satisfaction at the comprehensiveness and constructiveness of the exchange of views that took place."11 Kissinger: Good. Brezhnev: There is little draft on my visit to the United States that we can hold in reserve for now: "On the forthcoming visit of L.I. Brezhnev to the United States of America: On the invitation of the President of the United States, Richard Nixon, extended by him during his stay in Moscow in May 1972, and in accordance with subsequent agreement, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, L.I. Brezhnev will pay an official visit to the United States from June 18 to June 26, 1973." Kissinger: Or should we say, "starting June 18. Departure will be by mutual agreement only." That was a joke. Brezhnev: What happens if President Nixon asks me to stay another two days? Will you kick me out? Kissinger: That's what I meant. What if you come on the 16th? Kissinger: Right. Brezhnev: We will keep this to ourselves. It has been fully consulted on here. This is for the information of the President. Kissinger: And we will publish a unilateral statement of gratification with our stay.' 12 Brezhnev: Thank you. We then have the question of Vietnam. And also the question of economic relations will be an important topic of my talks with President Nixon. So perhaps we can start on that tomorrow. Kissinger: All right. Brezhnev: Then some minor points. But I can mention one thing. If the agreement on the major issue is signed, then I am prepared to sign it. Kissinger: Yes. Brezhnev: And I will be accompanied on my visit by Mr. Gromyko. As for the other people who might sign other agreements, we haven't finalized it. 11 The text of the communiqué was sent to Washington in message Hakto 24, May 8. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Material, Box 32, HAK Trip Files, HAK Moscow, London Trip, May 4-11, 1973, HAKTO & Misc) 12 Both a joint U.S.-Soviet statement and a White House statement were released on May 9. See "Kissinger Leaves Soviet After 4 Days of Talks," The New York Times, May 10, 1973, p. 3. Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, of course it is up to you if you want to bring them as part of your entourage, or have them come separately. We've instructed our agencies to begin talking to your side about these various draft agreements. They will be solved. Brezhnev: [In English] Very good. [In German] "Sehr gut." Gromyko: In American, "OK." Brezhnev: "OK." Kissinger: We still have these SALT Principles. We can decide it afterwards. Brezhnev: Anyway, we have something to work on tomorrow. [Brezhnev goes out for a minute, then returns.] Gromyko: Now we go boar hunting. You have to go down from the tower and look for them. I will explain the principles to you. Kissinger: We should work out some basic principles of hunting. I can give lectures on it now. Brezhnev: There is a story about a lecturer who used to get up and speak as follows: "The main merit of the previous speaker is that he has raised this issue. What does this mean, comrades? What if Dr. Kissinger had not raised this issue? It would never have been raised. The question would have been in a recumbent position. This is very important. Now the question is no longer recumbent; now it is a standing question. A standing question is not a recumbent question. Therefore I'd like to emphasize the fact..." And so on for a half hour. Kissinger: Was he from Harvard? Brezhnev: He was from the Institute. Gromyko: Can we assume that the final communiqué of the visit is substantially agreed? Kissinger: Well, as far as the main content-but as far as language is concerned... The main headings. Gromyko: We gave it to you as a preliminary document. Brezhnev: So in a preliminary way, it is agreed upon. One idea I have I should raise, so it is no longer recumbent. [Laughter] Kissinger: It will certainly be better as a standing question. [Laughter] Brezhnev: I'm quite certain if I don't raise it, it will be recumbent. I did promise to raise it with you this morning, but because we're so busy I didn't get to raise it until tonight. You'll appreciate this later: A recumbent question you can see only on one side, but a raised question you can see from all sides. [Laughter] Kissinger: Or we can consider the recumbent aspect and then turn it over. Because while it's recumbent we won't be distracted by the other aspects. Brezhnev: That's a good idea. But a recumbent idea is like a stone. Brezhnev: I can give a brief two-hour lecture at the university on this question. Kissinger: And it will make more sense than some of the usual lectures. Brezhnev: I want to go, on the way out, to look at the trophies. [The meeting then adjourned. The General Secretary and his party accompanied Dr. Kissinger and his party back to Dr. Kissinger's villa, stopping on the way at the refrigerator sheds to inspect the boars shot the previous evening.] 110. Message From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)1 Zavidovo, May 8, 1973, 0040Z. Hakto 19A. Please inform President as follows: 1. I had about eight hours with Brezhnev today in formal sessions,2 following several hours Sunday when we talked informally while he took me to his hunting preserve. 3 2. Agreement on prevention of nuclear war is now agreed with all our points accepted. 