We are prepared to use as much influence as possible on the South Vietnamese to get them to stop their violations. We will never get perfect compliance by both North and South. But we can certainly get sufficient improvement to reduce the risk of new conflict, which is our major concern.

16

I am taking Graham Martin1 to my meeting with Le Duc Tho, so he can hear what the North Vietnamese complaints are. When he goes to Saigon he will know of any agreement we reach with the North Vietnamese.

Gromyko: We were certainly very unpleasantly surprised when soon after the signing of the Paris Agreement and Act there began large-scale violations of the Agreement. We have had a mass of information regarding violations by Saigon. We have been and are in favor of the strictest possible observance of both the Agreement and the Act. But we can use our political weight, and proceeding from our known policies on this, but the main thing depends on the parties concerned, that is the signatories of the Paris Agreement. We are of the view that in certain respects the U.S. is behaving badly.

Dr. Kissinger: Like where?

Gromyko: We don't think you are unable to bring influence to bear on Saigon, notably on the subject of the release of political prisoners.

I would not like to go deep into this subject, but merely to say we have ample information on this subject, just to draw your attention.

Second, to draw your attention to the conducting of military operations by the U.S. in Cambodia, and it now appears in Laos. After the signing of the Act, which contained references to Laos and Cambodia and maintaining the peace in those countries, the U.S. is continuing military operations. This has created a rather negative impression in the Soviet Union and many are asking what is it all about. We would certainly welcome rectification of the situation in both Vietnam and Laos and Cambodia; we would certainly welcome an end to all violations of the Agreement. We trust you don't suspect we are taking any other stand on this; we are in favor of strict observance of both agreements.

You will recall we have had occasion to get in touch in Washington on certain aspects of the matter. I won't repeat this now.

Let me just end by saying that the Soviet Union will do all in its power and will use all its influence and weight in favor of observance of the Agreement.

Dr. Kissinger: That is important. Let me make two comments.

16 Ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam after July 1973.

Regarding Laos, we have done only two things, both when there was a specific attack by the Pathet Lao,17 and at the request of the Government that Hanoi recognizes.

Second, it is important to recognize that Hanoi has totally refused to comply with the provisions in Laos. There was an unconditional obligation for withdrawal. There was no condition of a political settlement. Then there was the agreement with Souvanna18 for withdrawal in 90 days; they haven't done it. They are continuing violations.

Regarding Cambodia, we have a formal understanding with North Vietnam regarding seeking a ceasefire in Cambodia. We unilaterally stopped all military operations, and Lon Nol1 unilaterally halted offensive operations-though it is not easy to distinguish this from the usual behavior of the Cambodians.

We would be prepared for a solution analogous to Laos. We would discuss it, though it is not for us to negotiate it. We will stop military actions as soon as an agreement is reached. We have no purpose than to end the war. There has to be some minimum observation of an international agreement we have signed.

I will discuss this in Paris.

Gromyko: How do you envisage developments in Cambodia?

Dr. Kissinger: I visualize discussions between the insurgent side and Phnom Penh side to establish a ceasefire first, then some coalition structure in Phnom Penh in which all factions are included. We would prefer it without Sihanouk, but all sides would be represented. Sihanouk would be a disturbing element, for reasons which I don't need to enumerate-it would introduce a great-power element. And in this context, the composition of the Phnom Penh side is also open to discussion. I am speaking frankly.

Gromyko: It appears to us that the position of Lon Nol is precarious. That is probably

Dr. Kissinger: ... true. But things in Cambodia never are quite as serious as they look.

Gromyko: Do you see any possibility for Sihanouk?

Dr. Kissinger: It is a possibility, but we would prefer to avoid it.
When I was in Peking I refused to meet with him.20 We have ig-

nored various overtures from him.

Dobrynin: Now you are prepared to accept him?

17 The Lao Communists.

18 Prince Souvanna Phouma, Prime Minister of Laos.

19 General Lon Nol, President of the Khmer Republic, or Cambodia.

Dr. Kissinger: No, we are prepared to meet with people technically with him. We are not sure of their loyalty.

Gromyko: He is angry at you, and at us.

Dr. Kissinger: That is another reason not to encourage his return. We feel some of his so-called ministers, if they returned, might have different loyalties when in their country.

Gromyko: When will President Thieu be out, by the way?
Dr. Kissinger: A minor question!

Gromyko: That was an American promise.

