150. Memorandum for the President's File by Secretary of State Kissinger1

Camp David, October 30, 1973, 6 p.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting with Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin on Tuesday, October 30, 1973, at 6:00 p.m., at Camp David

PARTICIPANTS

The President

Ambassador Dobrynin

Secretary of State Kissinger

General Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

Ambassador Dobrynin thanked the President for receiving him. This week, and today's meeting, the Ambassador said, were very important events in the U.S.-Soviet relations. The Soviet leaders valued the personal relationship with the President.

The Ambassador then read from General-Secretary Brezhnev's letter to the President of October 28, [Tab A]2 which spoke of a "crisis of confidence" in U.S.-Soviet relations produced by Israeli deceit. We should not have a confrontation, the Ambassador declared. It was with a certain amount of sadness that he had to note that relations had reached this point. It took a very difficult decision on the part of Brezhnev to preserve our good relations with each other. We now had a good chance to find the conditions for final resolution of the problem.

The President asked if the Soviets had leaked to John Scali. Ambassador Dobrynin went through the history of the Security Council deliberations which produced the ceasefire resolutions,3 and then retraced the history of the ceasefire itself. He complained about the press stories about alleged Soviet misbehavior. What kind of a relationship is this, he asked, if one letter produces an alert?1

Ambassador Dobrynin then discussed what was to be done. One of the first things to be done was to carry out the joint resolutions worked out between us. Then we should each send a senior repre

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 69, Country Files-Europe USSR, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 20, October 12-November 21, 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Brackets are in the original.

2 Printed as Document 149.

3

A reference to UN Security Council Resolutions 338, 339, and 340. See footnote 3, Document 149.

4 See Document 146.

sentative to Cairo to supervise the progress of implementation. Then there should be an end to airlift of military supply, and then a start of political negotiations.

The President replied that he still looked for a better future in U.S.-Soviet relations. He hoped détente would soon be put back on track. He appreciated Ambassador Dobrynin's discussion. Events had not changed the President's view as to the vital role of détente in the world. He cited the indispensable role that our two countries would play in getting a settlement in the Middle East. The key was how we could get both of our recalcitrant friends lined up. Despite the difficulties of the past two weeks, these events gave us the best chance in a long time to settle the problem. We had resisted enormous heat in this country, during five days of a substantial Soviet airlift into Syria and Egypt. Only when we could not get Soviet cooperation to stop it did we start our own airlift.

We must avoid situations where we confront each other, the President pointed out. General Secretary Brezhnev and he must have an overriding concern with avoiding confrontation.

We want to work with the Soviet Union all along the line, the President continued. The principle of détente will not be destroyed. We should hammer out areas where we can work together and demonstrate how it can work concretely. Our new relationship had helped enormously in the present crisis. What we need now is a demonstration that our relationship is durable and we can accomplish positive things together.

151. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin and Secretary of State Kissinger1

K. Anatoly.

Washington, October 31, 1973, 6:02 p.m.

D. Henry, I have a request.

K. Which is what?

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Telephone Conversations (Telcons), Box 28, Chronological File. Unclassified.

D. Could you give me part of your presentation today on Foreign Affairs.2 The Chairman, Fulbright, was talking about your brilliant representation and about the détente.

K. I made a very impassioned defense of détente.

D. He said you particularly mentioned about detente.

K. It was a closed session, but I will get you the extract.

D. No, no, I am joking. He mentioned he was very much impressed on your presentation on the détente issue.

K. I made very strong defense of détente.

D. He mentioned it. He is a fellow who is a rare one to say somebody brilliantly represented so I was impressed on the détente question.

K. Very good.

D. What about the... are you .

K. Before I get to the main subject let me say another thing. I saw in a Los Angeles paper today an article from Moscow.3

D. It was by an American?

K. Yes, it was an American and was very close to what you said yesterday. It said the Soviet leadership was very angry with me. D. Who was the author?

K. Seeger, and it said from now on Brezhnev would insist on protocol when he sees me.

D. I think it is invention.

K. My suggestion is if this is inspired it is not all that helpful.

D. Henry, I can tell you this is not the way we are doing that kind of inspiration... You could easily check an American correspondent. It is very easy to be checked. He will immediately tell you and your embassy who mentioned it from our side. I doubt very much that they would tell an American correspondent about their grievances. He would make his own deductions. First there was an agreement and afterwards a confrontation. It doesn't take a very wise man to figure that

out.