3. The Soviets gave us a set of principles to govern the negotiations for a permanent agreement on SALT.4 This document was a response to one we had submitted earlier which in turn had been a counterdraft to an earlier Soviet version. I again made strong argument that principles alone would not advance SALT Two very far since they were bound to contain much compromise language which would later be subject to dispute. I agreed to continue working on principles but urged major effort to obtain some concrete agreement, to supplement present Interim Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 32, HAK Trip Files, HAK Moscow, London Trip, May 4–11, 1973, HAKTO & Misc. Secret; Sensitive; Immediate; Eyes Only. 2 See Documents 108 and 109 for the records of the May 7 meetings. Tab A. 3 May 6. No record of these informal conversations was found. 4 Attached to Document 108 at Tab D, not found; also attached to Document 109 at Agreement, on urgent aspects of MIRV problem, as discussed in Verification Panel and approved by you.5 So far, Brezhnev has shown no inclination to proceed with concrete negotiations. As regards the principles, there are the expected differences on such points as forward-based systems and it is unlikely that a document can be agreed here during my stay. This will give us opportunity to decide whether it is desirable to have such a document on principles promulgated at the summit. 4. Soviets have also given me a new paper on the Middle East which does not however materially go beyond existing Arab positions. Brezhnev has several times stressed his concern that conflict may break out before, during, or shortly after his visit. He says that he can exert effective influence on Arabs only if latter see hope of a settlement. I have stressed the need to get away from abstractions and maximum positions and our readiness to play role in realistic negotiations, including our willingness to exert influence on Israelis in that case. I suggested leaving further US-Soviet exchanges until my next meeting with Ismail next week. 5. Brezhnev gave me a proposed summit communiqué which in general is a basis for an agreed text, but it will take a good deal more work to get it into acceptable language.' 6. In informal talk, Brezhnev continues to give vent to extreme suspicion of and hostility toward Chinese. This also seems to inhibit Soviet willingness to move rapidly on SALT. 7. On Tuesday, which will be last day of meetings here, I expect to deal with Vietnam problems and return to SALT issues. Brezhnev also wants to talk about trade relations. 8. There will be a brief communiqué at the completion of my visit. and a separate announcement of the dates of Brezhnev's US visit for separate later release, perhaps May 14.9 5 A reference to NSDM 213, May 3, "Instructions for SALT Talks," which followed Verification Panel meetings April 25-30. The NSDM and the minutes are scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, volume XXXIII, SALT II, 1972–1979. 6 Attached to Document 108 at Tab F, not found; also attached to Document 112 at Tab A. 7 Attached to Document 108 at Tab E, not found. 8 May 8. "Nixon responded to Kissinger in message Tohak 92, May 8, stating: "Be sure Brezhnev knows that any major hostile action by North Vietnam between now and the time of his visit would have a disastrous effect here. You are right about SALT II. But Brezhnev must be made aware of major disappointment in the summit if we come up only with general principles." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 32, HAK Trip Files, HAK Moscow, London Trip, May 4-11, 1973, TOHAK 75–139) 111. Memorandum of Conversation1 Zavidovo, May 8, 1973, 2:10-4:20 p.m. PARTICIPANTS Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee, CPSU Anatoli F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to USA Andrei M. Aleksandrov, Assistant to the General Secretary Georgi M. Kornienko, Head of USA Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Viktor M. Sukhodrev, First Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Interpreter Andrei Vavilov, First Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Mr. Philip Odeen, NSC Senior Staff Mr. William Hyland, NSC Staff Peter Rodman, NSC Staff Richard P. Campbell, NSC Staff SUBJECTS Economic and Other Bilateral Relations; (Briefly) Middle East and Vietnam [Outside, Brezhnev tells Dr. Kissinger he has incriminating documents on him. Dr. Kissinger replies, "I knew that sooner or later you'd get them." Inside Brezhnev's office, Brezhnev hands over photos of the boar hunt the night before.] Dr. Kissinger: I wonder if I could ask General Secretary to sign some of these. Brezhnev: For a thousand dollars. Gromyko: A hundred million each. [Brezhnev signs three of them.] Dobrynin: You look like revolutionary partisans. Brezhnev: I think we look more like gangsters. [Laughter] Dr. Kissinger: Thank you very much. It will be a very pleasant souvenir. It is a good photograph. Brezhnev: Let's take up a new field today, the prospects for economic cooperation. If you have anything you would like to say, I would like to hear it. If not, I'll say something. Dr. Kissinger: Let me say a few general words on this subject. Then we can discuss any specific matters the General Secretary would like to raise. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 75, Country Files-Europe-USSR, Kissinger Conversations at Zavidovo, May 5-8, 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held in Brezhnev's office at the Politburo Villa. Brackets are in the original. |