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FM Gromyko: No one knows about this.
Dr. Kissinger: Except the English. I also mentioned it very vaguely to Bahr, but I didn't show him anything.
FM Gromyko: And his comment was?
Dr. Kissinger: He didn't know enough about it to say anything. But he was quite positive. Incidentally we are having him over here and having pictures taken, before the German election.
Our biggest problem still is with the nature of the document, whether it is a treaty, an agreement, or a declaration-and secondly, the nature of the obligation that should be stated. We think we have made some progress in the second paragraph.
Ambassador Dobrynin: I like that, we took it from his declaration and he says it is progress!
Dr. Kissinger: Frankly, between the President's attention to the campaign and my attention to Vietnam, we have not had as intensive a time to devote to other matters as we wished. On Vietnam, since no one else knows anything, I have to do it. What we have done is—it is still in the form of a declaration, but we can discuss this. We have taken into account your concerns about actions by third countries. This is paragraph 1. (He hands over U.S. draft at Tab D. Gromyko and Dobrynin read it.)
We have added a new sentence. We “intend to work toward the establishment of binding obligations whereby the use of nuclear weapons would be effectively precluded."
FM Gromyko: But it still only a goal. It is only “intend."
Dr. Kissinger: We can strengthen it, to make it "will." (Marks on his own copy.)
FM Gromyko (to Dobrynin in Russian]: It is not right, it is completely not right. This is sad. (To Dr. Kissinger in English] Let me be frank. It looks like the President and you are changing. This is certainly not in the spirit of the preliminary exchange between the President and the General-Secretary in Moscow. It is weaker than the basic declaration signed in Moscow.
Dr. Kissinger: Our intention was not to be weaker but to make a step forward. The President will tell you this. The problem is we have difficulty going as far as you want.
FM Gromyko: It is weaker.
Dr. Kissinger: Then that is bad drafting. It was certainly not our intention to make it weaker.
FM Gromyko: But nothing is done. There is no obligation, there is not the slightest sign of our Article 1"7 reflected in this. [To Dobrynin in Russian) Nothing of it remains.
Dr. Kissinger: That was not our intent. I think that a declaration that we intend to establish a binding obligation is a step forward. This was certainly not in the basic principles.
FM Gromyko: I think not, because it means that now they are afraid to undertake an obligation. This is tantamount to justifying the use of nuclear weapons.
Ambassador Dobrynin: Why is it so difficult for you to accept this? Do you intend to use it?
Dr. Kissinger: Obviously not. Because our allies are more dependent in their conception on the use of nuclear weapons in their own defense.
Ambassador Dobrynin: But this is covered by Article 3 about existing alliances,
Dr. Kissinger: Article 2 is a considerable improvement. Let us do the following: I understand your point. You think that anything that does not create a binding obligation is not a great advance. Instead of playing around with Article 1 we should consider the basic idea of Article 1—the binding obligation—and put the qualifications in the other Articles. I know you are not inviting qualifications, but your point is that if it is worth doing at all it must have a binding obligation in it and if we need qualifications we should propose those and put them in elsewhere. That's what you are saying.
FM Gromyko: Absolutely right.
Dr. Kissinger: If so, we have been looking at it in the wrong way. We have been trying to modify Article 1. We should see if we can essentially accept Article 1 and then go through the rest of the document.
17 Article I of the latest Soviet draft, handed by Dobrynin to Kissinger on September 21, reads: “The Soviet Union and the United States of America undertake not to use nuclear weapons against each other. Accordingly the Soviet Union and the United States will build their relations so that they should not contradict the obligation assumed by the sides under this Article." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 495, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 13)
Article III of the latest Soviet draft reads: "N ng in this Treaty shall affect the obligations undertaken by the parties toward other states, or any obligations under the Charter of the United Nations. The Treaty shall not affect the right of individual or collective self-defense, as provided for in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations."
19 Article II of the Soviet draft reads: “The Soviet Union and the United States shall prevent such a situation when, as a result of actions by third states, they would find themselves involved in a collision with the use of nuclear weapons. In case of a military conflict involving states—not parties to this Treaty, the Soviet Union and the United States shall apply all efforts to prevent an outbreak of nuclear war.” (Ibid.)
FM Gromyko: There are plenty of qualifications already in the document.
Dr. Kissinger: I know you are not inviting qualifications. I prefer if you would not consider this as our formal reply.
FM Gromyko: You'll have a new paper before I leave New York?
Dr. Kissinger: You can say, as the President will say to you, we will still consider it very seriously. You have answered many of our concerns. We have not had an opportunity to devote much time to it, so we now have to face Article 1. There is no way around it.20 What you have now given us makes it easier for us to consider Article 1.
FM Gromyko: When do I get a definite answer?
Dr. Kissinger: Definitely in November. Frankly, it depends on when I can get a day or half a day with the President alone to go over the details with him. There are many other issues on which I have wide latitude because I know his views. But on this one, I will have to discuss it with him.
FM Gromyko: Alright. Now the Middle East. I would like to listen to you. I remember what you said to the General-Secretary and the Prime Minister.
