work slowdowns occurred in Moscow in August. In the past such strikes have been triggered by increased work norms. Scattered strikes could also reflect workers' concern over the adequacy of food supplies this fall and winter. Discontent might grow if supplies of consumer goods become more limited.


Message From the President's Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Kissinger) to the President's Deputy Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Haig)1

London, September 14, 1972, 0825Z.

Hakto 27. 1. I read your cable with the incredulity that tends to accompany my reading of the Washington mood on the trips. Does anyone, in his right mind, believe I can bring something home on the Jewish issue?? Has everyone forgotten that we are charged with the foreign policy of the U.S.? On the other hand I think a call by Humphrey and Javits on Dobrynin might be helpful.3

2. Here is what has repeat has been accomplished:

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 24, HAK Trip Files, HAK's Germany, Moscow, London, Paris Trip, Sep. 9-15, 1972, HAKTO 1-35. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The message is incorrectly dated September 4. A stamped notation on the message indicates it was received at 4:58 a.m. on September 14. After departing Moscow, Kissinger stopped in London on September 14 to meet with British Prime Minister Edward Heath.

2 In a message on September 13, Haig wrote Kissinger: "The President has not commented on the progress reports I gave him but there is obviously no worrying going on with respect to what you may or may not be doing in Moscow. The general impression I get is that the President and at least Haldeman are very anxious for you to come home with as good a package as you can get. I do think that the President hopes that you will have been able to get some Soviet assurances on the Soviet Jewry problem. As you know, the staff will not leave him alone." (Ibid., TOHAK 1–116)

3 In message Tohak 82, Haig wrote Kissinger that "Senator Javits called me last night" and said that "he and Senator Humphrey have been urged by their Senate colleagues to see Dobrynin and make a formal Senatorial démarche. I told Javits it would be best to hold up on any such action, and in any event Dobrynin was in Moscow and that such a démarche should not be made at the Ministerial level. Javits agreed and this issue, which is approaching a boiling point, should remain under control until you return.” (Ibid.)

A) A settlement of the lend-lease issue.

B) A breakthrough in the trade negotiations in which we are getting ninety percent of our maximum program

C) A date for opening SALT.

D) A break in the deadlock on MBFR and CSE so that both conferences can be announced next month.

E) Very satisfactory talks on Vietnam.

F) Major progress on next year's summit.

G) Other crucial matters to be discussed when I return.

3. In these circumstances, to wait with a briefing by me till Monday is madness. A briefing on Saturday would enable me

A) To emphasize the President's role in these negotiations and focus attention on his relation to Brezhnev.

B) Set the frame-work without killing the October announcements. C) Get ahead of the power curve on speculation; in short do what the briefings in the summit week did.

4. Failure to brief on Saturday would

A) Enable each Department to get out what was achieved and their version of what was attainable.

B) Enable each Department to claim credit for itself.

C) Get so much speculation started that we will never catch up with it again.

5. In other words, please go back to Haldeman and the President on this. Rogers will be no happier either way. The President should understand that he is on the threshold of the greatest spurt in foreign policy since the summit and that it has to be properly set up with him as the focal point.5

Warm regards.

* Monday, September 18. In message Hakto 20 to Haig, September 13, Kissinger wrote: "I think I should brief press Saturday a.m. [September 16] before they run wild." (Ibid., HAKTO 1-35) Haig wrote Kissinger in message Tohak 82 that Haldeman "believes that you should have the press conference on Monday, after staying at Camp David Friday night and ostensibly reporting to the President both Friday night and Saturday morning. In this way, we will get both the weekend play and an early week heavy play riding the communiqué and the Q's and A's out until Monday. In a substantive sense, I also support this game plan since we are bound to have some bureaucratic problems with Rogers and Peterson and there could be some additional problems develop with our NATO allies which could be put more effectively to rest after some delay between the surfacing of the communiqué and the consultations and the Monday press briefing."

5 In message Tohak 97, September 14, Haig informed Kissinger "the President agreed that you can proceed on Saturday. He insisted, however, that you could only do so after you brief Rogers and at first insisted that you see Rogers before you see him to keep him out of a tense meeting with the two of you. I insisted that he see you first and he finally agreed." (Ibid., TOHAK 1–116) According to Kissinger's Record of Schedule, on September 16, he met with Rogers for breakfast from 7:25 to 8:08 a.m., met with the President from 9:46 to 10:42 a.m., and held his press briefing at 11:33 a.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1967-76) Records of the meetings were not found. The news conference was reported in The New York Times, September 17, 1972, p. 1.

