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Dr. Kissinger stated that we would not go beyond what we have said here. And what was written in the letter, the President added [referring to the President's letter to Brezhnev of June 74 stating the U.S. interpretation of the agreement]. General Secretary Brezhnev said he recalled the letter very well. If we give different interpretations, he added, politically the agreement would be reduced to nothing. Therefore the General Secretary agreed to Dr. Kissinger's briefing.

The General Secretary said he thought the President's letter stressed balance of strength as the basis of the US-Soviet relationship, but he thought the agreement would be given added impetus by the SALT principles. He didn't think we should link all this to the European Security Conference, MBFR and SALT. He indicated that the Soviets would have an MBFR suggestion to make which would suit us very much.

The belief of our people in progress would be undermined by stress on positions of strength. The comments in the press would be very favorable. The Soviets have no selfish purposes in all this matter, he assured the President. He had received a report from Suslov, who was presiding in Moscow in Brezhnev's absence. The Politboro all sent their warm support, and also their warm greetings to the President.

The President suggested that we should let Dr. Kissinger stress what the agreement does not cover. General Secretary Brezhnev replied that if we gave in to that pressure, Dr. Kissinger would spend all his time on negative things. "Why should we do anything to belittle the agreement?" the General Secretary asked. "So let us comment in a positive way." Senator Fulbright had said he would positively support the Administration's policies.

The General Secretary cited the agricultural agreement as an example of the positive approach. The two sides had just signed it the other day. The General Secretary now proposed an exchange of letters saying that the Soviet Union will buy an average of five million tons every year for five years, beginning July 1, 1974. This would be announced after the Summit.

4 Document 120.

5

The Agreement on Cooperation in Agriculture was signed on June 19 by Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz and Andrei Gromyko. See Document 129.

128.

Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the
Department of State (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

Washington, June 21, 1973.

SUBJECT

Brezhnev's Figures on Soviet Jewish Emigration

The figures on Soviet Jewish emigration Brezhnev gave to Congressional leaders on June 192 appear in various parts accurate, unintentionally erroneous, and perhaps deliberately misleading.

Brezhnev said there were 2.1 million Jews in the USSR, which is the figure used in the 1970 Soviet census, but which is significantly lower than the three million figure Kosygin used in Stockholm in April 1973 and generally accepted by Western scholars.

Brezhnev said that 68,000 Soviet Jews were able to leave before January 1973. He gave no beginning date for the period. According to our figures (from the Dutch, the Israelis, and voluntary agencies) from 1960 until January 1973, 55,500 Soviet Jews emigrated for Israel. This is 12,500 below Brezhnev's figure. We have no data for the period before 1960 nor comprehensive totals on Soviet Jewish emigration for countries other than Israel.

In the first five months of 1973 Soviet emigration to Israel was approximately 12,500. Therefore, the combined total from 1960 through mid-June 1973 is just over 69,000—close to Brezhnev's 68,000 figure, which he, however, claimed as the total by January 1, 1973. He may have confused relevant time periods.

Brezhnev referred to 61,000 applications and to 60,200 approvals in 1972. We have no firm data on applications last year, although the Israelis believe that some 100,000 applications are pending. However, the reference to 60,200 approvals seems far wide of the mark since about 31,500 Soviet Jews actually emigrated. If Brezhnev misread and the "6" was actually "3" the number of applications he claimed was approved would correspond fairly closely to the number which actually left. (The figures on annual totals vary by several hundred depending on where the count was made-Moscow, Vienna, Israel-because of the numbers in pipeline.)

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 939, VIP Visits, Brezhnev's U.S. Visit, May-July 1973, 2 of 4. Secret; Nodis. Clift forwarded the memorandum to Kissinger under a June 29 covering memorandum, which Kissinger initialed.

2 See Document 125 and footnote 2 thereto.

Brezhnev's reported assertion that 95 per cent of the Soviet Jews are free to leave appears to be a brash effort to dissimulate. The claim was first made formally by Soviet Deputy Minister for Internal Affairs Shumilin in December 1972 when he asserted that 95.5 per cent of all applications are approved. In his remarks to Congressmen, Brezhnev gave some corroborative evidence on what had been suspected about how the 95 per cent figure was reached.

In referring to the list of "742" names of Jews denied permission to emigrate, Brezhnev reportedly said that "177 have not applied for exit visas for security reasons, but these cases are being reviewed." It seems clear from this remark that the Soviets did not count these de facto refusals of applications in their tabulations. The “95 per cent" claim, therefore, almost certainly refers only to applications which have been accepted for action, either to be approved or refused. The number of applications which the authorities refuse to accept, and are not included in the Soviet tabulations, is unknown, except for the “177" (probably 177 families) to which Brezhnev referred.

