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any changes before Americans become better adjusted to this new facet of US-USSR relations.
-Note that Union leader Curran14 has already expressed misgivings that the United States may at some point back away from its insistence on such points as carriage of one-third of the cargoes in US ships-that the grain deal is being watched closely by suspicious people.
4) Science and Technology Summit Agreement. Deputy Chairman Kirillin was forced to request a second postponement of the first meeting of the US-USSR Joint Commission on Science and Technology-this time because of ill health. Dobrynin is currently expecting Ed David to propose a new date for the meeting, the Soviets having asked if it might be possible to hold it in early to mid-January. I see no need for you to raise the subject, but should Dobrynin do so:
-Say that you haven't had a chance to discuss this with David, but that you see no reason not to schedule the meeting as soon as it is mutually convenient to do so.
-Add that it would be a mistake to let this initial implementing step drag on too long, bearing in mind the President's desire to have all Summit Agreements moving ahead smoothly and productively.
-Further, you may wish to ask for Dobrynin's views on the desirability of earmarking the proposed US-USSR Agriculture Research Agreement for the Brezhnev visit, as discussed below.
5) Brezhnev Visit. A recent article in the Washington Post15 reported Dobrynin at a Yugoslav Embassy function in late November as saying that the Brezhnev visit would not take place in the spring of 1973 but would be put off until later in the year to permit the Soviets to take a better look at the current status of US-USSR relations. Should you wish to raise the Summit with Dobrynin, including possible agenda items, you have my memorandum of November 29 and one of December 616 which suggest several possibilities (in addition to arms control agenda items). These can be summarized briefly as follows:
a) Agricultural Research. It is now planned that the first meeting of the Science and Technology Commission will approve an Agricultural research agreement between the US and Soviet Agriculture departments—an agreement dealing with research in the fields of farm crops
A reference to Joseph Curran, President of the National Maritime Union.
15 Dusko Doder, "Delay Seen in Brezhnev Visit Here," Washington Post, December 9, p. A1.
16 Sonnenfeldt's memorandum of November 29 on possible agenda items on space cooperation for Brezhnev's visit is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 67, Country Files-Europe USSR, Map Room, Aug. 1972-May 1973 [3 of 3]. The December 6 memorandum was not found.
and farm animals and the mechanization of agricultural production. There have been indications that the Soviets would rather have this as a separate agreement not linked to the overall science and technology agreement.
-You may wish to ask Dobrynin if the Soviet Government would prefer to upgrade this agreement and retain it for formal signing during the Brezhnev visit.
b) Space Cooperation.17 NASA Administrator Fletcher recently suggested three new cooperative projects to Keldysh-Keldysh said he would study them.18 These involve: 1) a joint unmanned Mars mission; 2) cooperative arrangements whereby the US would process real-time data from the USSR's next Mars lander; and 3) a joint project involving the orbiting of a satellite around Venus to collect scientific data via ejected-balloon-borne equipment.
-You may wish to note that NASA has raised these possibilities with the Soviet Academy and ask Dobrynin if there has been any reaction thus far, and more generally, what the Soviet reaction would be to marking an additional step in US-USSR space cooperation during the Brezhnev visit.
c) Moon Treaty. The Soviets have been pressing for UN acceptance of their proposed Moon Treaty.19 There has been considerable give and take on the draft treaty provisions and it is now possible that the UN Outer Space Legal Subcommittee will resolve the outstanding issues at its meeting next spring and that a treaty will be ready for approval by the UNGA next fall.
Should the President and Brezhnev decide that it would be desirable to sign a bilateral agreement on use of the moon and other celestial bodies-an agreement that takes into account the UN's efforts—this option would appear to be available for the Brezhnev visit.
-You may wish to ask Dobrynin for his reaction to arranging for a bilateral moon-and-other-celestial-bodies treaty signing during the Brezhnev visit.
17 President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev signed an agreement on space cooperation on May 24, during the Moscow Summit. A draft text of the agreement was transmitted in telegram 4915 from Moscow, May 24; see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume E-1, Documents on Global Issues, 1969–1972, Document 281. The final agreement is printed in the Department of State Bulletin, June 26, 1972, pp. 924–925.
18 Sonnenfeldt's memorandum, November 29, summarizing Keldysh's talks with Fletcher during the former's visit to the Houston Space Center, is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 67, Country Files-Europe USSR, Map Room, Aug. 1972-May 1973 [3 of 3]. James Fletcher was the NASA Administrator; Mstislav Keldysh served as President of the Soviet Academy of Sciences.
19 The Moon Treaty was submitted to the UN General Assembly by the USSR in 1971. See Yearbook of the United Nations, 1972, pp. 40-42.
Soviets Very Itchy About the Future. Judging from Zhukov's recent comments20 and other indications, the Soviets are quite uncertain about what is going on here. They are trying to figure out who is up and who is down and they are uncomfortable about getting used to new faces. The changes at Commerce and concurrent reports about John Connally's influence seem to worry them particularly. Dobrynin may be asked to report his impressions and give an assessment when he sees Brezhnev not only of personnel changes per se but of policy implications, especially in light of the Vietnam situation.
You are presumably up to date on the Cox visit to Moscow21 which Jeanne Davis has been handling. The Soviets have been cooperative.