Economic Normalization and Soviet Jewish
Emigration, September-December 1972

47. Editorial Note

On September 18, 1972, President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger phoned Senator Hubert Humphrey (D-MN) to discuss the issue of exit fees for Jewish emigrants from the Soviet Union. The transcript of their telephone conversation reads in part: "K[issinger]: Nice to talk to you. I'm calling you about the letter you wrote the President a week or so ago about the Jewish problem in the Soviet Union. H[umphrey]: Yes. K: And I just wanted to tell you personally I don't want to have it made public that I did raise it in a number of meetings. H: Fine, Henry. K: The problem is that I think we've got to lower the visibility of the debate because they can't yield to pressures from a foreign country. I'm not saying they're going to yield anyway. I'm not asking you to lower this. H: Listen, I understand that. K: As a government we have to do it in as quiet a way as we can. We could score a lot of points in the campaign by saying what I said and to whom I said it. H: Yes. K: But we're not going to say anything publicly. I wanted you to know though that something has been done.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Telephone Conversations (Telcons), Box 15, Chronological File)

On September 21, Kissinger phoned Secretary of Commerce Peterson regarding the protests of Senators Percy, Ribicoff, and apparently Javits about the Soviet exit tax. According to the transcript of the conversation, Kissinger told Peterson: "everyone's feeling here-including my own-is we just don't want-it's just not easy to have a discussion with these three guys. I am going to get it quieted down by Rabin. My experience with Percy is when he says he'll help, he says something that hurts. He is running for reelection and I don't think he is going to do anything that would hurt him. P[eterson]: What do you think about Ribicoff? K: I think Rabin can handle Ribicoff, but I don't see what there is to gain from Ribicoff. I am going to talk to Javits alone today." Noting that "a guy named Vanik [Congressman Charles Vanik (D-OH)] is putting a rider on the foreign aid bill," Kissinger said that it "would be useful" if "we could try to stop them from putting on legislation long before MFN ever comes up." The transcript continues: “K: But I just don't think you can do it with that gang. I mean they are the less likely group-Ribicoff is a devout Jew and on what basis is he not going to do it? P: Well, is there anything you can tell him about what you said to the Soviets? Part of it is they don't think we're doing anything. K: Well, my frank opinion is I would just as soon isolate them

gradually and we will get them through the Israelis. P: Uh-humm. Do you get any response, Henry, from the Soviets on what their attitude is? K: Well, I think if we all would shut up, there's a chance of getting them-slowing down the administrative implementation." (Ibid., Box 16, Chronological File)

On September 21 at 3:11 p.m., Congressman Leslie Arends (R-IL) (misidentified as Aarons in the original transcript) phoned Kissinger: "A[rends]: I hate to bother you but you know about the Vanik Amendment which he is going to offer to this- K: Oh, about the Jews? A: Yeah. K: Well, in rough terms. A: The unfortunate part about it though-Gerry [Gerald R. Ford, House Minority Leader (R-MI)] and I have just been sitting here trying to figure out something-Gerry will be back in a minute-is that the Parliamentarian is apparently going to say that this is germane. That's hard for me to believe, but this is the last word. And I'd like to read this thing to you in just a minute. It says, 'None of the funds appropriated or made available pursuant to this Act for carrying out the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, may be used to provide loans, credits, financial and investment assistance or insurance guarantees on sales to or investments in any nation which requires payment above nominal and customary costs for exit visas, permits, or for the right to emigrate.' This is tough. K: You know our view on this. A: I know the view on the thing. Now the question is in my mind and that Gerry and I discussed is did you get hold of Rabin yesterday? K: Well, the one thing I cannot afford is to have spread all over the Capitol Hill whatever I may discuss with Rabin. A: That's right, that's right. And we don't want you to tell us what Rabin said or anything but I mean you were going to― K: I have talked with him and will work on him. A: Alright. K: But for Christ's sake, don't mention it." (Transcript of telephone conversation, September 21; ibid.)

At 3:19 p.m. on September 21, Kissinger phoned Israeli Ambassador to the United States Yitzhak Rabin: "K: Mr. Ambassador, I have just been told that Congressman Vanik is putting forward a Resolution cutting off all assistance, guarantees and so forth to any country that has emigration fees. R[abin]: Congressman? K: Vanik. And I'm getting desperate [calls] from Gerry Ford and others saying they're all being put into a horrible fix. I really believe this is going to backfire against the Jewish Community as soon as people get their breath. R: I should say to you I know it's not so easy to find out because as a matter of fact I'm not aware of any real demand by any Jewish organization about it." Kissinger noted that "our people are really getting concerned and I don't know what you can do and I don't want you to do any one thing." Kissinger mentioned "general public pressure," and added, "people don't mind, but if it happens to help the opposition candidate—.” Rabin replied, "I understand." (Transcript of telephone conversation;

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