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commitment to an honorable conclusion of the conflict and my representatives will remain ready to engage in prompt, productive negotiations to that end. I will be fully alert to any indication that the other side is prepared to pursue this path. I am looking forward to the results of the mission you mentioned during my last meeting with you.
Mr. General Secretary, I shall await with interest your own reflections on the considerations I have outlined in this message. The long road that brought us to the Moscow summit was not an easy one, and it was marked by many detours. Given the many important differences which we both recognize remain and will continue to remain between us, the road to the next summit meeting will undoubtedly not be an easy one either. But we now know how to prepare and we can accelerate the process. I hope that when the not too distant time comes that we may repay here the hospitality extended to us in the Soviet Union, we will be able to show new accomplishments in the cause of peace for our two countries and the world as a whole. That should be the goal of all our endeavors in the weeks and months ahead.
Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1
Washington, June 12, 1972.
1. I saw Dobrynin at 12:30 pm today due to a conflict in his schedule. I told him that in response to his message of yesterday2 and after discussing the issue with you and the President we wished to confirm that there would be no air activity over Hanoi or Haiphong during the period just prior to the arrival of the Soviet Delegation and through
1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 494, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 12. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. A handwritten notation at the top of the memorandum reads: "HAK has seen."
2 Not found.
their departure. I told him that this was consistent with the discussions held by the President with the Soviet Leaders at the time of the Moscow Summit, adding that if I could have a firm assurance of the time that the Soviet Delegation would be spending in Hanoi it might be possible to add some additional restrictions but in any case it would be impossible to halt U.S. air activity throughout North Vietnam. Dobrynin stated that he thought the group would be there three or four days and could not be sure precisely but that in any event the period would be so brief that it would not result in a major military implication for the U.S.
I then told Dobrynin that you had asked me to see him urgently and inform him that during the February visit to Peking3 it had been agreed that you would make a subsequent visit to that capitol and that in recent days Peking had expressed a great sense of urgency that your followup visit take place very soon. I pointed out that we had been attempting to delay the visit but that the June 26 visit of the leaders of the House, the Democratic Convention during which it would be impossible for you to be in Peking for domestic political reasons and in light of the actions planned for September, you and the President had determined that it would be necessary for you to accept Peking's invitation and that you planned to be in Peking for three full days next week, arriving Monday evening and departing Friday a.m.* I emphasized that matters of Soviet interest would be assiduously avoided and that the President was most anxious that the Soviet leaders were aware of his determination to abide strictly to the provisions of the principles arrived at by the two parties during his visit to Moscow.5 Dobrynin seemed a little disturbed and noted that we were aware of the Congressional visit and the Democratic Convention long before now and he, therefore, wondered why the Soviet side had not been informed of your visit to Peking earlier. I pointed out that we had hoped to have it occur much later but that Peking was insistent and that they had made reference to the situation in Southeast Asia. Therefore, in the light of all these factors the President had decided to proceed next week. I mentioned that this decision had just been made and that you had flashed me from Tokyo so that Ambassador Dobrynin would be informed as soon as possible. I pointed out that the visit was not known by any other U.S. officials and that we now planned to make a low-keyed announcement on Wednesday at 11:00 a.m. I also pointed out that you were very anxious to meet with the Ambassador at breakfast on Tuesday morning and would cover in greater detail the circumstances surrounding your visit to Peking. He stated that he was scheduled to
Kissinger accompanied Nixon on his trip to China, February 21-28.
5 See footnote 10, Document 1.
have breakfast with Secretary Peterson on Tuesday and I told him that I would take care of that problem and he offered to meet with Peterson Wednesday, Thursday or Friday.
[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than U.S.-Soviet relations.]
10. Breakfast is set up in the Map Room at 8:30 am tomorrow morning with Dobrynin.
[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than U.S.-Soviet relations.]
3. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the
Washington, June 13, 1972, 4:53 p.m.
D: Hello, Henry.
K: Anatol, two things.
