Gromyko: I listen to that with satisfaction. That is exactly how we see it. Kissinger: On many of these, after we have stated our general principles, we should stay in contact as specific issues come up. Gromyko: There is another matter: we gave you our draft of the possible final draft of the document on political issues [Tab A].8 I am sure you have reviewed it. We did it with the aim of setting up on common ground. Kissinger: We have studied your proposition and we have many comments and amendments and suggestions. There are two problems: the evolution of the preliminary Conference has affected some of your draft. We have not informed the French and the Germans. Have you? Kissinger: Not to the French at all. Some to the Germans. I was talking about it with Bahr in September. But I didn't show a draft. Gromyko: You have studied it completely? Kissinger: What we would like to do is do a counterdraft, after consultation with our allies. We would like your authorization to do it in a formal way. We will talk to the three and we will let you have our views by the end of the month. Gromyko: All right. The draft we handed you dealt with preliminary matters. It is not a principal question whether it would be one or two. You are free not to wait until our new draft. Let's leave it open, whether it will be an all-embracing document or two documents-on political matters and then on economic and cultural matters. Maybe one, maybe two. As to the agenda, now we should look about the possibility of establishing some kind of organ—a committee, or commission. I would like to say a few words. As I said at Camp David, we have no special interest in an organ. The Soviet Union will continue to exist even if it is not set up-but nevertheless, we feel it could be useful linkage between the Conference and a later meeting on troop reduction. Just a consultative, purely consultative organ, for preparation for consultation by governments. This would be all right. We think at least there is nothing bad in it. Kissinger: How do you visualize the consultative organ? Gromyko: Since it will function between the first Conference and the second, in idea it will be permanent. It is a matter of convenience 8 Attached but not printed at Tab A is "General Declaration on Foundations of European Security and Principles of Relations Between States and Europe." and open for consideration. We are open minded. One thing more: it should be written that it will be consultative. Kissinger: We will reserve our judgment. We had thought of some kind of administrative organ for distributing papers-as a sort of a clearing house. Gromyko: All right. In Vienna, it looks like the Hungary question has been solved. What is going on? Kissinger: It took three months. It nearly broke up the NATO alliance. Our debates with our allies are more serious than with you. Gromyko: If you ever need advice on allies, let us know. Dobrynin: We will help you. Gromyko: By September-October, the all-European Conference will be over. I hope, in view of the mountain of paper. Last fall we agreed on September-October." Kissinger: Can we at least agree on a time interval between the end of the CSCE and the beginning of MBFR? Gromyko: And you suggest? Kissinger: Say one month? Gromyko: I think it would be acceptable. I will tell the General Secretary. Kissinger: Good. Gromyko: Do you have any bright ideas for this? Kissinger: It would be constructive if you pulled your forces out of East Germany. It would create a good atmosphere. You are asking me in what direction the Conference should go and what it should accomplish? Gromyko: Yes. It is a sort of goal. Kissinger: We submitted our analysis to our allies. Do you have it? My understanding is that whenever we distribute something to our allies you get in it in 48 hours. Is it true? Gromyko: Why 48? Dobrynin: Sometimes we get a distorted view from the allies and want to hear it from the horse's mouth! Gromyko: You can wait until you are ready. Kissinger: No we are ready. We want to treat this as seriously as SALT. We are genuinely trying to examine what proposals we can make which both sides can feel improves their security or at least doesn't hurt it. One question is whether the reductions should include 9 The CSCE convened in Geneva for Stage II, the working phase, from September 1973 to July 1975. only stationed or also national forces. The difficulty with national forces is it is hard to monitor reductions. And national forces are not of the quality of stationed forces. I am thinking of the Polish Army band. The second point, what I said about maneuvers in connection with the CSCE—if it is not addressed in the CSCE it will at least have to be addressed in MBFR. Another issue is whether we speak in terms of units or in terms of numbers. Do we say three regiments, or 50 men from each regiment? If we say 50 men it is harder to verify whether they have left. This will have to be addressed-for both sides. Then ceilings. I joke about all Soviet forces. We won't reject it. But probably they will be smaller