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Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National
Washington, September 21, 1972.
ment on 122 the earliest
Lend-Lease Negotiations with the USSR
The President wishes you to be aware of the following additional details related to his decisions promulgated in NSDM 190/CIEPDM 12:2
- The total Soviet obligation to the United States referred to in numbered Paragraph One of that memorandum has been agreed with the Soviets to be $725 million.
-The President does not wish this sum, nor the amount of annual lend-lease installments deriving therefrom to be inserted in the agreement, or referred to in the lend-lease negotiations, until the final stage of those negotiations.
In instructing the U.S. Negotiator, the President has asked that you keep the above in mind so that the U.S. Negotiating Team will implement NSDM 190/CIEPDM 12 accordingly. He has emphasized that knowledge of the fact that a figure has been agreed upon should be held exclusively to you.
Henry A. Kissinger
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 495, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 13. Top Secret; Nodis; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only.
2 Document 49.
Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National
Washington, September 26, 1972.
Handling of Soviet Non-Use of Force Resolution in the UN
The Soviets have now completed the preliminaries for introducing a General Assembly Resolution on the renunciation of the use of force and the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. They have made oral démarches to us and other UN members seeking support and have left the usual aide mémoire.? Under normal circumstances, the Soviet item would go to the First Committee, where the debate will occur, as it did last year on their World Disarmament Conference item.?
Given the nature and intent of the Soviet proposal we can expect certain fireworks between the Chinese and the Soviets in the debate. The question is what position the United States should take.
Thus far the Department of State, without White House clearance, has, as expected, issued totally negative instructions with the following points (Tab A):4
—the proposed Soviet resolution will not add anything to the UN Charter;
-restating Charter language tends to detract from the Charter, if the language varies;
-we have strong reservations about calling on the Security Council to make GA Resolutions binding;
-injection of this issue into the Security Council is likely to result in an acrimonious debate and harm the Council's effectiveness (sic);
1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 720, Country Files-Europe—USSR, Vol. XXV. Secret. Sent for action. Concurred in by Fernando Rondon, NSC Staff member for African and UN Affairs. Haig wrote at the top of the memorandum, “thru Haig."
2 For Vorontsov's oral démarche urging U.S. support for the Soviet draft resolution introduced in the General Assembly on September 26, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume E-2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1969–1972, Documents 341 and 342. The text of the draft resolution is ibid., Document 344.
3 In September 1971, the Soviet Union introduced a resolution seeking to place on the agenda of the UN General Assembly a proposal to convene a World Disarmament Conference. See ibid., Documents 336–340. General Assembly Resolution 2833 was adopted on December 16.
Attached but not printed is telegram 173183 to USUN, September 20. For text, see ibid., Document 341.
-we are "concerned" about Gromyko's proposed exception to the effect that people of "oppressed colonial countries” could legitimately use all available means;
—we think the way to make recourse to force less likely is to pursue genuine and constructive negotiations.
These are standard debating points, but clearly negative. Presumably, this is the line we will take in any debates, but how we might vote is another matter. We would probably abstain, if there is no further guidance from the White House, and might support it if there is wide support in the GA.
The problem is that by taking a negative line we tend to range ourselves on the side of the opponents who, in addition to the Chinese, may be quite small in number and oppose a proposition that is certain to pass, at least in the GA.
On the other hand, it would be too cynical to support the Soviet proposal, which, though probably harmless as a UN resolution, accomplishes little and has some anti-Chinese overtones.
One way out may be to use the constitutional argument that the Security Council not be involved, and in the debate take the position that we support the idea and principle but see no need for further reiteration by the General Assembly. We could indicate that we will abstain, if the item proves contentious in debate.
In any case, we need guidance on how you want to handle it: 1. By requesting cables for clearance:
-this runs certain risks and is tiresome, but the most direct way of controlling the tactics.
2. By asking for a position paper and holding an SRG:
— this allows the establishment of control, through post SRG NSDM, etc., but takes some time and will probably yield no new ideas.
