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We then turned to Cambodia. Dobrynin said that as far as he understood, we wanted an outcome in which we did not have to abandon the Lon Nol government in Phnom Penh, because of the principle that we did not give up our allies. On the other hand, he did not see what negotiating leverage we had with the bombing cutoff imposed on us by the Congress. I said that we would do what we could. Dobrynin said that this would require extraordinary diplomatic skill, and the only possibility was that I pull another rabbit out of the hat. Otherwise he would say we had no chance at all. He said, “Particularly what are you going to do if China and Hanoi are going to agree with each other on a possible government constituted without the Lon Nol group? What can you do about it? I don't think your economic card is strong enough." I said there should be no illusion that we would forget who had put us into this uncomfortable position. Dobrynin replied, “In that case you should go after Senator Fulbright, not after us."
He asked again whether we thought it was possible to have a transitional government without participation of the Phnom Penh group. I told him that in that case we would not make an agreement and we would let nature take its course. He seemed to be worried that we might make a deal with Sihanouk and the Chinese. I told him that we were particularly interested in Sihanouk and we were pursuing our own policy, but that we would do what was necessary to have an honorable ending
In the Cambodian discussion particularly, Dobrynin's view was close to being supercilious.
On SALT, Dobrynin said that he would not object to an overture by Johnson about resumption, and he thought that the Soviets might be prepared to resume in early August since Semenov had already been on leave. He waited on a suggestion on whether we should get bilateral talks started. I gave him a note [Tab B] requesting verifiable evidence that the new construction we had detected at Soviet ICBM launch sites was not for additional launchers. MBER
On MBFR, Dobrynin said that Brezhnev thought he had made a suggestion to the President in the helicopter going to El Toro Air Baseo—the suggestion being that we should begin with modest cuts
Attached but not printed.
6 No record of this conversation was found. When traveling to San Clemente, Nixon would typically land at the El Toro Air Base and would take a helicopter from there to the Western White House.
and then stop for a couple of years. He wondered what our reaction to this was. I said that we had not understood that it was such a specific proposal but I would give him my reaction next week. Dobrynin said that he didn't ask for a formal agreement, just some understanding that we would work in parallel towards that objective. Berlin
We then talked about the problem of exfiltration from Berlin and I read him the attached memorandum [Tab C].?Dobrynin took notes and said he appreciated the discussion.
At the end of the meeting Dobrynin said that Gromyko did not particularly like what I had sent to Camp David because he thought that I had previously accepted the May 1972  document. This represented a retrogression. But they would let us know about their discussions with Ismail in Moscow. MEN: Soviet Jews
Dobrynin handed me a note [Tab D) giving an initial accounting of the status of some 700 Soviet Jews seeking to emigrate, who were on a list I gave him at Zavidovo.'
Scowcroft's July 9 memorandum on the subject is attached but not printed.
Tab D is attached but not printed. Kissinger gave Dobrynin and Gromyko a list of 700 Jews during their meeting in Zavidovo on May 6. See Document 107.
135. Memorandum of Conversation
Washington, July 19, 1973, 5:20–5:50 p.m.
Mr. Max Fisher
Kissinger: Well, I am sorry I couldn't see you on the West Coast. I understand you are seeing Dobrynin.
Stein: Yes, next week.
Maass: It is our understanding that a meeting without us would start great problems.
Kissinger: None of this ever leaves the White House (referring to Miss Ryan taking notes). My problem is that if I have to refresh my memory I will have something with which to do so.
Fisher: How do we stand?
Kissinger: At the time of Zavidovo you gave me a list of about 700 names to get some ticklers on.? The Soviets have about two weeks ago given an answer to that list, which is here. [Tab A]} And all of this was done since that list was given to him. (Dobrynin).
Maass: The 258 figure was the figure he mentioned when he was here, with the total 750. To our knowledge there have been 58 who have come out.
