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factorily resolved. In turn, the Soviet Union does not wish to pay its lend-lease amounts until the MFN question is satisfactorily resolved.” He stated that "it would not be at all surprising if on one or two of these critical items, we will find ourselves in a situation in which decisions at the highest level of the two governments will be involved." (Department of State Bulletin, September 11, 1972, pages 285-288)

In response to a question regarding the connection between the commercial talks and political considerations, Peterson said, “The more favorable the political environment, the more political tensions are reduced, given the kind of system we have in the United States, the more likely, I think, that the American public, the Congress, and others will support the concept of expanded trade, support the concept of expanded credit." (Ibid., page 292) In an article published in The New York Times, reporter Hedrick Smith suggested that Peterson's remarks "implied that Soviet help in easing tension in such areas as Vietnam would influence Washington.” (“Big Issues Block U.S.-Soviet Trade,” The New York Times, August 2, 1972, page 47)

On August 4, National Security Council Staff member Helmut Sonnenfeldt, who had accompanied Peterson to Moscow, reported his views in a memorandum to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry A. Kissinger. Sonnenfeldt, who sent the memorandum in advance of Kissinger's conversation with Dobrynin scheduled for later that day, wrote, "Here, again, we have press problems: the NYT stories that we are stalling to extract Vietnam help from the Soviets.

“— Tell D. [Dobrynin] that none of these stories came from us. The only thing Peterson said-as the Soviets know-was that trade is related to the political environment. This is elementary and Moscow knows this as well as we do.

"-We were not stalling in the Moscow talks. On the contrary we found the Soviets almost completely inflexible and got the impression-which Peterson mentioned to Patolichev-that the Soviets might be supposing that because of the election the President was so eager for a deal that they can afford to play a game of chicken with us.

"Our position is that since the Soviets raised the issue of an overall trade agreement, we, too, want to go for an integrated, comprehensive deal which commands Congressional and public support. Hence, we cannot accept the Soviet Lend-Lease position and have to insist on such points as arbitration and copyright. We also have to push for adequate business facilities for U.S. firms and must protect ourselves on the anti-dumping issue. We are not trying to squeeze the Soviets and fully recognize that they have problems on these matters; but our point is that if there is to be a comprehensive approach, it must be viable and cannot leave the President exposed.

“—We remain very interested in joint ventures and Peterson's tactic, on instructions, was to try to identify some deals that we can move on urgently-like platinum. Gas is so complex that it takes more time; we don't want to get hung up on those complexities.

"--The Soviets should do careful homework and we will be ready before your trip in September to receive a senior official from Moscow to get the issues narrowed. We will also do careful homework in the meantime." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 495, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 13)

23. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, August 4, 1972.

PARTICIPANTS

Russian Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

The meeting took place in an extremely cordial atmosphere. SALT

Dobrynin began the meeting by a rather strong attack on the Jackson Resolution.2 He said it would be very difficult to understand in Moscow why such a measure should be pushed by the Administration.3 I said it was not pushed by the Administration, but indeed that

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 495, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 13. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The luncheon meeting took place at the Soviet Embassy.

2 On August 3, the U.S. Senate ratified the ABM Treaty by a vote of 88-2. On the same day, Senator Henry M. Jackson (D-WA) substituted his own version of a resolution approving the U.S.-Soviet Interim Agreement on limiting offensive strategic nuclear weapons, i.e. the SALT agreement. Jackson's amendment to the original resolution approving the agreement "put Congress on record as favoring the principle of numerical equality on offensive weapons in any treaty negotiated in the next round of the strategic arms limitations talks." Jackson's resolution also contained an admonition that if Moscow took any steps-even ones permitted under the Interim Agreement-that endangered U.S. strategic forces, "this would be ground for abrogating the agreement." (John W. Finney, "Senate Approves Missile Pact with Soviet on Missiles, 88–2,” The New York Times, August 4, 1972, p. 1)

3 The New York Times reported that Jackson's substitute resolution approving the Interim Agreement was "apparently supported by the White House." (Ibid.) In an August 4 memorandum to Kissinger, Sonnenfeldt recommended that Kissinger tell Dobrynin that "regardless of what The New York Times may say, we did not put Jackson up to the resolu

we had declared our neutrality. Dobrynin said it would never make any sense in Moscow that Senator Scott would put his name on a resolution not supported by the White House. He thought it was very unfortunate and that we would pay a price totally out of proportion to any possible gain. He said that we should remember that Brezhnev and the President signed it jointly; how would we feel if the Soviets attached reservations on their part even if they repeated things that had already been agreed upon? I told Dobrynin I would have to see what could be done at this late stage. Dobrynin said that he had no official authority but he wanted to tell me that it really would make a great deal of difference if some progress could be made.

