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rangements. In fact, General Secretary Brezhnev was emphatic on this with me, and stressed the need to achieve this.
Secretary Kissinger: But how do we proceed? Because we're not even in the same framework yet.
Minister Gromyko: We are certainly engaged in a very intensive study of this issue and we have made substantial progress in the formation of our positions in terms of the forthcoming Summit. You know as well as we know that our delegations in Geneva have made no substantive progress, and if you have any thoughts on this ...
Secretary Kissinger: We lack a theory of what we're trying to do. In the first SALT, we had a rough outline in terms of numbers and could work out the details. Now we don't even have a rough idea of what we want to do.
Minister Gromyko: I would suggest the crux of the matter is not that we lack a theory to guide us in finding practical solutions. I think we have common premises, but we lack practical concepts to convert theory to practice. You said we shouldn't allow ourselves to be thrown back. We both agree. We proceed from the assumption that we have traversed a very important path in the past by achieving the agreements already signed. For example, we are both in agreement that we are faced with the task of converting the provisional agreement into a permanent one, or else the task of elaborating or covering the provisional one in a new agreement.
Secretary Kissinger: Or extending it, for say ten years.
Minister Gromyko: At least there is no great theoretical difference. The task is to elaborate it to the point of figures.
Secretary Kissinger: And criteria. Have you any ideas?
Minister Gromyko: When you mentioned figures at one time to our Ambassador, you said that you might add something to the considerations you gave. Then you said it was not precisely a promise to give new considerations. Do you have or don't you have something new, just so we know?
Secretary Kissinger: What figures do you mean?
Minister Gromyko: You mentioned certain figures concerning the Far East, China. You said you might add something and you even had certain figures—to take into account the Far East. Do you have any precise considerations on this?
Secretary Kissinger: [Picks up briefing papers and reads them to himself. I just wanted to review some figures. [Reads). In the context of some limitation on MIRV, for example, if we said that each side had
equal throwweight of MIRVs, we might be able to consider some inequality in numbers—not in a permanent but in an extended provisional agreement. For example, if we said you could put MIRVs on ... The difficulty is that your missiles have more MIRVs--you have four and we have three. Sometimes you have even more than four. Suppose we said the throwweight of MIRVs should be about equal, then you could MIRV somewhat fewer missiles but we could live with some inequality in numbers—including the ones with single warheads. If you MIRV 300 and we MIRV 500, because of the inequality of the number of warheads, then we would not insist on your reducing the overall number of your missiles. You could keep your 1400 and we could keep our 1100—but you would MIRV 300 and we would MIRV 500. We would
— not ask you to reduce your number.
Minister Gromyko: When you say "extended provisional agreement,” you mean a “reviewed” provisional agreement, or in terms of time?
Secretary Kissinger: In terms of time. But with these new figures.
Minister Gromyko: With these new figures. (Viktor translates Kissinger's presentation into Russian]. And how about compensation for the Chinese factor?
Secretary Kissinger: We cannot compensate for that in words—but you would have 1400 missiles and we would have 1100, so you would have 300 more than we.
Minister Gromyko: Yes, but then you say you will MIRV 500 of yours while we MIRV 300. That makes the total throwweight equal. Therefore the question of compensation for our geographic factor doesn't come into the picture. And there is no mention of your forward-based missiles. The geographic factor is in your favor.
Secretary Kissinger: With regard to the first point, the total throwweight of the MIRV'd missiles will be equal. The total throwweight of all missiles will be strongly in your favor.
Minister Gromyko: What I am asking is, does that mean you are ignoring the forward-based strategic arms altogether, or simply haven't reached that question?
Secretary Kissinger: Let me distinguish two things. The Chinese factor is included—we have to be more precise with the figures in a negotiation-because the MIRV'd missiles are equal but on top of that you have 900 more and we have 600. Those 300 should certainly compensate for the Chinese factor.
Minister Gromyko: You are approaching that question from an end angle, as it were. The Chinese factor is taken care of in that calculation. It's built into this calculation.
Secretary Kissinger: Yes. You'll see when you study these figures. It gives you an overall advantage in throwweight and an overall advantage in numbers. It gives a certain equality in MIRVs.
Minister Gromyko: I understand you sort of built that factor into that calculation so it doesn't poke out of the sack to be visible. But you have elsewhere your forward-based missiles—your heavy bombers, submarines, intermediate-range rockets, and other types of weapons. Is it right that you've eased them out of the picture? We shouldn't leave that out, especially after blini.
Secretary Kissinger: I haven't fully studied it. But you have certain weapons that can reach these countries. I haven't studied it fully.
Minister Gromyko: I ask all these questions because we do want to find a common language on this issue. You mentioned figures to our Ambassador some time ago—figures that were supposed to serve compensation for Chinese factor. I was prepared to say we do not exclude reaching agreement on that basis.
Secretary Kissinger: What figures do you have in mind?
