The President has reviewed progress on lend-lease negotiations with the Soviet Union, considered the recommendations contained in the State Department's memorandum of July 10, 1972,2 and directed that the following should govern the US position when negotiations are resumed with the USSR: -We should initially indicate that, for the purpose of these negotiations, we are willing to settle for a stream of payments sufficient to retire $500 million at 5% or $750 million at 2%, beginning in 1972 and terminating in 2001. -Our negotiator is empowered, with the concurrence of the Chairman of the US side of the US-USSR Commercial Commission, to fall back progressively to a position of $500 million at 41⁄2% or $687.5 million at 2%. -If the Commercial Commission's negotiations in other areas seemingly might justify other terms, such as extending the terminal payment date, our negotiator should request the Chairman to seek further guidance from the President. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-235, NSDMs 151–200, Originals. Secret. Copies were sent to the Secretaries of Treasury and Commerce. On July 21, a copy of the NSDM was forwarded to Moscow for Peterson in telegram 131920/Topet 17. (Ibid., Box 953, VIP Visits, Pete Peterson's Moscow Visit (Commerce), 17 Jul-3 Aug 72 [2 of 2]) Peterson visited Moscow from July 20 to August 1 for the first meeting of the U.S.-USSR Joint Commercial Commission. 2 The Department's summary of the status of Lend-Lease negotiations with the Soviet Union as of July 10 is ibid., Box 720, Country Files-Europe—USSR, Vol. XXIII, June-July 1972 [1 of 1]. -If an overall agreement is not reached with the Soviets, our negotiator should indicate that we would expect the Soviets to resume payments owed to us on the "pipeline" account.3 Henry A. Kissinger Peter M. Flanigan 3 A reference to the lend-lease "pipeline account," which provided American goods to the Soviets immediately following World War II, and which the Soviets had been paying off since 1954. 14. National Security Decision Memorandum 181 Council on International Economic Policy Decision Memorandum 101 Washington, July 20, 1972. ΤΟ The Secretary of Commerce SUBJECT Commercial Commission Negotiations and Related Matters Based on the President's meeting with the Secretary of Commerce in San Clemente,2 the papers of the Backstop Group, and other related documents, the President has made the following decisions: -The Secretary of Commerce, as Chairman of the US side of the US-USSR Commercial Commission, while in Moscow in addition to directing negotiations on subjects within the terms of reference of the Commission should coordinate US positions on other economic issues, including those which will be negotiated concurrently by representatives of other agencies. Specifically, this includes lend-lease and shipping negotiations, and presentation of our positions regarding taxes and possible extension of Export-Import Bank credit. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-235, NSDMs 151–200, Originals. Secret. Copies were sent to the Secretaries of State and Treasury. On July 21, a copy of the NSDM was forwarded to Moscow for Peterson in telegram 131924/Topet 18. (Ibid., Box 953, VIP Visits, Pete Peterson's Moscow Visit (Commerce), 17 Jul-3 Aug 72 [2 of 2]) 2 No record of the meeting was found. -The delegation is authorized to negotiate a trade agreement on the basis of the draft discussed by the ad hoc CIEP group on July 173 with changes then agreed, with Article 11 deleted from the text of the agreement. -A shipping agreement is a high priority objective, with the issue of the freight rate differential to be settled in such a way as to minimize the current and future subsidy burden on the US, with a three-year renegotiation clause as a minimum. -The delegation should encourage the Soviets to join the Universal Copyright Convention. An offer to negotiate a tax treaty may be used as an incentive for the Soviets to do so. You should not offer to negotiate a bilateral copyright agreement. -On the question of arbitration, you should attempt to reach agreement as per Article 10 of the Trade Agreement but not enter into at this time any agreement regarding establishment of a bilateral arbitration panel and procedure with the USSR. -With respect to business facilities as per Article 9 of the Trade Agreement, you may offer reciprocal diplomatic immunity for a limited number of Soviet and American trade officials and their acts ad referendum pending further study of the consequent legal status of Soviet officials operating in the US and their powers to conduct commercial dealings. -Were the Soviets to offer a satisfactory lend-lease settlement, you could separately, by letter, assure them of the President's willingness at the earliest appropriate moment-bearing in mind Congressional considerations-to seek authorization from the Congress for the granting of MFN treatment to the Soviet Union. -If it is not possible to break the link between the Soviets beginning new lend-lease payments and entry into effect of MFN, we should attempt to maximize the front-loading of pipeline payments with only non-pipeline payments triggered by entry into force of MFN. -The delegation should submit daily progress reports including texts of new proposals made to and by Soviet representatives. Henry A. Kissinger 3 Not found. Peter M. Flanigan 4 The trade agreement was signed in Washington October 18; see Document 65. 15. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Moscow, July 20, 1972. Dear Mr. President, One of the questions which were not completed during our meeting with you in Moscow is the question of concluding a Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union on the mutual non-use of nuclear weapons. All of us were so absorbed by the consideration of other questions and projects which had become ripe for completion, that we did not make our way to this question in real terms. Yet, a positive outcome of our consideration of this extremely important question would have major long-term consequences not only for the relations between the USSR and the USA, but also for the world as a whole. From what you said at the meeting with me on this subject, and from our appreciation of the significance of this question it follows, in our opinion, that it should be dealt with the view of working out, in a possibly not prolonged time, a document acceptable to both sides. We proceed on this basis and, on our part, have most carefully studied the text which you left with me during our concluding conversation.2 I think that we should find a necessary combination of the principal idea without which the document is totally impossible-prevention of a nuclear war between our countries, with the way in which they should build their relations. In short, we are ready to express in the Treaty the idea that the very development of the relations between the two powers should not contradict the task of not permitting a nuclear war between them. From our clarified draft3 you will see that we have taken into account your considerations on other articles of the Treaty as well. In conclusion I think it will be appropriate to stress once more that it is important that any changes and amendments should not nullify the very idea of not permitting a nuclear clash between the Soviet 1 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 494, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 12. Top Secret. A handwritten notation at the top of the first page of the letter reads: "Handed to K by D, 12:00 pm, July 21, 1972." 2 Nixon handed over the draft during his penultimate conversation with Brezhnev in Moscow on May 29 at 10:20 a.m. The draft treaty is ibid., Box 487, President's Trip Files, President's Conversations in Salzburg, Moscow, Tehran and Warsaw, May 1972, Pt. 2. The record of the meeting is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971-May 1972, Document 299. 3 See Document 17. Union and the United States of America. We believe that other states irrespective of the degree of their political closeness to you or to us can only positively meet such a major act in relations between the US and the USSR, since it will further strengthen the basis under the Soviet-American relations for which we both already exerted such serious efforts during our recent meeting in Moscow. I saw Dobrynin and told him I had three matters to discuss. Middle East I wanted to give him a message from the President regarding events in Egypt.2 We were not aware of these events beforehand. We had not yet fully understood their significance. Nor did we know the extent of Soviet withdrawal. In any event, I wanted Dobrynin to know that the President had issued the strictest orders that there would be no U.S. initiatives toward Cairo and that we would not try to gain unilateral advantages. On the contrary, we would proceed within the letter and spirit of my conversations with Gromyko in Moscow in June [May].3 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 494, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 12. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting took place in the White House Map Room. 2 On July 18, President Sadat ordered the withdrawal of all Soviet advisers from Egypt. 3 For the memoranda of these conversations, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971-May 1972, Documents 293 and 295. |