Nuclear Understanding

We then turned to my trip to the Soviet Union. Dobrynin said they expected some definite progress on the nuclear understanding, and they were prepared to sign it early in October when he thought it would do us a great deal of good. I said we would do our best, but that their present draft was not quite acceptable. He said it would help if I could give him a counterdraft. I said I would do my best. Dobrynin pointed out that he would return to the Soviet Union on August 14th for about two weeks, so that it would really be quite important to have such a draft available by then.

Economic Relations

We then talked about the economic negotiations. Dobrynin pointed out that there had not been as much progress as we had expected, but he assumed that this was due to our desire to keep matters in status quo until September. He asked whether I thought we would settle for 3% on the Lend-Lease. I said we would have to study it but we would certainly make a major effort to get the Lend-Lease agreement settled in September, particularly if they were willing to meet us some part of the way.

Dobrynin reiterated Brezhnev's great interest in the LNG project.5 I again pointed out that we were in principle willing, but that it was a technically complex issue which required further study.

tion" and that "we have been trying" to "get the language changed so that it will create no problems for the USSR." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 495, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 13)

* See Document 17 and footnote 3 thereto.

5 A reference to a proposed gas deal between the Soviet Union and the United States, in which the United States would assist in the development of Soviet liquefied natural gas fields in exchange for imports. Regarding Brezhnev's interst in the project, see Document 21. See also Document 69.

Middle East

In a half-hearted way Dobrynin asked whether we had any papers on the Middle East. I told him that we hadn't made too much progress but I didn't have the impression that he really wanted to pursue the topic.

Spy Cases

We reviewed the status of the $200 thousand payoff for Markelov and Ivanov and the legal steps that had to be taken to return $180 thousand from it."

Kissinger Trip

Dobrynin told me that during my visit Brezhnev personally wanted to conduct the negotiations. But since no official decision to that effect had been made, he could not give me the formal notification. Also, he thought that the Soviet Union would agree to an announcement on September 5th, though again no official position had been taken.

Vietnam

I then handed Dobrynin our opening statement and draft plan from our August 1st meeting with the North Vietnamese for the personal information of Brezhnev.

Dobrynin said that the only information they had about the July 19th meeting was that I had presented my proposals in a very conciliatory way but I had not gone beyond what had already been presented in Moscow. He asked me whether I had anything to add. I said no, I didn't wish to add anything to what they had already been told by their allies.

I told Dobrynin that I hoped that North Vietnam would not confuse the impact of the election. They should know that under pressure we always moved forward. Dobrynin remarked that the North Viet

"Igor Ivanov, a chauffeur for the Soviet trade agency Amtorg, was convicted of espionage in October 1963. Ever since, pending appeals, he had been free on $100,000 bail. Valerii Markelov, a Soviet translator at the UN, had been arrested on February 14, 1972, for espionage. Haig wrote in a memorandum to Kissinger on August 3 that "Justice is moving rapidly on Ivanov so that the $80,000 [of the original bail] can be returned by the end of the week or the first of next week to the Soviets." Haig also reported that Justice was recommending "that we move on the 15th to get the $100,000 back in the Markelov case at a time when the regular judge [who was then on vacation] will be back temporarily and can do it quietly and gracefully." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 995, Alexander M. Haig Chronological File)

7 See Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, volume VIII, Vietnam, January 1972-October 1972, Document 225.

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namese were undoubtedly counting on the fact that we would become more conciliatory under the pressure of the campaign. In his judgment they would wait until the end of September to see whether the President still held a substantial lead, and then they would make a move if they thought there was no probability of an electoral outcome. He said he had begun to wonder whether McGovern represented really a new alignment of forces or was similar to the Goldwater phenomenon. I said we would soon know, but that we would not pay any attention to domestic politics; we would pursue the strategy which we consider to be in the national interest. Dobrynin said that there could be no doubt that they wanted to win.

We agreed to meet again on August 11th.

24.

Memorandum for the President's File by the Executive
Director of the Council for International Economic Policy
(Flanigan)1

Washington, August 11, 1972.

At 10:30 on August 11 the President met for 30 minutes with Secretary Peterson, Dr. Kissinger, and Peter Flanigan in the Oval Office. Secretary Peterson was to report on the Peterson-led delegation to Moscow for the first meeting of the US-USSR Commercial Commission.

Peterson told the President that the Soviets were hard negotiators and were occasionally sticklers for a non-substantive point. Peterson was convinced, however, that the Soviets need the deal more than the U.S. does from an economic point of view, and that Brezhnev needs it from a personal point of view.

In describing his long meeting with Brezhnev on the Black Sea,2 Peterson said that the two issues obviously important to Brezhnev were a gas deal and the settlement of lend-lease.

With regard to a gas deal, the President made clear that he wanted at least a very strong appearance of interest on our side. He recognized Brezhnev's personal commitment here, and wanted to meet it by very obvious cosmetic actions if we could not meet it by substantive actions.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Box 89, Memoranda for the President, Beginning August 6, 1972. No classification marking.

2 See Document 21

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