I certainly appreciate your joke about Waldheim. He has only a narrow capability to give effect to guarantees. I get the irony of that remark. (Mr. Brezhnev then tells a story about a scientist who was considered a towering figure, but this was very ironic because he was a very weak person.) I see that you have, in brief, touched upon the three principles. I appreciate the fact that you have had certain reservations about guarantees and don't want to refer to them right now. But if you could say few words on this, it would help our planning for tomorrow. a Kissinger: No, I'm prepared to do this, Mr. General Secretary. I'm like a professor. Brezhnev: Good. Just let me add that, as we see it, these guarantees need not be in the form of a Security Council resolution, but in the form of a guarantee bilaterally. Gromyko: Bilateral, in the sense of two powers? Kissinger: There are two senses. One, a guarantee to speed up the process, and two, a guarantee to assure the results of the process are, in fact, carried out. Gromyko: We were talking about the second, the guarantees that were related to the second point. Kissinger: I had the impression that it was used in connection with both senses, that you propose that we assume responsibility for speeding up the consultations and afterwards to guarantee the results. Gromyko: Yes. Kissinger: In principle, we are prepared to move in that direction in both senses, keeping in mind it is a very delicate problem. I agree that the Secretary General can't do it. I agree that in the Security Council, if the permanent members were to do it, they would fight among each other rather than settling local disputes. So we understand the problem. We would have to discuss how to give effect to a bilateral understanding, but in principle it is not rejected. Some of my colleagues are of the impression that Alexandrov agrees with what I just said. Brezhnev: I cannot see Alexandrov. As I see it then, in principle, all the points in our last message are acceptable as a basis for discussion. What we have to do is to think over ways to correlate them in appropriate form. Kissinger: Except there's a paragraph which has a precision we don't think is necessary. Gromyko: We will talk with you tomorrow. Brezhnev: In short, it's a question of formulating a joint position. Kissinger: And how we express the obligations of 242. Brezhnev: Now we are agreed after that discussion on the basic principles. Kissinger: Good, Mr. General Secretary. Brezhnev: You have experienced a time difference. I would suggest we start tomorrow at 11:00 o'clock and meet without any time limit. Kissinger: I agree. That gives the Ambassador a chance to go to a Mass in the morning. Brezhnev: That is his innermost desire. Good. 10 10 For Kissinger's report to Nixon on this meeting, see Scowcroft's October 21 memorandum for the President's file, printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXV, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973, Document 219. 143. Memorandum of Conversation1 Moscow, October 21, 1973, noon-4 p.m. PARTICIPANTS USSR General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko Deputy Foreign Minister V. V. Kuznetsov Mr. G. M. Kornienko, Chief, USA Division Ambassador A. Dobrynin Mr. A. M. Alexandrov-Agentov, Aide to CPSU General Secretary Brezhnev us Secretary Kissinger Assistant Secretary Joseph J. Sisco Deputy Assistant Secretary Alfred L. Atherton Director of Planning and Coordination Winston Lord Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, NSC Staff Mr. William Hyland, NSC Staff B: My voice situation is that my doctors keep treating me and I keep... K: That's good for my nerves. B: In that case I shall do my best to cure my voice. I have been thinking about how we should proceed today, and I have the following suggestions to make. Yesterday in general terms you expressed your attitude in principle to points raised in our latest document.? Now to speak in the same general terms to you as yesterday, let me say I and my colleagues have formed the impression that you regard that document as a good and constructive basis for our work and for possible agreement between us. As I understand it, in the latest letter I have received from the President, he feels that if we act in the spirit of accord, in the spirit of at 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 76, Country Files-Europe-USSR, Kissinger Trip to Moscow, Tel Aviv, & London, October 20-22, 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held in Brezhnev's office in the Kremlin. 2 See Document 142 and footnote 5 thereto. 