Gromyko: Suppose something is wrong on the understanding on Jerusalem; one of the parties doesn't fulfill it adequately. We should take heed of it, should draw attention to it. Kissinger: We should draw attention, yes. We do not exclude participation in guarantees if the parties concerned request it, and then we have to work out the text of the guarantees. Gromyko: First you say if they agree; then if they request. Kissinger: It amounts to the same thing. Gromyko: It should say "unless they disagree." Kissinger: Well, we won't impose guarantees on parties against their will. Gromyko: I detect a lack of enthusiasm. Kissinger: No, it is a lack of imagination. I don't know what you have in mind. If they request it, we can give it. If they say nothing, we can offer it. But not if they don't want it. Gromyko: That is too theoretical. Maybe even more for you than for me, guarantees can be something useful. The same for us-Egypt and Syria. You say: "If you ask strongly, maybe we agree." But we can say, "Look, gentlemen"—and in one case, Madame "we think it is useful." Kissinger: I think it is premature to go into details about it. Kissinger: See, you have a big plan for the Middle East. I am not a big planner; I have to let the situation develop. [Gromyko smiles] Gromyko: When will we review the Middle East situation again? When you come? Kissinger: Definitely. Gromyko: But not before. Kissinger: We are now working on the Syria matter. When I get a response, I will let Vorontsov know. Gromyko: Good. On Syria we will work... Kissinger: ... together. Will you let us know what their response is? Europe Gromyko: Yes. Are there any other Western European developments? Kissinger: Did I tell you about my conversation with Asad? How at the end of a long discussion he finally said there was one sentence in the letter [to Waldheim] that he objected to the one that said Syria agreed to come? Gromyko: You told me. Kissinger: Any Western European developments? No. Are you thinking of anything in particular that should refresh my memory? Gromyko: What is the goal of the Nine? To establish a superstate in Europe? Kissinger: Yes. Gromyko: Or just a collection of sovereign states? Kissinger: They want a united foreign and defense policy. Gromyko: Do the French agree? Kissinger: The French are pushing it. We are not supporting it. We are not yet opposing it but we are not supporting it. Gromyko: When is it scheduled? Kissinger: Five years. Gromyko: The French are always sensitive to this nuclear problem. West Germany. Kissinger: First they will combine with Britain. Gromyko: They will participate? Kissinger: That is the logic of events. A combined foreign policy, economic policy, and defense policy. Gromyko: What is behind it? What is the main factor that guides the French? Kissinger: Political assertiveness. Self-assertion. Gromyko: Self-assertion. To be stronger against you. Kissinger: And you. It is directed at us both. It is not very well thought through. They want our protection so they can carry out an anti-American foreign policy. risks. Gromyko: Double security. Kissinger: It is good if they can get it. Gromyko: And they think they are angels. Kissinger: They think you are the devil but that we will run the Gromyko: They see you as an angel. Kissinger: We are considered children; they think they can play with us. Gromyko: Jobert ... Kissinger: He thinks he is smarter than we. Gromyko: Jobert, whenever you talk with him, it is in so complicated a way. Kissinger: And nothing ever happens after you talk with him. This is what I've found. Gromyko: He doesn't like any kind of joint action between us even for peace. Kissinger: But he has no alternative. Gromyko: No constructive alternative. Kissinger: But he's in the great tradition of French diplomacy. Since Napoleon, other than de Gaulle Gromyko: Napoleon III? Kissinger: Napoleon III united Germany and Italy and made France a second-rate power. It may have been inevitable, but the French didn't have to do it. After World War I, the Rhineland was the key. They had to keep Germany in the east; all it took was to move into the Rhineland. Gromyko: When will they conclude the treaty, China and Japan? Kissinger: My impression, when I was in China, is that their relations go very slowly. What is your impression of what goes on in China? Gromyko: It is something like the Cultural Revolution, with Mao behind it. Kissinger: I must tell you, when I was at a dinner, I started discussing Confucius and all the Chinese at my table started shaking and getting nervous. I couldn't understand why my general discussion of an old philosopher had this effect. I was just making conversation. Gromyko: Maybe they draw a parallel between Confucious and somebody living. Then we pay attention to a statement by Teng Hsiao-ping." Now he is, I think, a deputy of Chou En-lai. He said: "I received a Japanese delegation because Chou is not a young man and it's difficult for him." And he made remarks hostile to the Soviet Union. We don't know what it means, this rearranging of the military. This process going on-there is no stability. Kissinger: No stability. But nothing has changed in our relationship and there are no military discussions of any kind. Dobrynin asked about helicopters. There are discussions going on; they wanted some, but it was very few. Gromyko: It is not an easy situation there for contacts. Kissinger: Very difficult. They're very open in a very restricted group with me. But no contact with the people. Maybe we can discuss it further in Moscow. 5 Charles de Gaulle, President of the French Republic from January 1959 to April 6 Deng Xiaoping (Teng Hsiao-ping), Vice Premier of the PRC State Council. Viet-Nam Gromyko: Any news from Viet-Nam? Kissinger: No. Gromyko: Comparative quiet. Kissinger: Comparatively quiet. If there is a major offensive, we will have to do something. But if it stays as it is, we won't do anything. [They get up and walk downstairs.] Gromyko: Our interest is in quiet and in fulfillment of the Agreement. Kissinger: And any influence you can use ... Gromyko: And this is a constant. Kissinger Trip [Dobrynin comes out to say goodbye.] Kissinger: Shall I plan to arrive on the evening of the 17th? Gromyko: Certainly. Kissinger: It will be about three days? Gromyko: The General Secretary said as much time as is necessary. Four to five days if needed. Kissinger: You think we will have serious talks on SALT? There almost have to be. Gromyko: Yes. Kissinger: Because if there are... I am looking very seriously at this. Anatoliy will confirm. Jackson and our military are now a united front. I will bring something concrete. If we do this, it will probably be four days. What dates did you suggest? Dobrynin: The 18th or 19th. Kissinger: Then I will come the evening of the 18th. Gromyko: Probably Zavidovo. Kissinger: Good. 161. Memorandum of Conversation1 Washington, March 13, 1974. SUBJECT Washington Post Luncheon PARTICIPANTS Department of State The Secretary George S. Vest, Special Assistant for Press Relations Washington Post Benjamin Bradlee-Executive Director Howard Simons-Managing Editor Philip Geyelin-Editorial Page Editor Meg Greenfield-Editorial Page Duty Editor Steve Rosenfeld-Editorial Page Richard Harwood-Assistant Managing Editor For National Affairs Lee Lescaze Assistant Foreign Editor Ronald Koven-Correspondent Murray Marder-Correspondent Marilyn Berger-Correspondent [Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Soviet Union.] Question: What's happening to détente and what are the Soviets up to? The Secretary: There has been much argument over who has gained what in the process of détente. You should keep in mind that the Soviets could ask themselves rather searching questions about whether they have gained enough in the process. Grain, yes, they did gain. It was not discussed at the Summit between the President and Brezhnev. But they did put one over on us because of a bumbling bureaucracy. But except for the wheat deal what have they gotten out of détente? In this country some liberal groups seem unwilling to accept any monument to an achievement by this administration. I think we have to assess in which direction Soviet attitudes are moving. I think I can detect a certain chill in Soviet attitudes. They are faced with a lot of problems when they look at the course of affairs inside the U.S. and even a compromise with Jackson on MFN may not 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1028, Presidential/HAK MemCons, MemCons-HAK & Presidential, March 1-May 8, 1974 [3 of 4]. Limited Official Use. This meeting, held at the Washington Post building, was conducted on a deep background basis. |