ties. The Soviets had noted our structural changes and that the Secretary had been invested with the noble task of heading it. "We know you enjoy the confidence of the President."

Pensively, Brezhnev said that it was really impossible to over-estimate the importance of mutual confidence. We must both try in every way to develop and strengthen that, not allow it to be just a fleeting thing. As the Russians say, "There is no confidence without love." Though the word "love" was not appropriate here between politicians, the confidence part was. So, now you go ahead and cooperate with Kissinger, whom I haven't seen for some time. Perhaps I should send him a telegram and ask him why he hasn't been telling me anything since he is dealing with the Soviet Union. You and he should tell me what you are saying about us! Turning serious again, Brezhnev said he knew Kissinger and knew that cooperation between him and the Secretary would be serious and fruitful.

At this point there was a humorous exchange, with the Secretary saying that if Sonnenfeldt was willing to sell something to Brezhnev for only 10 percent he was not sure he ought to be dealing with such matters. Sonnenfeldt remarked that he was supposed to get two percent commission from the Lend-Lease settlement and Brezhnev shot back quickly that that settlement was not yet in effect and might not be.

The Secretary then said he would like to say a word about the matter of confidence and our Congress where certain questions were already being debated. He would like to assure Brezhnev that the President was working hard on the problems relating to Congress and in the spirit which had been developed during his Moscow visit. But we do have serious problems with the Congress. The President was seeking various ways to break the log-jam created by attitudes in Congress. The Secretary said he had explained this matter in detail yesterday to Novikov and so would not go into it closely here.5 The important thing was to have confidence that the President was working to see that the agreements we signed would be carried out. He is working in the most arduous way and in the politically most sensible way.

4 See footnote 2, Document 65.

5 In a memorandum to Nixon, March 15, Shultz summarized his meeting with Deputy Premier Ignatiy Trofimovich Novikov: “I set forth in detail possible strategies we might pursue on MFN, described our new organizational arrangements on trade relations, reviewed the agricultural picture and informed him of our readiness to let gas companies proceed with further feasibility studies, though without commitment on our part with respect to eventual financing and pricing policies. Novikov showed intense interest and reacted positively throughout. I believe relationship with him will prove useful over time." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 495, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 15)

Brezhnev then asked what was the Secretary's evaluation of the spirit of the talks he had had with Novikov, Baybakov and Kuzmin. He commented all three were fully abreast of Soviet policy thinking. Secretary Shultz replied he had received a great deal of information from Baybakov about the planning process and about the relationship between planning the internal economy and foreign trade. The explanations had been very helpful. With Novikov, the Secretary said, there had been a fruitful two-way exchange on the organization of work between us in the economic field, on matters relating to oil and gas, the question of MFN status for the USSR, and to a lesser extent on agricultural matters and the desirability from both our standpoints for early information about any Soviet grain purchases so we could plan our planting and our transport arrangements. In general, the Secretary said all the conversations with Soviet officials had been useful and their general tone had been constructive, especially the talk with Novikov.

Brezhnev commented that Novikov, Baybakov and Kuzmin were very well informed on economic-commercial matters, were close to the Soviet leadership and knew their opinions and the nuances of policy. Novikov was perhaps the most competent person in the foreign economic field in his capacity as a deputy to Kosygin dealing on a daily basis with economic matters. These three men accurately reflect Soviet positions on policy.

Brezhnev said he had had a conversation with Novikov just before the Secretary and his party went to the Bolshoi Theater and been filled in on their talk. As concerned business facilities in Moscow, Brezhnev said Novikov had already spoken to people about the establishment of permanent trade missions between us, and that he supported this idea.

With respect to agriculture, Brezhnev said there was really not much he could tell the Secretary at this time but he would like to assure him that a constructive solution to that question (advance knowledge of purchases) would be found and they would let us know. Brezhnev said he was convinced that we did need to coordinate these matters between us rather than continue in the hit-and-miss way we have had before. Both our economies require planning and we should go down the road of better coordination. As of now, he said, they could not give us an absolute figure but should be able to come up with more or less realistic figures for maybe the next five to ten years.

Secretary Shultz commented it was hard to be exact where nature's whim played such an important role but we did need some figures for planning various things on our side. He told Brezhnev that the Soviets

No record of Shultz' meeting with Nikolay Konstantinovich Baybakov, Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and Deputy Minister of Trade M. R. Kuzmin, was found.

could pass any information they consider highly confidential to us with assurance that it would not leak out. Brezhnev said that was indeed the spirit in which he informed the President of various matters. In fact, that was an important aspect of our relationship. He thought that recently the passing of information between us had been improving.

Secretary Shultz said he would like to return to gas. We realized that this subject was of deep significance to both countries. It involved a long term, a large scale, required mutual confidence, and had mutual benefit. Brezhnev commented that the latter aspect was essential since otherwise our businessmen would not go for it, nor would the Soviets. But Brezhnev thought their and our experts would be able to calculate quite accurately who would get what benefit and what the proper time-frame should be. From what he understood, 30-40 years seemed to be indicated. It might be difficult for us all to live to see the ultimate fruit of such long-term agreements. In any event, he thought it would be difficult for him personally though he would certainly like to live that long. He said his 87-year old mother lives in Moscow and is now looking forward to her 90th birthday. She has a great interest in things, sees movies, and watches television, and is always full of lively comments on things. Brezhnev hoped he would be the same at her age.

