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The Soviets have still not answered our invitation to talk in January in Geneva.11 Apparently, they are having major problems with the Romanians, who object to being excluded. The Romanians, however, do not want to invoke their Warsaw Pact membership as grounds for participation. Therefore, the Romanians are pushing the line that CSCE should take up military security issues (which we and the Soviets oppose) and that participation in MBFR should not be restrictive.

In light of all the problems we have encountered in trying to keep our Allies from raising substantive issues in the initial talks, you may want to warn Dobrynin that the Soviets should be prepared for more of a substantive exploration than we originally envisaged.

You might want to reassure him that we do not intend to press for any agreements in this phase, or start a major debate, but that our Allies will almost certainly go over what NATO has already said in public, i.e., "balanced" reductions, undiminished security, a phased approach, and the importance of constraint on movement. The Soviets should be prepared to accept an agenda that includes principles and constraints as well as verification, area, size and type of reductions, as separate issues without prejudice to the order or potential substance.

Bilateral issues are in the earlier memorandum at Tab A. Of considerable importance, Ed David is resigning-reported in the January 2 Star. This means a new US Chairman will be required for the US-USSR Science and Technology Joint Commission.

Nuclear Non-Use

The President's letter raised this and offered to continue developing an agreement. You should be aware that Brezhnev in his speech called attention to the UN resolution on this matter,12 and offered to conclude an agreement with any nuclear power. You might wish to make the point that such a project is more plausible after another SALT agreement, than now, especially if the Soviets are willing to consider a permanent replacement for the Interim Agreement, rather than only a series of add-ons.

11 See footnote 7, Document 70.

12

See Document 52. UN General Assembly 2936 (XXVII) was adopted November 29, 1972. See Yearbook of the United Nations, 1972, pp. 9-12.

73.

Memorandum From the Director of Central Intelligence
(Helms) to the President's Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, January 11, 1973.

[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80-M01048A, Box 8, Tensions in the USSR. Sensitive; Secret; Eyes Only. 2 pages not declassified.]

Tab A

Washington, undated.

Ongoing Operations

[2 pages not declassified]

74. Editorial Note

The Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam, also known as the Paris Peace Accords, was signed in Paris on January 27, 1973, by representatives of the Governments of the United States, the Republic of Vietnam, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam. It provided for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam and marked an end to U.S. combat in the war in Vietnam. Documentation on the negotiations that culminated in the agreement, including Kissinger's conversations with Ambassador Dobrynin, are printed in Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, volume IX, Vietnam, September 1972–January 1973.

The same day, Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev wrote a letter to President Nixon congratulating him on the conclusion of the agreement. Brezhnev wrote: "There is no doubt that consistent realization of the achieved agreement on peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem, while eliminating one of the most dangerous hotbeds of international tension, will in many ways facilitate the healthening [sic] of the entire world situation.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 495, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 15)

On February 2, Nixon replied to Brezhnev and thanked him for his message. Nixon wrote with regard to the Paris Peace Accords: "We are now in the first stages of implementing that agreement. I am certain that if all concerned act in accordance with both the letter and the spirit of this agreement, major benefits will be rapidly felt not only by the people of Vietnam but by the world as a whole. You may be sure that the United States will do its full share to assure the faithful implementation of the agreement and to heal the wounds of war. I am confident that you agree with me that restraint by all interested countries is of great importance.

"I agree with your statements concerning the beneficial effects of the Vietnam settlement on our mutual relations. We have already demonstrated that even while the Vietnam conflict was still going on, major forward steps could be taken by our two countries. This process should undoubtedly be accelerated now." (Ibid., Kissinger Office Files, Box 70, Country Files-Europe—USSR, Exchange of Notes Between Dobrynin & Kissinger, Vol. 5)

75. Message From the Soviet Leadership to President Nixon1

Moscow, undated.

When we look back at the road covered in Soviet-American relations since the May meeting, we naturally feel satisfied with the positive changes in the relations between our countries. It is also quite understandable at the same time that our thoughts are more and more returning to those matters which happen to be yet unresolved. In this connection we would like to draw the President's attention first of all to the following two questions.