Kissinger: They add and get 738 names. Dobrynin said there are 80 more that are in the process of being cleared now, which would bring it up to whatever he said.
Fisher: How recent is this?
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1027, Presidential/HAK Memcons, Memcons-HAK & Presidential, April-November 1973, [4 of 5). Confidential. The meeting was held in Kissinger's office in the White House. Brackets are in the original.
2 Presumably the list Kissinger gave to Gromyko on May 6; see Document 107. 3 Attached but not printed. See footnote 9, Document 134.
sequence of events is as follows: He gave me some figures. Then I asked for figures in order to talk to Len* during the week (of Brezhnev's visit). There was a lot of confusion and we never got the list during the week. Then I made a formal request. I then pointed out that it didn't add up to 738 and Dobrynin answered that 80 are in the process.
Maass: It is interesting, Dr. Kissinger, that one month has elapsed since the 258 have been granted permission to leave and they have not been able to leave. There may be many reasons for this. The tourist season, there may be pipeline trouble, etc. As of yesterday there has been no indication of their being able to leave.
Kissinger: These months, I can't believe they would trick us. That would be absurd.
Max Fisher: I agree.
Kissinger: Yes, there are 80 in the process. I assume that it isn't inevitable that they will get out.
Stein: It is a question of time.
Maass: The class of the 149 that have been denied exit permission for security reasons, there may be a whole variety of reasons. When someone applies he doesn't know if he will be a security risk.
Kissinger: I have mentioned before the process in which I raise these matters. I have always done it when I was engaged in some unofficial meeting with Brezhnev, such as during a walk with him in Zavidovo. I tell him that this is not official business of the United States, but here is a list and that I have the impression if something is done it would be very beneficial for the Soviet Union. He then takes it.
The same goes for the two points I raised last time. This procedure worked for the exit tax. This is really all that has happened.
Maass: Did you get any feeling from the Helsinki Conference?5 I am speaking of the reformulation of the Soviet citizenship procedures?
Kissinger: You mean on movements of people. In the Conference we will make some progress on these items. Because Western Europe and we pay so much attention to them. I can only tell you what I said last time. We have made more progress with the Soviets with both the exit tax and this than one would believe possible. It would help if you could do something that shows it leads somewhere. Then I can go back to them with another set of proposals.
4 Garment. A reference to the CSCE, which initially met in Helsinki July 3–7.
Stein: The problem from public visibility is that nothing has occurred. We have the list, but to our knowledge only 58 on the list of 700 or so have been allowed to leave. Certainly if 200 arrived, there would be a favorable reaction. We are looking for a handle to move.
Kissinger: I cannot believe that Brezhnev would communicate a list that would be false. I am not saying that the Russians are not capable of lying. But this I can't believe.
Stein: I agree.
Maass: These 177 were included in the list but some may be hardship cases.
Stein: Here they say they haven't applied.
Fisher: We have to find out where the people are coming out. I have the emigration figures. We should check the list against the people coming out. I think it is a substantive gain.
Kissinger: I will try to get Dobrynin to move out those on the lists.
Stein: I think it would be a very substantial achievement if 250 were granted permission, and with the 80 more reviewed. You are dealing with a great number.
Maass: Accompanied by something else. What is the balance of those who want to get out? We would like to know in advance for those who will apply, what their chances are. If they are a new security risk, they should not apply. A security risk, say a recently released man from the army, should know he will have to remain for a certain number of years, before he should apply. Or someone from a space agency in the USSR who has information that has been classified, if he knew the requirement, at least he would not put himself in a position of applying and losing his job.
Garment: I share Henry's view that this achievement is very considerable. This is a situation that is inherently difficult to codify. The more one tries to do it, it will move in the wrong direction.
Kissinger: They have a domestic problem that the only group that can get out is the Jews.
Garment: You have achieved progress that is not easy to put on a billboard.
Stein: Has there been any response to the 242?
Maass: There has been some progress, they have reduced the sentence of one individual from 10 years to 7.