at strengthening the President's hand in the tough months of slugging that face us in bringing Europe to its senses. It is not I but the country that is being punished by this act of pique. I shall be seeing Sadat again tomorrow at 11:00 a.m. Cairo time for a heavy negotiating session. I must insist that I be given a full report of the conversation before that time, although I must tell you that there is almost no scenario of that conversation that I can imagine that will not be damaging the question is only the degree of damage perpetrated. I ask for your help, for the sake of the country, in two ways: 1) To get me the information quickly and,* 2) To assure that this sort of thing does not happen again. Finally, I must emphasize how gravely I view this development. I urge you not to underestimate the seriousness of this cable. 4 In message Tohak 79/37588, December 14, Haig replied to Kissinger, noting that he had just left Nixon and had made a formal request for more details on the President's meeting with Dobrynin. He reported that the President said that, on the Middle East, he had merely urged continued U.S.- Soviet cooperation in achieving a settlement and had asked the Ambassador to use Soviet influence on Syria regarding the POW issue. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 42, HAK Trip, Europe & Mid East, December 8–22, 1973) 155. Memorandum of Conversation1 Geneva, December 22, 1973, 1:30-4:25 p.m. PARTICIPANTS Andrei Gromyko, Soviet Foreign Minister Viktor Sukhodrev, Soviet Foreign Ministry (Interpreter) Secretary Henry A. Kissinger Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff SUBJECTS Middle East; US-GDR relations; Summit preparations; SALT; CSCE; MBFR; [After a brief photo opportunity, the conversation began informally in the anteroom.] Secretary Kissinger: I think we came out all right. Minister Gromyko: When I talked with the General Secretary just before I left, he said it is all arranged on Zavidovo. Secretary Kissinger: Good. It is a great place. When I looked at the auspices question yesterday, I realized that you preferred what we would have preferred. I think we let the Egyptians maneuver between us. We had no interest in having UN auspices and we had a lot of trouble with the Israelis on this. We were lukewarm, and you were too, but neither of us wanted to take the responsibility for it. I think the British and French were pushing it. Minister Gromyko: Especially the French. Secretary Kissinger: This is just for you: I've complained officially to the French for their behavior on the Middle East. Minister Gromyko: Jobert never misses any forum to throw his arrows at us. Secretary Kissinger: That is true. Minister Gromyko: I asked him how many arrows he has sharpened for us! [Vodka was served. Gromyko recommended a Belorussian vodka named for "bison herbs," which prompted a discussion of bison, boar, and hunting.] 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 71, Country Files-Europe—USSR, Gromyko, 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held at the Soviet Mission. Brackets are in the original. Kissinger and Gromyko were attending the Middle East Peace Conference. Secretary Kissinger: Can you go hunting in Zavidovo in the winter? Minister Gromyko: Yes. I went just before I left Moscow for Geneva. Secretary Kissinger: We'll get the Israeli military delegation here by Tuesday,2 just to talk. Bunker will be back on Thursday. I've talked to Eban;3 he'll have an Ambassador here. You were right. It'll be better that way. [The group then moved to the dining room for the luncheon. The main topics of the conversation over lunch were eating, drinking and hunting.] Secretary Kissinger: Ambassador Dobrynin has a good cook. We know sooner or later we will lose him [Dobrynin]. Minister Gromyko: You'd prefer later rather than sooner. Secretary Kissinger: From our point of view. He is intelligent, reliable, a good friend of the United States. Minister Gromyko: He played a role in the development of US-Soviet relations. Secretary Kissinger: The Arab world is very new to me, Mr. Foreign Minister. I've no experience with it. Minister Gromyko: You never dealt with them before? Secretary Kissinger: I have never been in an Arab country and never had much dealings with them. I frankly thought I could get through my term of office and let someone else do it. To be honest. Now that I have started, I will finish it and with enthusiasm. Minister Gromyko: It is an extremely complicated world. Secretary Kissinger: Extremely. And you can't count on every word they say. [Laughter] Minister Gromyko: Should I comment or not? Secretary Kissinger: [Laughter] No. That is why we should communicate; otherwise the confusion will be total. Secretary Kissinger: Have you been in Africa? You might enjoy hunting there. Minister Gromyko: I have been in Arab Africa, not black Africa. Minister Gromyko: In passing. I passed through there to attend the Crimean Conference [in 1945]. 