First. We proceed from the fact that we have an understanding of principle with the President on the question of non-use of nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union and the United States against each other. The conclusion of such a treaty would be really a considerable step forward, which would be of long-run positive consequences both for the relations between our countries and for the whole world.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 495, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 15. Top Secret. A handwritten notation at the top of the page reads: "Handed to HAK by Dobrynin 1/28/73."

The sides, as is known, have already exchanged several drafts of such a document. At the time when our Minister A. A. Gromyko was in Washington at the beginning of last October, the President said that the work on the text of such a document might be continued in the month of November. But until now it did not turn out to be possible to do so, though we, on our part, are prepared to take up that matter at any moment. We believed before and we believe now that the more definitely the essence of the basic idea is expressed in such a treaty-not to allow a nuclear confrontation between our countries-the more significant the conclusion of this treaty between the USSR and the US would be.

At the same time we agree that the formulation of that basic idea could be supplemented—and it has already been taken into account in our latest draft treaty3-with the provisions that our countries will build their relations in such a way that those relations would not be in contradiction with the parties' obligations not to use nuclear weapons against each other as well as with their undertakings regarding non-use of force in general.

We consider it also very important that in the treaty there should be clearly expressed the determination of our countries to prevent such situation when they would turn to be involved in the conflict with the use of nuclear weapons as a result of actions of the third states.

In our opinion, it is quite possible to solve also the question of consorting the obligations of the sides, to be taken in accordance with the treaty, not to use nuclear weapons against each other with the allied obligations of the sides towards the third states.

Thus we are ready and invite the President to directly engage ourselves in the interests of the cause of peace in the business of completing the working out of a document, which would formalize the agreement concerning non-use of nuclear weapons and would become the major event of world politics not only for 1973 but also for a far longer foreseable period of time.

Second. L. I. Brezhnev paid attention to the readiness of the President expressed in the message of December 18, 19724 to continue the discussion of the questions of the Middle East settlement, which the President quite justly ranks among the foremost foreign policy tasks, which demand the exertion of efforts on the part of our states in this 1973.

Consequently, we on our part repeatedly raised the question concerning the necessity of seeking a constructive settlement of the Middle

2 See Document 56.

3 Presumably the draft Dobrynin gave to Kissinger on September 21, 1972; see footnotes 17 and 18, Document 55.

4 Document 71.

East conflict and suggested to resume an active discussion of this question, particularly through the confidential channel.

However, in reply to our appeals we were told that the US were totally absorbed in the Vietnamese affairs and therefore could not for a while pay due attention to the subject of the Middle East.

Speaking about this question, it is necessary to emphasize that time is passing while the situation in the Middle East remains complicated and dangerous. If effective measures are not taken the events there can get out of control. There is no doubt that if hostilities in the Middle East erupt once again then-taking into account existent ties with this area of other states including major powers-there could develop quite unwelcome consequenses for the cause of international security, and it is difficult to envisage what would be the end of it and for how long these complications would persist.

As is known, in the course of the Soviet-American exchange of opinion, including that on the highest level, a thought has been repeatedly stressed that the United States and the Soviet Union should not allow that the development of events in that area would lead to a confrontation between our countries; it was stressed that it is necessary and possible to find a solution answering to the interests of all states in the Middle East, to the interests of our states and the interests of peace in general. This has been pointed out personally by President Nixon as well, who not [just?] once spoke about his readiness to use his influence for the solution of the Middle East problem in this very spirit.

We think that both the USSR and the US really can use their influence, their weight, and nature of their ties with the countriesparticipants in the conflict in order to finally bring the whole matter to the liquidation of the military hotbed in the Middle East.

In this connection a postponement of the exchange of views between us on this important problem seems to be unjustified. There can be of course an order of priority in the solution of problems, but there are problems which can and should be solved in parallel with other urgent international issues. We believe that in the interests of big policy it is exactly in this way that we should approach the solution of the Middle East problem.

As for the Soviet Union, we are prepared for a confidential exchange of views with the American side on this problem. The President knows well the essence of the Soviet position. We have consistently proceeded and proceed from such provisions of principle, which are contained in the known resolution of the Security Council.5

5 A reference to UN Security Council Resolution 242, adopted on November 22, 1967, in the aftermath of the Six-Day War.

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