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agreement were not wholly popular in Europe. He said that we had averted the worst dangers so that if the Soviets were moderate in their statements, the US could live with the situation.

The Foreign Minister asked whether there had been any reaction from the Far East.

Dr. Kissinger replied that there had been virtually none, although what had come from Japan had been favorable. Alluding to China, he said that he was confident that the reaction from there would not be positive.

Foreign Minister Gromyko, taking the posture of the statue “The Thinker" by Rodin, said that the Chinese were probably sitting there contemplating their next move.

Dr. Kissinger said his estimate is that the Chinese will be "very critical." In response to a question from the Foreign Minister on what points he thought the Chinese would particularly object to, he said that they would not like the fact of an agreement and particularly they would not like Article 4. He felt they would be "extremely negative." They do not want the impression of an extremely close relationship between the US and USSR.4

Foreign Minister Gromyko said that the Chinese would assume that what is good for the USSR is bad for them. He said that is not necessarily the case, but that is how they will see it. Minor Communiqué Items

Dr. Kissinger said he would like to settle two minor issues in the communiqué:

-Dr. Kissinger proposed that the date on which the President was invited to come again to Moscow be inserted since it had been mentioned publicly. To make this point, he would add the words “to visit the USSR in 1974" and drop the words in the present draft, "at a time convenient to both sides." He commented that “your ally” (referring to the Chinese) will not like the prospect of another summit.

On page 9 of the present draft he felt that the words “the US and the USSR proceed from the assumption" should be changed to "the US and the USSR hold the view that." He said this was a purely editorial change since on page 10 practically the same words are used. Foreign Minister Gromyko assented, saying that the two phrases mean about the same in Russian.

Dr. Kissinger went on to say that the US needed a list of people to be included on the first page of the communiqué, and Ambassador Do

* For the Chinese reaction to the agreement, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XVIII, China, 1973–1976, Document 39.

brynin said he would give that to the US side in the afternoon. Finally, Dr. Kissinger gave to the Foreign Minister a copy of the paragraphs proposed to cover the Civil Aviation agreement. He handed Ambassador Dobrynin an English text of the agreement. The Middle East in the Communiqué

Dr. Kissinger continued, saying that the only issue left is the Middle East.

Foreign Minister Gromyko said that, as the Soviet side sees the situation, it is difficult to agree on any “substantial” text for the communiqué. It could be stated that both parties expressed their positions and added that they would continue to exercise efforts to promote a just settlement of the problem which is in accord with the interests of independence and sovereignty of all the states in the area.

Dr. Kissinger said that such a statement would be "less than last year's."

Foreign Minister Gromyko said, “in one sense less; in another sense more.” It would not mention Resolution 242. Last year, he said, the two sides had hidden the differences between them and accentuated the matters on which there was agreement. But since the areas of agreement were thin and the Arabs did not particularly like last year's communiqué, he felt that the two sides should simply indicate that they had expressed their views. He indicated that the Soviet side would be willing to mention Resolution 242 if the US were prepared to mention the Jarring memorandum of 1971.5

Dr. Kissinger replied that the US could not do that. In any case, the two documents were of a quite different character.

Foreign Minister Gromyko said that they could be mentioned together, and Dr. Kissinger replied that we had never mentioned the Jarring memorandum. The Foreign Minister noted that the US had initially expressed a positive view. Dr. Kissinger replied that this had been purely a unilateral expression of view.

Dr. Kissinger said that he did not see how "we" could separate ourselves from Resolution 242. He felt it would be a pity after a week of substantial harmony if the press were to report disagreement on the issue of the Middle East.

Foreign Minister Gromyko acknowledged that the press might report such disagreement, but the reality is that there is disagreement on fundamental points. The US side in Moscow in 1972 had said it would show flexibility on the issue of withdrawal of Israeli troops, but that flexibility has not materialized. The crucial point is withdrawal. Nothing has happened in the past year.

5 The Jarring Mission, headed by Gunnar Jarring, UN Special Representative for the Middle East, worked to guarantee the provisions outlined in UN Security Council Resolution 242. For a synopsis of the Jarring Mission and its findings, see Stebbins and Adam, eds., American Foreign Relations, 1971, pp. 194–198 and Yearbook of the United Nations, 1971, pp 167–169.

Foreign Minister Gromyko said that he had talked with Secretary Rogers on the plane the previous afternoon. They had not discussed a text, but on the basis of the talks they did have, the Foreign Minister proposed the following:

“The parties expressed their deep concern with the situation in the Middle East and exchanged opinions regarding ways of reaching a Middle East settlement.

“Each of the parties set forth its position on this problem.

"Both parties agreed to continue to exert their efforts in the direction of the quickest possible settlement in the Middle East. This settlement should be in accordance with the interests of all states and peoples in the area and with the interests of their independence and sovereignty."

Dr. Kissinger asked the Foreign Minister what the phrase "and peoples" was intended to reflect. He said he did not understand how the two were different in a context like this or how we could distinguish “peoples" in the context of a situation like this. He asked the Minister what he intended to convey. He indicated that the US would prefer to drop that phrase.