Dr. Kissinger: That was never part of the American proposal. Only as part of an election in which all parties participate. Not even Le Duc Tho has asked for this.

Gromyko: That doesn't mean we can't ask for it.

Dr. Kissinger: But our objective is to ease the situation.
Gromyko: Does his presence help?

Dr. Kissinger: Le Duan's21 presence doesn't help.

Gromyko: That is in a different part of Vietnam. When are the general elections there?

Dr. Kissinger: He has announced them for August 26.
Dobrynin: Unilaterally.

Gromyko: One-sided elections. He will reelect himself.

Dr. Kissinger: No, it is for the Assembly.

Gromyko: Well, what do you expect in the South of Vietnam in the future? Do you think in the last few days it is somewhat more quiet? Dr. Kissinger: Yes, according to my reports, somewhat quieter. But the rains have started.

Gromyko: So nature works in a positive direction.

Dr. Kissinger: But in the north of South Vietnam, it is becoming dry. I think if it is quiet there for a year or two, great power interests would be further dissociated.

Gromyko: When do you meet the North Vietnamese representatives?

Dr. Kissinger: May 17.22 It is the day we agreed upon.
Gromyko: You will go home first?

21 Ho Chi Minh's successor and founder of the Indochinese Communist Party who served as General Secretary of the Communist Party in Vietnam.

22 For the memorandum of conversation between Kissinger and Le Duc Tho, May 17, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume X, Vietnam, January 1973–July 1975, Document 49.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. He will almost certainly come through Moscow. You can tell him that if he makes a big effort, I will make a big effort.

Gromyko: Do you like him?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. He is pleasant, and intelligent, in the Vietnamese way.

I have to tell you about our negotiations on Laos and Cambodia. In Article 20, we said "the parties shall respect the Geneva Agreements." He had trouble with that because in Vietnamese it meant only future, and implied they weren't complying with it now. We agreed on "must."

Gromyko: Shall we meet at 10:00 for dinner?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. Thank you.

[The meeting then ended.]

113. Message From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)1

Zavidovo, May 9, 1973, 1254Z.

Hakto 30. Please inform President as follows.

1. Spent another eight-plus hours with Brezhnev and Gromyko Tuesday. We covered bilateral issues, including trade, summit communiqué. A series of new bilateral agreements should be negotiable by the time of Brezhnev visit which though not major in themselves will keep momentum going. On trade, Brezhnev again displayed great eagerness for long-term projects as well as major additional credits. I gave generally favorable response but pointed out that specifics should be worked out in joint US-Soviet Commercial Commission and that immediate task for us is to get MFN legislation for which I assured Brezhnev you would fight.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 32, HAK Trip Files, HAK Moscow, London Trip, May 4-11, 1973, HAKTO & Misc. Secret; Sensitive; Immediate; Eyes Only.

2 See Documents 111 and 112.

2. In separate session with Gromyko I hit hard on Vietnam peace agreement violations, serious consequences of DRV offensive and obstructionist behavior of Poles and Hungarians. Gromyko, like Brezhnev earlier, said Soviets support strict observance of agreements by all sides. Relationship of Vietnam situation to Brezhnev trip to US can hardly be lost on Soviets. On Middle East, Soviets toward end of session seemed to recognize uselessness of the maximalist position in their paper which they had given me earlier and showed some flexibility. We will explore in the next few weeks whether something can be done at the summit.

3. During four hour dinner Brezhnev was voluble and jovial and again struck theme of long-term US-Soviet friendship and his high regard for you, and displayed great anticipation of his US trip. I stressed several times the need for new concrete SALT accomplishment, a point I also made strongly with Dobrynin. Soviets claim they have not had time to study our specific proposals. Whether this is true or not, Brezhnev can be in no doubt that for US the nuclear war prevention agreement can not rpt not stand alone as major summit accomplishment.

4. I will have more considered overall assessment of this trip and how it fits into our present situation and general foreign policy strategy on my return.

Letter From the President's Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Kissinger) to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev1

Zavidovo, May 9, 1973.

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

I have been authorized by President Nixon2 to inform you that the text of the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War is agreed between us in substance.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 75, Country Files-Europe—USSR, Kissinger Conversations at Zavidovo, May 5-8, 1973. No classification marking. The letter is on White House stationery but it was presumably prepared in Zavidovo to be given to Brezhnev before Kissinger's departure.

2 See Document 108 and footnote 2 thereto.