margins. In the President's Foreign Policy Report10 we discuss this quite openly. In the Arms Control section. It discusses our philosophy, though not the numbers. We are genuinely interested in achieving some common ceiling. Then the countries in the area should not be used to circumvent the agreement. Some allies fear you might put into Budapest what you take from Central Europe. I asked why would they do it in Budapest if they can put them in Brest, which is closer to Central Europe. Dobrynin: When? Kissinger: June, July. When the General Secretary comes we can begin discussion. Of course, we look at it from our point of view. And certainly we are approaching it without giving ourselves the benefit of the doubt. But we also consider your point of view. So we are not making insolent proposals. Once we know the views of our allies-by June or July—we can begin to exchange ideas. [Kornienko gets up and gives Gromyko a paper] Never in all our years has Kornienko not given a paper that was trouble. Gromyko: This is a subject that I had in the back of my mind, but we could do it later. Kissinger: No, he is a great professional. Gromyko: This concerns the question of the two Germanies joining the United Nations. 10 President Nixon's Fourth Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy, May 3, emphasized the effort to reduce arms competition, the treaties signed to that end, and how these efforts and treaties aided in his efforts to move from confrontation to negotiation. For the text, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1973, pp. 365–376. page. Kissinger: Do you want to express a view? I saw it was a whole Gromyko: It can be one sentence. Kissinger: I accept. Dobrynin: DeGaulle's method. But in a positive way. Kissinger: Our view is that after ratification of the German Treaty-which will be before your visit. Gromyko: By the Bundestag. Not the other formalities. Kissinger: That is only another month. Gromyko: It is the Bundestag that ratifies, then it goes to the Bundesrat. Kissinger: The latter has two choices. If it rejects it, the Bundestag can override by an absolute majority. Last year it was a problem, but it wouldn't be this year. The Bundesrat can also give an advisory opinion. But even if it rejects it, it won't be a problem. Gromyko: I think before the visit to the United States it will be completed even from the formal point of view. Kissinger: Yes, I agree. After the formal ratification, we will proceed with the recognition of the German Democratic Republic. Then we will be prepared to support, in conjunction with the Federal Republic of Germany, the admission of the two Germanies to the United Nations. Gromyko: When? Kissinger: We would prefer not to have a special session for it, but have it in a regular General Assembly session. Gromyko: The outcome is the same. Kissinger: The outcome is the same and we will not in any event oppose it. If you agree in Bonn, we won't disagree. As long as no other issue is raised at that session. Gromyko: Preliminarily it can be agreed that no other question can be raised. Kissinger: Preliminarily, if the Federal Republic of Germany is not opposed. I am not insulting their Foreign Minister if I say he doesn't have the new Politburo member's precision of mind. That is true of most Foreign Ministers. Dobrynin: We won't go into detail! Gromyko: Now it is 20 to 3. Americans are more punctual in regard to meals, so we won't deign to keep you more. Kissinger: Anatol, can I see you for a minute? [He hands over the list of Soviet Jews, Tab B]11 Can our Embassy reveal the meetings with Brezhnev, Gromyko and Dobrynin? Just to confirm the meetings with the people. Dobrynin: Yes. Brezhnev and Gromyko. 11 Attached but not printed. 108. Memorandum of Conversation1 Zavidovo, May 7, 1973, 11:35 a.m.-2:55 p.m. PARTICIPANTS Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee, CPSU Anatoli F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to USA Andrei M. Aleksandrov, Assistant to the General Secretary Georgi M. Kornienko, Head of USA Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Viktor M. Sukhodrev, First Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Interpreter Andrei Vavilov, First Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Mr. Philip Odeen, NSC Senior Staff Mr. William Hyland, NSC Staff Peter Rodman, NSC Staff Richard P. Campbell, NSC Staff SUBJECTS Nuclear Agreement; SALT Brezhnev: Did you have a rest? Kissinger: Yes, thank you. The air is so nice. Brezhnev: I hadn't been out in the fresh air as much as I was yesterday. If it were not for my colleagues here, I would have been in bed until 6:00. Dobrynin, Gromyko, and Aleksandrov made so much noise they woke me up. We should try to get away into the forest. Gromyko: You might get as far as the taiga. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 75, Country Files-Europe—USSR, Kissinger Conversations at Zavidovo, May 5-8, 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held in Brezhnev's office in the Politburo Villa. Brackets are in the original. |