Minister Gromyko: You mentioned 200 additional. The principle itself which you mentioned at that time—but the figures weren't enough—but I was prepared to say that.
Secretary Kissinger: The principle is still acceptable.
Minister Gromyko: But now, when you formulated your remarks, your ideas suggest you want to place us in an equal position in one area but you
fail to mention other areas. Secretary Kissinger: Only MIRV. Beyond MIRV you have the advantage.
Minister Gromyko: But you leave out an entire area. Perhaps you can give this further thought and convey your views to our Ambassador. Preferably before your visit.
Secretary Kissinger: Definitely.
Minister Gromyko: Because this is a field in which one has to be objective because it is so important.
Secretary Kissinger: Definitely before the end of January. If you have any new ideas, let me know through Dobrynin, so we can study it.
Minister Gromyko: Yes, but we will await your ideas.
Your representatives and ours at CSCE are in contact with each other, but we believe your representatives, even if they take a position favorable to success, should be nevertheless a little more active in
bringing that success about. Particularly in view of the Summit. Because we should approach this Summit with more progress in this area.
Secretary Kissinger: I will call our representative back and talk to him personally.
Minister Gromyko: We would appreciate it. We should do our very best, both sides, to bring this to a conclusion before March. Even the pessimists thought it could not end before March.
Secretary Kissinger: We are not the problem. The Europeans are crazy on the subject of human contact. I've told you I believe you are serious people and won't be undermined by the introduction of newspapers
in the Soviet Union. I'll speak to our representative personally. He's not in Washington now, but I'll bring him back and speak with him. There should not be slow progress.
Minister Gromyko: Just in brief on the subject of the negotiations on the reduction of forces and armaments in Central Europe, we can in a sense understand why some pose the question in this way: “Let's just set a ceiling and both go down to that ceiling and just cut off everything above that." We're convinced that kind of approach will yield no positive results; we need a more realistic approach. We need to keep the present alignment-preserving that correlation of forces, and non-harming each other, we can find some success.
You have said it will be a long journey; we agree it will be long. We for our part have patience.
Secretary Kissinger: If the correlation is the same but at a lower level, this gives a certain advantage for the offensive side. One approach is agreement in principle on a common ceiling and in the first step have a symmetrical cut, say 10-15 percent each.
. Minister Gromyko: I should want to ask you to take another look at that entire area and at the positions made known by countries in Vienna. We were surprised by the oversimplicity of some Western nations in the talks. Perhaps you are not familiar with all the details.
Secretary Kissinger: Did I make that obvious?
So probably some of the countries are proceeding from the fact that this road will be a long one. If so, neither of us should regard that as a tragedy, even if it is long.
Secretary Kissinger: I've scheduled a review meeting when I get back. Then I'll have a more considered view.
Minister Gromyko: I appreciate it. A few words on trade and economic relations.
We certainly regret the situation that has developed in the U.S. Congress and the impediments erected in the way of resolving this question in Congress. It is a sad thing that the understandings made by
the President have not had effect. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union-and the General Secretary made this emphatic to me before I left-we appreciate very highly, very highly, the effort made by the President and Secretary Kissinger. The General Secretary made this point specifically to me. We note the statement of President Nixon that this problem-extension of MFN—will be resolved next Spring and the barriers to trade will be eliminated.
This is a reciprocal question, a two-way question-we're not standing with outstretched hands. It is to our mutual benefit.
Secretary Kissinger: We are in complete agreement. We have a common enemy–Senator Jackson. I speak frankly with you. We have no disagreement in principle or in practice. I have talked to Senator Fulbright and in January we'll start a publicity campaign by starting open hearings.
You are entirely right. We promised it to you. We owe it to you. And you are right that it is a reciprocal question. It is natural for two great powers, and especially for two great cooperative powers.
The President will certainly not sign the restrictive provisions now in it. He has said this publicly.
Minister Gromyko: To become law he must sign it?
Minister Gromyko: We'll have to wait and see how events go, hoping for a favorable outcome in the meantime.
Secretary Kissinger: Exactly.
Minister Gromyko: Before we end, I would like to give you a piece of information on some matters. This is also something General Secretary Brezhnev asked me to convey to President Nixon through you.
You know many Soviet leaders have visited Cuba. But there has never been a visit by the General Secretary of the Central Committee. The General Secretary intends to visit Cuba sometime in January. No agreements, political or economic, will be signed. It will be of a general political nature, and will not in the slightest way have any anti-American character. On the contrary, it will promote, as we see it, a better climate for relations between Cuba and the United States.
Secretary Kissinger: I appreciate that very much. The General Secretary was kind enough to hint at that during his visit.
Minister Gromyko: Yes, but not the timing.
Secretary Kissinger: May I say a personal word? This is personal, not official. Our President is usually calm and detached on all other issues, but on Cuba he is very emotional. This doesn't affect the fact of the visit—but the public manifestations. This is a personal word.
Minister Gromyko: The second point of information for the President is that there is a possibility, I repeat, a possibility, of a working