3. Issuing instructions now on how to deal with it along the lines described above (i.e., relative neutralism with the intention of abstaining). Recommendation
That you indicate how you prefer to proceed:
Memorandum for the President's File by the President's
New York, September 26, 1972, 4:40 p.m.
President's Meeting with Jewish Leaders
-As for the problem of Soviet Jews and the emigration tax, the problem has always been what is actually the best way to help the Russian Jews. It is clear that if we make this an issue of prestige or a test of manhood between ourselves and the Soviets, the Soviets will only dig in their heels and the situation will become worse. The Soviets are well aware of our views on this issue, from the Presidential level on down. It is, however, impossible to make public all the facets of this complex and troublesome problem. In this instance, there had to be a degree of trust in America's leadership. Above all, the issue does not lend itself to politicization in the domestic environment. Certainly, the objective observer must understand that the emigration of Soviet Jews thus far has been no accident. In the long run, the improvement of relations between the Soviet Union cannot but have an ameliorating effect on the welfare of the Soviet Jews themselves, whereas an abrupt test of the So
1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 720, Country Files-Europe—USSR, Vol. XXV, September 1972 [1 of 3). Secret. The meeting took place in the Carpenter's Suite at the Waldorf Astoria in New York. The original is incorrectly dated September 27. On September 25, Kissinger forwarded a set of talking points to Nixon for the meeting. In a covering memorandum, Kissinger wrote: “Given the natural tendency of any group such as this with a strong special interest to over-interpret what they hear, it seems to me important to stay fairly close to the suggested talking points." (Ibid.) Kissinger also spoke with Rabin, September 25, telling him: “One other thing as long as I have you on the phone, the President is very nervous about this meeting with the Jewish leaders tomorrow. I don't know whether you have any influence on them to keep them from harassing him too much.” Rabin replied: “I don't believe there will be any harassment there. They'll ask questions. I think what they'll try-two of them talked to me and they would like practically to get the ... If he could start with a few words rather than to let them set a tone, if I may advise." Kissinger replied: "Right.” (Transcript of telephone conversation, September 25; ibid., Kissinger Telephone Conversations (Telcons), Box 15, Chronological File)
Attached but not printed. The list is also in the President's Daily Diary. (Ibid., White House Central Files)
viet leadership which constitutes a challenge to a principle which they, themselves, consider to be an internal matter can only complicate the situation.
At this point, the group asked several questions. Rabbi Klapperman went into a lengthy exposition of the importance of taking positive action to improve the plight of Soviet Jews who in the face of the Soviet head tax could spend a lifetime accumulating funds before they could hope to emigrate. The President reiterated the need for trust, and emphasized his compassionate feelings for this humanitarian dilemma. He also noted his strong opposition to the so-called quota system which, if applied here in the United States, would give him no more than a quarter of a Kissinger in a key advisory role!
At the conclusion of the meeting, the President invited the participants to bring their problems at any time to General Haig or Dr. Kissinger. The meeting adjourned."
3 According to a synopsis of the meeting prepared by Lawrence Y. Goldberg, Nixon concluded the meeting by saying: “I very much appreciate your concern. I am aware of the facts that you have mentioned. We are in the closest touch with the situation. The Prime Minister says—we will trust you, but we will watch you, too. Today, a little girl handed me a note at the Statue of Liberty. It asked that I do something to get her uncle out of the U.S.S.R. I am thinking about that little girl. Trust me and my motives. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, President's Office Files, Box 90, Memoranda for the President, Beginning September 24, 1972)
Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National
Washington, September 29, 1972.
Dark Side of US-Soviet Relations
The seemingly routine telegram at Tab A2 offers a reminder of the Soviets' continuing “Cold War" approach to the United States' modest
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 67, Country Files-Europe-USSR, Map Room, Aug. 1972-May 31, 1973,3 of 3. Confidential; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for action.
2 Attached but not printed is telegram 9846 from Moscow, September 27.