K. It had a lot of detail. You know, it sounded-I normally don't pay any attention but it sounded very plausible.

2 Kissinger met that day with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in executive session. The text of his presentation was not found.

3 A reference to "Russian-U.S. Détente: Realism Moves In as Euphoria Fades" by Murray Seeger in the Los Angeles Times, p. A1. Seeger cited Soviet sources who maintained that, because of the Arab-Israeli crisis, Kissinger "has lost his high status in Soviet eyes and will have trouble regaining the standing that enabled him to negotiate directly with Communist Party chief Leonid I. Brezhnev instead of lesser lights."

4 See Document 150.

D. I don't believe... if they wanted some fellow not from America Maybe some of the fellow said something, even I doubt this one quite frankly.

...

K. Well it sounded very plausible. It repeated many things that you said.

D. From . . . it is not only my point of view. I told you they feel the same, that is very clear Henry. I am telling you...

K. Look, I am not asking to be loved. I am saying we are in a very difficult situation. The two people who helped put the détente together is the President and me and there is no sense in attacking the two of us while we are trying to do this. Whatever mistakes were made last week were not unilateral. Mistakes were made on both sides. Although I can tell you, having to deal with Egyptians is enough to test anyone's

nerves.

D. I'm not arguing about that. I think it is not worthwhile to argue. If you look in perspective at the big things we have done and have to do in the future, all of these things were very small but got out of proportion in sense of word which Brezhnev had given to them.

K. We now have the art of statesmanship. Now is for us to keep this thing together and to go back to the big things we did together rather than let it be split [spoilt?] completely. We did important things for three years and shouldn't let three days get in the way. On behalf of the President pass on his message to your leadership that he feels, that he attaches the greatest importance to continuation of what has been known as the détente policy and the greatest importance to the confidence established between him and the General Secretary.

D. Yes, he said that he is going to write a letter.

K. He asked me to reiterate.

D. Will he write a letter?

K. Yes, he will write a letter but we haven't had a chance. It may be Friday. We have been preparing for the Egyptian and Israeli visits.” It will be a very positive letter.

D. I understand, you need some time... I understand.

K. On your specific proposal, we are prepared to designate somebody to meet with somebody you designate to discuss how to implement Article 3 of Security Council Resolution 338.

D. Where?

K. They can meet in Geneva, or here, whatever you decide.
D. You are here.

5 Meir met with Nixon in Washington on November 1. Kissinger traveled to Egypt November 6-7.

K. Let them meet wherever. Should he go to Moscow? Eventually they can take a trip to the Middle East.

D. Why don't they begin with the Middle East?

K. We have another idea that hasn't been fully decided yet. We may upgrade the head of the Interest Section in Cairo and send a more senior person there with the agreement of Egypt and he could get together with whoever you have.

D. Just trying to develop ideas you mentioned...

K. We don't exclude a trip to the Middle East.

D. Just to give them something. I know for instance, Gromyko will hardly like the idea. When he is in charge, you are in charge.... people in Cairo, just to put Atherton. I don't know, maybe I am wrong. That is my impression. Do something we ask you...

K. Then let me raise this tomorrow with the Israelis.

D. I think it would be better. I mentioned to Gromyko and Brezhnev your discussions with ... but thinking aloud, they are waiting for their reaction.

K. Let me raise it with the Israelis tomorrow.

D. Yesterday it was one thing, today another.

K. Let me see what the Israelis reaction will be.

D. They didn't react negatively, but they are waiting further because you said you haven't discussed anything...

K. I will give you a definitive answer tomorrow.

D. I will send to Brezhnev the message from the President, but on this particular issue I won't say anything until I hear from you.

K. We have given strict instructions to this department to keep their mouths shut. Now it turns out you have over a hundred ships in the Mediterranean. If that keeps up we will be driven into

D. How many have you?

K. Less than 50. Look, you used to have the same number of ships as we had and then it increased.

now.

D. Is this a number game or a word game?

K. In the past your number was about a third of what you have

D. Are they military or commercial?

K. No, military. We don't object to commercial. These are submarines and others. You have double the submarines you normally have and nearly three times as many surface ships.

6 Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.