K: One, on that trip-I mean, not mine but yours.2
K: We have put on the restriction I mentioned to you this morning.
K: And we will maintain it until he leaves if it is within a reasonable time.
1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Telephone Conversations (Telcons), Box 14, Chronological File. No classification marking. Blank underscores are omissions in the original
2 Kissinger is referring to Podgorny's upcoming trip to Hanoi.
3 According to Kissinger's Record of Schedule, he met with Dobrynin in the Map Room for breakfast, 8:32-10:16 a.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1967–76) In a June 13 memorandum, Haig wrote Kissinger: "Inform Dobrynin that in light of the brevity of Podgorny's visit to Hanoi, you have prevailed upon the President to extend the bombing restrictions to a line south of 20° latitude throughout the period of Podgorny's visit. Mention that this restriction is being applied in the face of strong bureaucratic opposition but that we are making this exception as an expression of our good will and interest in Podgorny's activities in Hanoi." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 67, Country Files-Europe USSR, Map Room, Aug. 1972-May 31, 1973 (1 of 3)) No other record of the meeting has been found.
D: Yeah, I understand. Okay, thank you.
K: Yes, but it is important that you tell me as soon as you can once you know the time is.
D: I will check with them but I am sure nobody could answer me right now because it will depend-he probably already arrived today or if he doesn't arrive but how many days, I just tell you reasonably it probably take around four days but nobody could tell as of now. Particularly, because it is not just a quick visit in a sense, that is, a visit from this till this one. He will just have an informal discussion with them but it will not be long, I am sure about this.
K: Well, if you could let me know, then I will not put an arbitrary restriction on.
D: Yeah, I understand. May I put it this way, I will say to-by Saturday or what you say, or you don't want really-better not to mention, of course, specifically but―
K: Well, we have now put it on through Saturday their time.
D: I see.
K: But if your leader should stay an extra day, could you let me know?
K: And we will not do anything while he's there.
D: Yeah, I understand. Okay, I think it's fair enough. Saturday, yes, their time.
K: As it is now, the orders are to go through Saturday.
D: Yes, understand.
K: But if you let me know before, say Friday, or let Haig know that he's staying, say through Sunday.
K: We will not do anything while he's in the country.
D: I understand. It involved that
D: Okay, thank you.
K: Secondly, I have on this issue of how we present the treaties.*
K: We have found a formula which I think you might find interesting. We will invite the two foreign relations committees and the two armed services committees
*In his June 13 memorandum to Kissinger, Haig wrote: "Inform Dobrynin that we are transmitting the SALT legislation to the Hill at noon today." He recommended that Kissinger explain "the packaging of the legislation" and the "general format of testimony."
D: The whole committees.
K: The whole committees. And the Joint Atomic Energy Committee to the White House together with the press
K: The press pool.
D: I see.
K: And I will present them. The President will introduce me and I will introduce me [it?] and I will present it.
D: Um-humm. It's quite a performance (laughter).
K: So it will not be on television but it will be a very full press coverage.
D: I see. You'll be in the White House?
K: And it will be in the White House.
D: Is it any timetable or you cannot say?
K: We haven't told the press so it's strictly for you.
D: I understand.
K: Thursday morning at 9:00.5
D: Oh, Thursday morning. So it's really before you go?
D: I see. I think it's a very good idea.
K: It will not make my reception much warmer when I say friendly things about you.
D: (laughter) So I see you are not really exhausted by your trip to the Orient. Still there are some ideas following.
D: Okay, thank you. So we will-somebody will be in touch with you.
D: You are leaving on the end of Thursday or Friday?
K: I'm leaving either at the end of Thursday or Friday morning.
K: But you will let Haig know?
D: Yeah. He knows?
K: Yes, he's fully informed.
D: Yeah. Okay about this one. And we will have this warm line I hope.
5 The June 15 White House briefing was reported in The New York Times, June 16, 1972, p. 1. For the text of the President's remarks, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1972, pp. 676-679.