2 December 25. 3 Abba Eban, Israeli Foreign Minister. Secretary Kissinger: I've always had respect for Stalin's foreign policy. He had a long-range vision. Minister Gromyko: I agree. Secretary Kissinger: [Offers toast] To our cooperation. Minister Gromyko: To our cooperation. Secretary Kissinger: In 1938, 1939, were you in the Foreign Ministry? Minister Gromyko: Just in 1939, I entered the Foreign Ministry. I was in the Academy of Sciences. Secretary Kissinger: You had to make big decisions then. I think you were essentially right on the pact with Ribbentrop. Minister Gromyko: We didn't have any reasonable choice. It was a pact for peace, for non-attack-not a pact to cooperate with someone else for attack. And we did it after all our attempts failed with the British and French. Secretary Kissinger: One could say the pact made the war inevitable, but you had no reasonable choice. There was very stupid leadership in Western Europe. Minister Gromyko: Very shortsighted. Secretary Kissinger: You needed some assurance. They had to decide whether to go to war with Hitler or not-but not to go to war half-heartedly and bargain with you over whether you could put your troops in Romania, etc. If they had let him take Poland he would have attacked you next. Secretary Kissinger: Also, at the end of the war he showed great courage, when we had the atomic bomb. He must have been difficult to deal with personally. People always said they were amazed how short he was when they met him. Minister Gromyko: He was not really so short. He was about Viktor's height-average. About 170-175 centimeters. Secretary Kissinger: Oh really? I had the impression he was much smaller. Minister Gromyko: But he was striking. So the first impression may be that he's not tall. But maybe psychologically people expected him to be higher because of his power. Secretary Kissinger: That must be true. * A reference to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939, also known as the Treaty of Non-Aggression Between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Minister Gromyko: At closed meetings, Politburo meetings, it was his custom not to sit. He was always walking, slowly, slowly, speaking, slowly, slowly. Secretary Kissinger: Did he encourage discussion? Minister Gromyko: Certainly, certainly. And he listened patiently. Secretary Kissinger: And he was intellectually in good condition until the end? Minister Gromyko: Perfect. Secretary Kissinger: He didn't realize he was getting older? Minister Gromyko: No. It was very sudden. Secretary Kissinger: I only studied his foreign policy, not the details of his domestic policy. Minister Gromyko: He was very sympathetic to President Roosevelt, from a human aspect. year. Secretary Kissinger: After the war, where were you? Minister Gromyko: I was First Deputy Foreign Minister. Minister Gromyko: Yes. Then I was Ambassador to Britain for a Secretary Kissinger: You must have the longest tenure as Foreign Minister. Minister Gromyko: No, I was just 49, in 1959. Just 15 years. Secretary Kissinger: To youth! What is your idea about the time for the Summit next year? Minister Gromyko: In the next room I will tell you. I swore to keep it a secret at this table. Secretary Kissinger: Just not between June 13 and 27, because I will be in Germany, no matter what you do. That is the time of the World Cup football championship. Minister Gromyko: To success of next year's Summit meeting. [They toast] Secretary Kissinger: To the success of the next Summit meeting. Before I took this job, I had no feel for how Soviet leaders made decisions. It was just theoretical. Minister Gromyko: Just in books. Secretary Kissinger: What is important in your domestic situation, I think, is that when we tell you something, you write it down and you tell the whole Politburo. So it mustn't be changed very easily, because it affects many people. |
