Sonnenfeldt: And Sikkim, too.

Kissinger: Hope Cooke, another American girl.8

Dobrynin: In Washington one of your colleagues told me that it's hard to get people to learn foreign languages, therefore they need to provide incentives. He told me a joke about a cat and a mouse. The mouse is in his hole and the cat is trying to get him to come out. He goes, "Meow, meow." But the mouse is too smart; he doesn't come out. Then the cat goes, "Rowr, rowr." The mouse thinks, “The dog has appeared. The cat has disappeared. And I know that the dog doesn't bite the mouse. So it is safe." So the mouse goes out, and the cat gets him. The moral of the story is, this is the advantage of knowing foreign languages. [Laughter]

Gromyko: There is another story. The mouse jumped into a bowl of milk, and the cat fled in fright. The cat's wife then asked him, why are you so frightened? The cat tells her the story. The wife says, "What kind of man are you?" The cat says, "I never tangle with a drunken woman!"

The breakfast meeting then ended. As they went to the door, Secretary Kissinger repeated that the accomplishment of the last two days was an example of what US-Soviet cooperation could mean.

8 An American socialite, who in 1963 married Palden Thandup Namgyal, the Crown Prince of Sikkim.

145. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Nixon1

Moscow, undated.

Esteemed Mr. President:

Israel has flagrantly violated the Security Council decision on the cease fire in the Middle East.2 We in Moscow are shocked that the understanding which was reached only two days ago has in fact been rup

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry A. Kissinger, 1973-1977, Lot 91 D 414, Box 1, Nodis Miscellaneous Docs., Tels., Etc., 1973-1977. Top Secret; Sensitive; Specat. A note at the top of the page reads, "HOTLINE First copy received 12:36 p.m. Oct. 23, 1973."

2 A reference to UN Security Council Resolution 338. See footnote 6, Document 143.

tured by this action by the Israeli leaders. Why this treachery was allowed by Israel is more obvious to you.

We see one possibility for correcting the situation and fulfilling the understanding ... in forcing Israel to immediately obey the Security Council decision. We vouch for the Arabs, since the leaders of Egypt and Syria have stated that they will implicitly fulfill the Security Council decision.

We pledged with you, jointly as guarantor-countries, to ensure the fulfillment of the Security Council resolution. In this connection, we propose that the most decisive measures be taken without delay by the Soviet Union and the United States of America to stop the violations of the understanding reached and of the Security Council resolution based on [this understanding].3 We would like to believe that on your part, on the part of the United States Government, everything will be done in order that the Security Council decision and our understanding with you will be implemented. Too much is at stake, not only as concerns the situation in the Middle East, but in our relations as well. We will be grateful for a speedy response.* Respectfully,

L. Brezhnev5

3 Brackets in the original, presumably added during translation of the message.

4

Nixon replied at 1:10 p.m. that he understood that the Egyptians had violated the cease-fire. He assured Brezhnev that the United States would insist that Israel respect the cease-fire, and he hoped the Soviets would likewise speak with the Egyptians. Nixon reiterated the importance of achieving a cease-fire. For the text of Nixon's reply, see Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, volume XXV, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973, Document 246, footnote 3.

5 Printed from a copy with this typed signature.

146. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Nixon1

Moscow, undated.

Mr. President:

I have received your letter in which you inform me that Israel ceased fighting.2 The facts, however, testify that Israel continues drastically to ignore the ceasefire decision of the Security Council. Thus, it is brazenly challenging both the Soviet Union and the United States since it is our agreement with you which consititutes the basis of the Security Council decision.3 In short, Israel simply embarked on the road to defeat.

It continues to seize new and new territory. As you know, the Israeli forces have already fought their way into Suez. It is impossible to allow such to continue. Let us together, the Soviet Union and the United States urgently dispatch to Egypt Soviet and American military contigents, with their mission the implementation of the decision of the Security Council of August [October] 22 and 23 concerning the cessation of fire and of all military activities and also of the understanding with you on the guarantee of the implementation of the decisions of the Security Council.

