mulation of their foreign policies and in their actions in the field of international relations.

ARTICLE III

The Parties undertake to develop their relations with each other and with other countries in a way consistent with the purposes of this Agreement.

In these three provisions we have accomplished our major objectives.

The text

-clearly requires violation of the Agreement if the USSR wants to use nuclear blackmail against us, our Allies or third countries;

-fully protects all other countries;

-restrains the Soviets from threatening any use of force without destroying this agreement;

-fully preserves our right of self-defense and all our commitments, with special, though not exclusive, emphasis on those to our Allies.

In sum, this agreement places a major constraint on the Soviet Union; no piece of paper guarantees Soviet behavior, of course, but it is of significance that Brezhnev is prepared to sign this version, which is light years away from his original project.

III. The Interpretation of the Agreement

Soviet

In discussing the significance of this agreement Brezhnev will lean toward an interpretation that comes close to his original objectives and that (a) stresses the renunciation of all use of nuclear weapons between

us;

(b) implies that as the two Superpowers we are obligated to act as a sort of nuclear policeman, consulting and acting together in all crisis situations;

(c) presses for some action to follow this up, probably by joining with the USSR to sponsor a UN resolution calling on all states to accept the provisions of our agreement.

All of this would be contrary to our interests.

U.S.

In essence, your interpretation in private, with the Soviets, with the Allies and the Chinese as well as in purlic must meet the following points: -this is no condominium;

-this is not a simple bilateral non-aggression pact but an agreement predicated on non-use of force by either one of us against each other and against any third country; while the agreement is bilateral, the obligations are multilateral:7

-this is not a simple agreement to ban use of nuclear weapons (as the Soviets have unsuccessfully sought for 27 years) but a statement of an objective and of the kind of conduct required of both of us eventually to reach the objective. The objective is to preclude war of any kind including, of course, the most disastrous kind, nuclear war;8

-our alliance relationships, including our strategy of flexible response in NATO, is fully protected. That is, the Soviets have acquired no free hand to launch conventional aggression without running the risk that we will use nuclear weapons in response;

-any other country that relies on us can continue to do do; -The Soviets cannot attack China, regardless of pretext, without violating this agreement;

—we have a right to demand consultations if we think the Soviets are threatening or planning to use force against any third country.

10

WHILE YOU CANNOT MAKE THE ABOVE POINTS ABSOLUTELY AS PRESENTED ABOVE, YOU SHOULD KEEP THEM IN MIND AS YOU TALK TO BREZHNEV. YOUR TALKING POINTS, WHICH FOLLOW, ARE WRITTEN ON THIS BASIS.

-make direct reference to the protection we have obtained for China;

-refer explicitly to our continued right to use nuclear responses to conventional aggression against NATO;

-the fact that we have had extensive consultations with China, the UK or any one else.

Your Talking Points11

In your most recent letter to Brezhnev you carefully spelled out our view,12 and you may wish to reiterate the major points.

12

-It is important that both sides adhere to similar interpretations so as not to put any cloud over our accomplishments.

7 Nixon underlined all of the preceding two points.

8 Nixon underlined the last sentence of this point.

"This point was crossed out, then reinstated with the marginal note “stet.”

10 Nixon underlined this point.

11 Nixon underlined most of these talking points.

-Thus, you should stress that for our future relations, it is important that the interpretations of this agreement do not diverge.

-The main significance of this agreement is that we have taken a step toward not only reducing the danger of a devastating nuclear war, but also toward creating the conditions in the world where wars of any kind and the use of force will no longer afflict mankind.

-This was possible only because we have agreed to respect fully the rights and interests of other countries; this is a mark of statesmanship; and the General Secretary deserves credit for his vision.

-It is important that you and he understand how we see this historic achievement.

-We have not agreed to ban nuclear weapons but have taken a step toward the conditions in which the danger of war, especially nuclear war is reduced, not only between our two countries, but between either of us and other countries. We have thus set ourselves an historic set of objectives.

-We have made clear, both in the second paragraph of Article I and in all of Article II, that the ultimate objective of excluding nuclear war can only be attained if both of us refrain from all kinds of threats or use of force against each other, against each other's allies, and against any third country.

-Thus, we have not established a condominium but have reassured the world that we will act responsibly.

--In accepting the obligations to consult with each other, in certain circumstances we have agreed not to impose our will on other countries or force solutions on them.

Thus, the agreement is of major historic importance, and the General Secretary will be remembered by his own people and ours for the courage in taking this step.

-It demonstrates that the Basic Principles of last year did in fact mark a turning point in our relations.

-We can take with great satisfaction that we have given these principles substance.

The impact of this agreement will be further enhanced, however, if we can demonstrate to the world and to our own peoples that we can further in the limitation on strategic arms.

go

-We have entered into this agreement on the assumption that permanent limitations on SALT will be achieved.

The text of the final Agreement is at Tab A.13

13 Printed as Document 122.

122. Draft Agreement Between the United States and the Soviet Union1

Washington, undated.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

ON THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Guided by the objectives of strengthening world peace and international security,

Conscious that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for mankind,

Proceeding from the desire to bring about conditions in which the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war anywhere in the world would be reduced and ultimately eliminated,

Proceeding from their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations regarding the maintenance of peace, refraining from the threat or use of force, and the avoidance of war, and in conformity with the agreements to which either Party has subscribed,

Proceeding from the Basic Principles of relations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics signed in Moscow on 29 May 1972,

Reaffirming that the development of relations between the USA and the USSR is not directed against other countries and their interests, Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

The United States and the Soviet Union agree that an objective of their policies is to remove the danger of nuclear war and of the use of nuclear weapons.

Accordingly, the Parties agree that they will act in such a manner as to prevent the development of situations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of their relations, as to avoid military confronta

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 75, Country Files-Europe-USSR, [Discussions with Brezhnev]. The agreement was signed in Washington on June 22. The final text (24 UST 1478; TIAS 7654), nearly identical to this draft, is printed in the Department of State Bulletin, July 23, 1973, pp. 160-161.

tions, and as to exclude the outbreak of nuclear war between them and between either of the Parties and other countries.

ARTICLE II

The Parties agree, in accordance with Article I and to realize the objective stated in that Article, to proceed from the premise that each Party will refrain from the threat or use of force against the other Party, against the allies of the other Party and against other countries, in circumstances which may endanger international peace and security. The Parties agree that they will be guided by these considerations in the formulation of their foreign policies and in their actions in the field of international relations.

ARTICLE III

The Parties undertake to develop their relations with each other and with other countries in a way consistent with the purposes of this Agreement.

ARTICLE IV

If at any time relations between the Parties or between either Party and other countries appear to involve the risk of a nuclear conflict, or if relations between countries not parties to this Agreement appear to involve the risk of nuclear war between the USA and the USSR or between either Party and other countries, the United States and the Soviet Union, acting in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement, shall immediately enter into urgent consultations with each other and make every effort to avert this risk.

ARTICLE V

Each Party shall be free to inform the Security Council of the United Nations, the Secretary General of the United Nations and the Governments of allied or other countries of the progress and outcome of consultations initiated in accordance with Article IV of this Agreement.

ARTICLE VI

Nothing in this Agreement shall affect or impair:

(a) the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense as envisaged by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations,

(b) the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, including those relating to the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security, and

(c) the obligations undertaken by either Party towards its allies or third countries in treaties, agreements, and other appropriate documents.