Brezhnev's statement that 300 Jewish emigrants have asked to return to the Soviet Union appears credible. We have no way of assessing his remark that 1,300 did not pick up their exit visas. Both figures are relatively small given the numbers involved.

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.3

3 Dudley W. Miller signed for Eliot above this typed signature.

129. Editorial Note

The Soviet Union and the United States signed 11 agreements during the Washington Summit between June 19 and June 23, 1973. On June 19, the Agreement on Cooperation in Agriculture was signed by Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. It specified certain cooperative projects in research and technology designed to raise agricultural production, especially food. Projects were to be overseen by the U.S.-USSR Joint Committee on Agricultural Cooperation. For the full text of the agreement, see Department of State Bulletin, July 23, 1973, pages 161–162. The Agreement on Cooperation in Studies of the World Ocean, the Agreement on Cooperation in Transportation, and the General Agreement on Contacts, Ex

changes and Cooperation were also signed on June 19. For the full texts of those agreements, see ibid., pages 163–169.

On June 20, the Convention on Matters of Taxation was signed by Secretary of the Treasury George P. Shultz and Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade Nikolay Semenovich Patolichev. The agreement was intended to avoid double taxation on income and to prevent, where possible, citizens of one country being taxed by the other. For the full text of the agreement (27 UST 1; TIAS 8225), see ibid., pages 169–173.

On June 21, the Basic Principles of Negotiation on Strategic Arms Limitation were signed by President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev. The Basic Principles reiterated the arms reductions that both countries committed themselves to in the May 1972 agreements and asserted that active negotiations toward a permanent agreement would continue, with the hope of concluding such an agreement in 1974. For the full text of the Basic Principles (24 UST 1472; TIAS 7653), see ibid., page 158. The Agreement on Scientific Cooperation in Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy was also signed on June 21. For the full text, see ibid., pages 159-160.

On June 22, the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War (see Document 122) was signed by Nixon and Brezhnev. On that same day, the Protocol on the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Chamber of Commerce (24 UST 1498; TIAS 7656) and the Protocol on Commercial Facilities (24 UST 1501; TIAS 7657) were also signed. On June 23, the Protocol on Expansion of Air Services was signed. For the full texts, see Department of State Bulletin, July 23, 1973, pages 173–175. The New York Times also printed the texts of some of the agreements in its editions of June 20-24, 1973.

130. Memorandum of Conversation1

San Clemente, June 23, 1973, 10 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Andrei Gromyko, Foreign Minister of the USSR
Anatoliy Dobrynin, Ambassador of the USSR
Mr. Makarov, Counselor to the Foreign Minister
Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President
Harold H. Saunders, NSC Staff

The discussion fell into four sections: (1) brief discussion of the press reaction to the signing on June 22 of the agreement on avoiding nuclear war; (2) brief discussion of some details of the US-USSR communiqué to be issued at the end of the Brezhnev visit; (3) discussion of the Middle East paragraphs of the communiqué; (4) discussion of the "general working principles" paper.

Reaction to Agreement on Avoiding Nuclear War

Dr. Kissinger began by saying that the reaction to the agreement signed in Washington the previous day on avoiding nuclear war had been "superb."

Foreign Minister Gromyko said that he would agree as far as he could tell from the West Coast papers that he had seen.

Dr. Kissinger said he would show the Foreign Minister our news summary. In response to the Foreign Minister's question, Dr. Kissinger said that the general sense of the reaction was "very good." Dr. Kissinger went and got from his desk a copy of the news summary and noted the comments on TV of Messrs. Brinkley, Valeriani,2 as well as the Associated Press lead. He concluded his comment by saying that overall it was "very, very positive." [Copy of relevant pages of news summary attached at Tab C.]3

Foreign Minister Gromyko asked how the reaction from US allies had been.

Dr. Kissinger replied that it had been mixed but generally positive. He said with a smile that the USSR would not be heartbroken if the

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 75, Country Files-Europe USSR, Brezhnev Visit Memcons, June 18-25, 1973. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Saunders. The meeting was held in Kissinger's office at the Western White House in San Clemente. Brackets are in the original. On June 22, after signing the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, Nixon and Brezhnev and their parties traveled to San Clemente.

2 David Brinkley anchored NBC Nightly News in the 1970s and Richard Valeriani also worked for NBC News.

3 Attached but not printed.

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