When Foreign Minister Gromyko said he felt there was no important distinction, Dr. Kissinger countered that, to be frank, the problem was that this raised the whole question of the Palestinians. He noted that in his conversations with Egyptian National Security Adviser Hafiz Ismail, Ismail had talked in terms of getting Israel back to its borders simply in order to gain an end of the state of belligerencynothing more than a virtual continuation of the cease-fire. Thus, the Egyptians seem to be putting themselves in a position to make the establishment of peace between Egypt and Israel contingent on a later solution to the problem of the Palestinians.

Ambassador Dobrynin recalled that this issue had been discussed at length between him and Assistant Secretary of State Sisco in 19697 and that the USSR had substantially met that objection by the US. He said he did not feel that was an issue any more.


For the May 26, 1972, memorandum of conversation in which the Middle East was discussed, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971-May 1972, Document 284.

For a summary of the 1969 discussions between Sisco and Dobrynin, see ibid., volume XII, Soviet Union, January 1969-October 1970, Document 38.


Dr. Kissinger recalled that he had not been a party to those discussions. In any case, we preferred not to see the word “peoples" introduced in this context.

Foreign Minister Gromyko then said that he would drop the phrase "and peoples" provided the following sentence could be added at the end: “Both parties stand for the fulfillment of decisions of the United Nations on this question."

Dr. Kissinger said that this is too open-ended for the US side. There are UN decisions which the US has not voted for.

Foreign Minister Gromyko suggested inserting the word "appropriate” before "decisions.” Dr. Kissinger repeated the point he had made earlier that the US did not want to indicate unqualified support for decisions which reach back over a number of years. He said that he would have to go back and look at them all to agree to this point. He would prefer not to have a sentence of this kind.

Foreign Minister Gromyko then went back to saying that the USSR would want either this sentence or the words “and peoples" in the previous sentence.

Dr. Kissinger indicated that perhaps if the word "appropriate" were inserted, that the US could consider the sentence.

At this point, Dr. Kissinger read through the text as it had been developed in the conversation, editing as he went through and reaching the following version:

“The parties expressed their deep concern with the situation in the Middle East and exchanged opinions regarding ways of reaching a Middle East settlement.

“Each of the parties set forth its position on this problem.

“Both parties agreed to continue to exert their efforts to promote the quickest possible settlement in the Middle East. This settlement should be in accordance with the interests of all states in the area and consistent with their independence and sovereignty.

“Both parties stand for the fulfillment of appropriate decisions of the UN on this question."

Dr. Kissinger and the Foreign Minister agreed that they would discuss this with their principals, and Dr. Kissinger indicated that he would tell Secretary Rogers that the Foreign Minister had presented this proposal following his conversation with the Secretary on the plane the day before.



8 For the final text of the communiqué, released on June 25 at San Clemente, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1973, pp. 611-619. It was also printed in full in The New York Times, June 26, 1973, p. 18.


Foreign Minister Gromyko indicated that General Secretary Brezhnev was "generally very satisfied” with the visit. Working Principles on the Arab-Israel Issue

Foreign Minister Gromyko asked, "What about the principles?" He asked whether there is anything new worth talking about. He felt that there is no point in spending time on the project unless it is possible to make some progress.

Dr. Kissinger said he had talked with the Israelis generally and had studied again the paper presented in Moscow this May.' He indicated that he had worked out a new version which he then handed to Gromyko (copy attached at Tab A.] 10

Foreign Minister Gromyko read through the principles and made the points indicated below:

On paragraph 1, he felt that the paragraph as now drafted reflected a different approach from the one in the principles discussed in Moscow in 1972 (copy attached at Tab B]." He said that the paragraph as now drafted loses the idea of a comprehensive settlement in which all parts of the settlement are inter-related. Introducing the idea of "separate agreements" suggests that it would be possible to have something like an interim Canal agreement outside the scope of the general system of overall agreements.

On paragraph 2, he said that "this is not the answer." He said that there are different interpretations of Security Council Resolution 242 and that this paragraph did not say what is necessary.

On paragraph 3, he said that this point would refer only to Jordan. He said that this had been made clear in the discussions in Moscow in 1972.

Dr. Kissinger said that he wanted to get the history of this point clear. When it had been discussed in Moscow, it was not limited to Jordan. The following day in Kiev, Ambassador Dobrynin on the Foreign Minister's behalf had come to Dr. Kissinger and said that the Soviet side regarded this as applying only to Jordan. But when it was drafted, Jordan had not been discussed. The Foreign Minister said that he felt Jordan was mentioned several times.

Dr. Kissinger said he would have a great deal of difficulty identifying Jordan in this paragraph. He stepped back to describe his overall philosophy about a set of principles like this. He felt that if the US and


See Document 112 and footnote 3 thereto.

Attached; printed with the extract of this memorandum of conversation in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXV, Abab-Israeli Dispute, 1973 War, Document 71.

11 Attached but not printed.

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