It is necessary to adhere without delay. I will say it straight that if you find it impossible to act jointly with us in this matter, we should be faced with the necessity urgently to consider the question of taking appropriate steps unilaterally. We cannot allow arbitrariness on the part of Israel.

We have an understanding with you which we value highly-that is to act jointly. Let us implement this understanding on a concrete case in this complex situation. It will be a good example of our agreed actions in the interest of peace. We have no doubt that all those who are in favor of détente, of peace, of good relations between the Soviet Union

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 69, Country Files-Europe-USSR, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 20. No classification marking. A note on the letter indicates that it was received at 10 p.m. on October 24.

2 Nixon's October 24 letter to Brezhnev is ibid.

3 A reference to Resolution 339, introduced in the Security Council by the United States and the Soviet Union, and adopted on October 23. The resolution referred to Resolution 338, confirmed an immediate cease-fire, and requested that UN observers be dispatched to the Middle East to supervise the cease-fire. See Yearbook of the United Nations, 1973, p. 213.

and the United States will only welcome such joint action of ours. I will appreciate immediate and clear reply from you.*

Respectively,

L. Brezhnev5

4 Kissinger wrote in his memoirs that, although the Soviet proposal had to be rejected, the Soviet threat of unilateral action had to be taken seriously. As a result, an NSC-JCS meeting convened late that evening and the President subsequently ordered the U.S. military to go to DefCon III, the highest stage of preparedness when attack is not imminent. For Kissinger's description of the events, see Years of Upheaval, pp. 584, 588. For Moorer's memorandum for the record of the late night meeting, see Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, volume XXV, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973, Document 269.

5 Printed from a copy with this typed signature.

147. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin1

Washington, October 24, 1973, 10:15 p.m.

K. We are assembling our people to consider your letter.2 I just wanted you to know if any unilateral action is taken before we have had a chance to reply that will be very serious.

D. Yes, all right.

K. This is a matter of great concern. Don't you pressure us. I want to repeat again, don't pressure us!

D. All right.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Telephone Conversations (Telcons), Box 28, Chronological File. No classification marking.

2 See Document 146 and footnote 4 thereto.

148. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin and Secretary of State Kissinger1

Washington, October 27, 1973, 11:24 a.m.

D. Thank you. Scowcroft sent me a copy of what you sent.2 I received what we sent to you just after your talk with me.3 By the way, in your letter which you sent to Brezhnev in answer you quoted sentences in his letter of ... you remember.+

K. Yes.

D. Perhaps when I dictated to you it was my sound but a little bit different. I don't think it makes that big of difference. It was not adhere. I said act here without delay.

K. That makes a big difference.

D. I don't think so.

K. Adhere means we have to agree with what you said. While to act here leaves it open to joint action.

D. You will say that you acted pro

This adhere speaks

about a Security Council resolution. So, in any case...

K. We had the impression that you were planning a military move. We did not invent this. Someday soon we have to discuss this. We had no reason to meet until 4:00 in the morning.

D. This is the point. On this, I think, one thing was really a big blunder on your side, maybe it was deliberate. For six hours you are just telling us every hour to wait, there will be a reply. I am sure if you had just mentioned to me that the President feels it was necessary to make an alert... blow up our relations. We don't want to do it, please send an urgent message to the Chairman. We will be forced to do it if we must. I am sure it would have received a reply that nothing ... K. That was a blunder.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations (Telcons), Box 28, Chronological File. No classification marking. Blank underscores indicate omissions in the original.

2 See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXV, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973, Document 290.

3 According to Kissinger's memoirs, Dobrynin called him at 9:35 a.m. (Years of Upheaval, p. 583) No record of the conversation was found.

4 Dobrynin is referring to Brezhnev's October 26 message; see Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, volume XXV, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973, Document 288.

5 See footnote 4, Document 146.