20 Presumably a reference to the comments made by Yuri Zhukov, editor of Pravda, reported in the Los Angeles Times: “An authoritative spokesman for the Soviet point of view, Yuri Zhukov, wrote in Pravda, the official Communist Party newspaper last week, that participants in the security conference should 'confirm the inviolability of European borders' and commit themselves to develop their mutual relations on the principles of good-neighborliness and cooperation and renunciation of the use of force in settling outstanding issues."" ("Proposed Europe Talks Facing 1st Serious Test," Los Angeles Times, November 19, 1972, p. 2)
21 Tricia Nixon Cox, the President's daughter, visited the Soviet Union in early January 1973.
Letter From President Nixon to Soviet General Secretary
Washington, December 18, 1972.
Dear Mr. General Secretary:
I should like to avail myself of Ambassador Dobrynin's return to Moscow to continue our full and frank exchange of views in the private channel. May I use this opportunity to extend to you, your colleagues and your people best wishes on the occasion of the anniversary which you will shortly be celebrating. Since we are approaching the end of
1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 495, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 14. Top Secret. A handwritten notation at the top of an attached note from Kissinger to Dobrynin reads: "Hand-delivered to the Embassy at 5:40 p.m., 12/18/72." Kissinger also attached to the letter a copy of a message delivered to the North Vietnamese in Paris the same morning. The message reiterated the importance of a speedy peace agreement.
2 See footnote 4, Document 70.
1972, may I likewise extend my personal good wishes for the coming year and express the hope that the positive and constructive relationship that has developed between our two countries will be further broadened and deepened in the period ahead. A high point next year will be your visit to this country to which we look forward with keen expectations as another milestone in our common effort to cooperate in the cause of peace and progress for all nations.
Looking back over the past year, our two countries have reasons to view what has been accomplished with considerable satisfaction. The agreements concluded at the meetings in Moscow and since then represent a solid beginning of a new and more fruitful era in cooperation. In Moscow, I recall, we both agreed that our people would evaluate our work on the basis of whether we could put into practice the documents and principles we had signed. In our bilateral relations and in various aspects of international relations, we have continued to make steady progress since the summit. The momentum has been reinforced and should now be accelerated.
The success we have enjoyed in this past year presents us with a challenging agenda for the coming year. The high hopes in both countries for further agreements in limiting strategic arms compel us to a more intense effort when the negotiations resume in February. Evidently, our task will be more difficult, and this is understandable because we will be considering both a new range of measures as well as long-term commitments suitable to a permanent agreement. As you know from our exchanges in this channel, our concerns are with the central weapons systems that can threaten the stability of strategic relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. You have expressed parallel concerns with various other weapons systems and other issues. We will need to consider most carefully in this channel how we can devise a framework for balancing the concerns of each side. During the period when the formal talks are in recess, I hope we can pursue these issues in the private channel in order to give impetus to the negotiations when they resume. We should use the private channel to seek to crystallize a significant agreement that could be signed at the summit.
There are other areas of arms control-for example, chemical weapons-where I believe progress is possible.
In addition I am prepared to continue the discussions on working out a mutually acceptable agreement relating to the non-use of nuclear weapons. I have kept in close touch with the exchanges on this subject that have taken place between Foreign Minister Gromyko, Ambassador Dobrynin and Dr. Kissinger and will continue to do so as these exchanges continue.
In European affairs, as you have pointed out, there are now new prospects for dealing with matters of security and cooperation and the reduction of armed forces. The initial contacts in Helsinki suggest that we can accelerate the preparations and define an agenda that will allow a full conference to be convened in June. We are also preparing for the initial talks on mutual reductions of armed forces. While the talks in January, as we have agreed, will be preliminary,3 we hope that some discussions can take place that will point up the issues that will be negotiated beginning next autumn.
Our Allies, as well as countries allied to the Soviet Union are deeply involved in both of these negotiations, and I am not suggesting that the United States and the Soviet Union can or should arrange the outcome without their participation or against their interests. Nevertheless, our two countries can facilitate the course of these talks and help ensure their success, and to this end we are prepared to remain in contact through this channel.
There are two areas where, quite frankly, we have met disappointment-in arranging peace in Vietnam and in moving toward a settlement in the Middle East.
Our views on the Vietnam negotiations have been conveyed to you, and there is little to add at this time. The Soviet Union has played a constructive role in these past months, and any further efforts would be greatly appreciated. I assure you that such a peace remains my paramount goal, as I know it also remains your goal.
In the Middle East, we are both limited in our roles, but within those limits we are prepared to pursue discussions in the interest of finding a means to revive the negotiations on either an interim agreement, or, if you think it more feasible, on a lasting settlement. In any case, this is a topic we should consider high on the agenda for the coming year.
In the present phase of our relationship, it appears that we will be more involved in negotiations that concern other countries—such as discussions about European security and cooperation, the Middle East, and even those aspects of the strategic arms limitation talks that touch
3 On November 6, Sonnenfeldt forwarded to Kissinger a note Dobrynin had presented to Rogers that morning. In his covering memorandum, Sonnenfeldt wrote: "The substance of the Soviet communication is that the sequence of the initial CSCE and MBFR talks is accepted for November 22 and January respectively, and a tentative timetable for actual negotiations in June and September-October, respectively. The Soviets also accept that initial MBFR talks will develop an agenda and take place in a city other than Helsinki." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 25, HAK Paris/Saigon Trip, TOHAK HAKTO 11/4/72–1/7/72 California Before Elections)
4 See Document 62.