Dr. Kissinger: As I told Anatoliy, we think we know how we might get a settlement with Jordan, but we don't think it is a good idea to have a separate settlement with Jordan. So we think a settlement with Egypt is the heart of the problem. We have not spoken with anyone. We are not aware of any secret Israeli plan, whatever you may read, or any secret Israeli/Egyptian talks.
Our view is that it is important to make an initial major step with respect to Egypt. I was never wild about the idea of an interim settlement but I believe the biggest problem is to get Israel to make an initial step back. The longer it stays the way it is, the harder it will be. Therefore, we should try to get the situation into a state of flux. Without a final determination, we should approach the problem from a standpoint of security, of security zones, without raising the issue of sover
20 Sonnenfeldt forwarded a revised draft text to Kissinger on September 27, along with two other variants. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 67, Country Files-Europe-USSR, Map Room, Aug. 1972-May 31, 1973, 3 of 3)
eignty. For example, the notion that Egyptian sovereignty extends up to the 1967 borders but for a certain period the Sinai will be divided into zones—one zone where both sides can station their forces, other zones where there can be some patrolling but no stationed forces, and maybe a buffer zone between them. Thus, for example, Sinai could be divided into five regions. In that event Egyptian civil administration would extend immediately to the borders.
I doubt Israel would accept this. In fact I am sure Israel would not accept this without massive pressure. If it is conceivable we could perhaps apply something like it to the Golan Heights. The major problem is to get some movement, or else the situation will be frozen so no movement can ever get started. Once movement starts, other pressures can continue to work.
FM Gromyko: I have two questions. First, does the United States accept the principle of withdrawal from all occupied territory? Second, does the United States accept the principle of a package deal? An all-embracing settlement?
Dr. Kissinger: When you say all-embracing, you mean Syria, because we can get the others.
FM Gromyko: I mean vertical as well as horizontal. I mean that the Suez Canal cannot be separated from withdrawal and the Palestinian question and Gaza and ...
Dr. Kissinger: We would like to separate out the question of the Canal, but I see that the others are related to each other. But in my view the only justified solution is one all sides can accept. We would like to make progress towards a settlement. If it can be achieved only by a global approach, we will consider a global approach. Our view up
to now, which has not changed, is that we should see if we can get a settlement on the Suez Canal first.
FM Gromyko: But Egypt will not accept this.
Dr. Kissinger: So we will look at the other approach. My own view, as I have told Anatoliy, is that a global approach will lead to no settlement. This is what Israel would prefer, because it means no settlement will occur. They would love to discuss this.
FM Gromyko: What nonetheless do you think practically can be done? Before November, or after November.
Dr. Kissinger: After November we should take the principles we agreed on in Moscow and apply them concretely to each area, to Egypt, to Jordan and to Syria. And then discuss how one tries to implement the right solution-whether to pass a UN resolution or apply direct pressure. If pressure is ever to be applied to Israel, it is better to do it earlier in the Administration.
FM Gromyko: We have talked with some Arabs in New York, and they have indicated again, they have reiterated, that they can't accept a partial settlement without it being part of a global settlement and without withdrawal of Israeli forces. Then am I right that you are not prepared now to discuss this in a concrete way?
Dr. Kissinger: To discuss what?
Dr. Kissinger: The only thing I mentioned was security zones. I have said I could not come up with a very concrete plan by now. What we should discuss is what do you mean by a concrete proposal.
FM Gromyko: Speaking concretely, what do you think about withdrawal? Are you in favor of complete withdrawal or not? Second, on the question of a partial or all-embracing settlement, it is a fact that without an all-embracing settlement a partial one won't give results, because the Arabs reject it. As for Sharm el-Sheikh you know our position: Egyptian sovereignty plus a temporary stationing of UN personnel. With respect to the Gaza, the people there must determine their own destiny.
Dr. Kissinger: All this is in the paper you gave us.
FM Gromyko: There must be some solution to the problem of the Palestinian refugees. On Suez, Egypt is prepared to allow peaceful passage of Israeli shipping. With respect to Israel's independence and sovereignty and existence, we agree to this, and the Arabs too, although without enthusiasm! With respect to guarantees, we are prepared to join with you in the most rigorous way possible, that is in the United Nations Security Council. Well, if we agreed on this, then we together could bring the necessary influence to bear on the parties concerned.
In short, what is your advice to me? What should I report to the General-Secretary on your views?
Dr. Kissinger: On the problem of guarantees, the history of UN guarantees does not create confidence that they operate when they are needed. This is the President's view: We will work for a common position we can agree to, on the basis of the principles we reached in Moscow. But at some time, it is essential to recognize realities. The Arabs may recognize Israel's right to exist, but the same was true of India and Pakistan before the war. The peculiarity of the Middle East is that war arises among countries who are already at war; everywhere else war arises among countries who are already at peace! What we need is some concern for security. We are prepared to bring pressure on Israel short of military pressure. We will not allow outside military pressure. Economic or moral pressures we are willing to do.
FM Gromyko: You did not reply. What should I tell the General-Secretary?