The Secretary said he shared Brezhnev's assessment of the gas outlook. There were many technical questions to be solved and the economic aspects must be carefully examined. We already know, however, what the general future demand picture for a clean energy source like gas is likely to be. The possibilities here are of great promise. While recognizing the uncertainties, we are ready to tell our companies, especially those involved in the "North Star" project that the United States Government has no objections to their going ahead with their studies, which we hope will have a successful outcome.

Brezhnev said that at a recent official conference with the Siberian oil people and various ministers he had heard that the reserves in the area under discussion amounted to some 20.5 trillion cubic meters. This amount was already proved out and more reserves were being discovered all the time. Under certain conditions, therefore, the Soviets could talk to us about even larger amounts of gas than were mentioned earlier. It was now up to the specialists to make their fine calculations. Brezhnev said he understood there were problems of a technical nature such as high pipe-pressure, laying pipe on the sea bottom and so forth, but he thought the specialists would solve those. He personally was more interested in the political aspect of the projects under discussion because this was the real meaning of such a long-term relationship between us in the economic field.

Secretary Shultz replied that was very well put. In fact, it seemed to him that there was a kind of parallel between the ever-expanding gas

reserves Brezhnev had mentioned and the expanding possibilities for our relationship. Brezhnev said that was right, that was the scale they were thinking about. As regards quantities, selling the US 300 million cubic feet was peanuts. (At this point, Brezhnev autographed three photographs which had been taken at the outset of the meeting and later handed them over to the Secretary.)

The Secretary said he wanted to say one further word about our problems in Congress with the MFN issue. He had given Novikov a very detailed explanation about the possible strategies. We would keep Dobrynin informed on how we see the process unfolding. We have given this background so that you will understand the processes involved and, to the extent possible, you will in your own activities see the relationship to the way in which matters go forward. (This latter part was at first incorrectly translated and Mr. Sonnenfeldt asked that the interpreter render it exactly. This was done.)

Brezhnev said he had said at the outset that he was happy to hear any advice of what the President thought they (the Soviets) could appropriately do within their possibilities. He had to be cautious because he realized this was a U.S. internal matter. He added that they would take no steps without the President's consent. So far as the agreements of last year were concerned, the Soviets felt duty bound to do everything necessary to carry them out. It was no secret that this was fully in our interest, meaning by this our common interest. The Secretary commented that was a very helpful statement and repeated his assurance that we would keep Dobrynin informed.

Brezhnev asked the Secretary to give the President his and his colleagues' best regards. They all wished him the best of health and success in his activities, especially as regarded progress on our agreements and in developing other areas of our future relations. Brezhnev underscored the very important stage in our relations at which we now find ourselves.

Secretary Shultz remarked that the two preceding nights he and his party had seen excellent performances in Moscow which pointed up the importance of doing things to the best of one's ability. He would like to present to Brezhnev a small gift which represented the fine work done by the Steuben company, which was well known for its glass objects. Since the gift was a horse's head, perhaps the General Secretary could use it to play chess. Brezhnev replied he used to play chess but had no time now. He promised to keep the little glass horse's head on his desk at home. He said the Secretary had caught him unawares but he would find something for him. Brezhnev made a parenthetical remark on the very wide uses of glass, from plates in windows to the finest art objects. Mr. Sonnenfeldt commented that the Secretary might have to make 31 more visits to the USSR to bring Brezhnev the re

maining pieces for a complete chess set. Brezhnev immediately quipped he would support the Sonnenfeldt line and that indeed the Secretary must come back to Moscow. There was much planning to do.

Brezhnev then asked whether the Secretary would be returning directly to the US from Moscow. Secretary Shultz replied he would be stopping in Bonn, then in Paris where a large meeting of Finance Ministers would be held Friday on international monetary arrangements.

Brezhnev asked the Secretary to tell the President he has received a message from the Japanese Prime Minister. It was a calm, businesslike message on relations between Japan and the USSR in which the Japanese suggested a new round of conversations on a peace treaty. These would follow up those started by Gromyko in Tokyo last year. Brezhnev stressed that the message had nothing to do with any third country but was confined to questions of general relations between the USSR and Japan, including references to their desire to develop further economic relations in the fields of oil, gas, and other resources. Brezhnev said he would soon tell the President in detail about this message through Dobrynin but wanted Secretary Shultz to be informed now on the general contents. He said he had told the Japanese Ambassador he agreed to such discussions and would plan to answer the message in the near future, with a suggestion that an appropriate time be arranged through diplomatic channels.

Brezhnev said he hoped the Secretary would find solutions to the problems to be discussed in Paris. He also asked vaguely about the talks between the U.S. and the GDR on the establishment of diplomatic relations. (This was not pursued.)

Secretary Shultz said there was no problem with the Soviet press release which Mr. Aleksandrov had handed to Mr. Sonnenfeldt. He continued that he would be meeting the press before leaving Moscow and would brief them in general terms about his reception but would not tell them what the Soviet side had said because it was their privilege to release that.

After everyone had got up from the table, Brezhnev took the Secretary over to a large plaque (about 6' x 4') resting on a stand. He explained that the plaque had been made of various kinds of wood by people on the island of Sakhalin in honor of the 50th anniversary of the formation of the USSR. The Secretary commented it was an unusual piece of work. Thereupon, Brezhnev went into the next room and returned with a portrait of himself (about 3' x 2') done in the same wood-mosaic style. He explained how the work had been put together

7 Diplomatic relations between the United States and the GDR were established on September 4, 1974.