3 On October 18, Nixon replied to Brezhnev's earlier message. He acknowledged Brezhnev's proposals, called for continued discussions between the two countries about the situation in the Middle East, and asserted that détente would fail unless peace was brought to the Middle East. See Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, volume XXV, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973, Document 204. tempting to find an acceptable solution, and in the spirit of seeking to take concerted actions after the cease fire, we can find a good way out of the present situation. I want to be sure I understood the President's message correctly. Therefore, if you have no doubts as to my having correctly understood the theme of the President's message, I would suggest-I'm sure this goes for diplomats as for ordinary people—less words and more deeds. I therefore suggest we begin the process of practically ironing out acceptable formulas, that is, we should immediately proceed point by point to what was stated in the document. Take point one, for instance, reach agreement on that; then we could inform President Nixon we reached agreement on that, and subsequent points under discussion. are in the process of being concerted. In general, I should like to keep President Nixon informed on all steps we take here; inform him quickly as possible. I feel he would like that. I want this to be so because the President himself has reacted very promptly to all of my messages and I should like to respond in kind. If you agree, we could take up point one and endeavor to reach agreement on it. We feel this would bring us closer to adoption of a constructive decision and if such a decision is arrived at, Dr. Kissinger could take two days off and go to Leningrad before going home. Seriously, we should proceed from the assumption that we have spent quite enough time discussing the general proposals of our talks and that, as I see it, we have reached a measure of accord on that score. Therefore, we should now turn to concrete work, and I believe we should take up the three points rather than relegating them to some kind of commission. It is better for us to bear the responsibility for decisions of such vital importance rather than to relegate the decisions to someone else. If we did that, there would be no need to meet face to face, relegating it to a committee, instead of meeting face to face across the table, and in a very good atmosphere. And, also, I proceed from the assumption that we certainly understand and realize you have certain difficulties as regards bringing your allies and friends to accept this or that decision. I trust you will realize we too have difficulties of the same sort, and particularly since we have more states to deal with than you. You have just Israel. We have the entire Arab world. We feel we are such major states we can, as President Nixon says, we can have decisive influence on decisions and a joint decision taken by us could prevail. What President Nixon said, I certainly agree with. Getting down to specific points, perhaps we can reach agreement quite quickly for something constructive to suggest to President Nixon and to finding an end to the conflict. And, I also proceed from another assumption. That is, that I have noticed in my three years of experience conducting discussions with Dr. Kissinger that I turn out to be the man who makes all the concessions. You know that is true, that is why you are smiling. What about my position? I have to do all the crying. I would then suggest that perhaps, Dr. Kissinger, if you agree, that you might give me the benefit of your comments on all three points of the resolution, of the document. We could then get down to concrete discussion and do away with abstractions. K: If we do away with abstractions, we will have nothing left to say. B: But I do think we ought... K: Mr. General Secretary, you have correctly understood the letter of President Nixon, and I agree we should proceed with the attitude you described. B: That is the only way we can act in order to get down to business. K: I also agree we should go point by point. Could I ask one procedural question, because it is not clear from our discussion what we are attempting to do. Is it our intention to do something that, with the concurrence of the parties, we submit to the Security Council, or something simply we submit to the parties? I wasn't fully clear yesterday what you had in mind. We are open minded. B: While we have no pride in this respect, as I understood it yesterday, we seemed to reach an accord on a general approach. We could reach agreement on a certain proposal which we could, with the concurrence of the sides, present to the Security Council, and that would be acceptable to both sides-this is one possible method of action. If we feel it would be more expedient for our two states to bring influence to bear on the Arabs on the one hand, and Israel on the other, and induce them to move forward to a peaceful settlement, that is another possibility I would agree with equally. In that event, too, we should start now by discussing the specific points, point by point. So if you have a certain preference, I would be glad if you told me. If we proceed from the premise that we cannot do anything at all, you cannot influence the Israelis and we cannot influence the Arabs, or proceed from the premise that we can do nothing through the Security Council in the sense of bringing about a resolution aimed at a settlement, first a cease fire and then a settlement, then the question arises why is our meeting necessary at all. Certainly I agreed to it in the sincere hope this meeting would proceed from the point towards a final acceptable solution that would serve the cause of reaching a peaceful settlement. How can we do that? By discussing the proposals. I'm not claiming the proposals are ideal or can be accepted as they stand right |