With regard to lend-lease, Peterson urged that if the President agrees to a lend-lease settlement (Peterson believes concessions in this area are possible), he insist the lend-lease settlement be a part of an overall deal and that the President stay tough on a comprehensive trade agreement. The President agreed with this proposal. The President instructed Kissinger to work out a message3 which could be sent to Brezhnev regarding our interest in a gas deal, and also to give thought to the best way to reach a lend-lease settlement. 3 Not found. 25. Memorandum of Conversation1 Washington, August 11, 1972, 1:15-3 p.m. PARTICIPANTS Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Socialist Republics to the United States The lunch was shifted to the Soviet Embassy from the Map Room at the last moment because the President's departure for Camp David had brought the press to the South Lawn. Dobrynin began the lunch by reflecting about the Presidential campaign. He was not clear in his own mind whether McGovern represented a new phenomenon or simply a reflection of a political accident. He asked how McGovern would react in a crisis. I replied that it was hard to predict but the possibility of a violent, outraged reaction to provocation could not be excluded. Dobrynin replied that in that case it was important to keep tension high but just below the level of explosion. Economic Relations Turning to economic issues Dobrynin asked how I assessed Peterson's trip. I replied that the topics were complex and technical. It 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 495, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 13. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting took place at the Soviet Embassy. At the meeting, Kissinger handed Dobrynin a draft announcement of Kissinger's upcoming trip to Moscow from September 10 to 13. (Ibid.) was therefore inevitable that discussions would be prolonged. I said that I expected to settle the Lend-Lease issue when I visited Moscow in September at a figure between our last two proposals (42% to 2%). I would also be prepared to suggest major progress on LNG following Brezhnev's injunction that there should be deeds not words. I pointed out that we were planning to establish a Presidential Commission on gas in the latter part of September to give a focus to our policy. The Soviet leaders could help by making sure we were informed about their dealings with private U.S. companies or there was likely to be total chaos. Dobrynin indicated that he considered this approach extremely positive. I said that we would have Lynn stand by to join me in Moscow and I therefore suggested putting the economic issue first on the agenda. Dobrynin indicated a readiness to go along with this. Nuclear Understanding The conversation next turned to the nuclear agreement. Dobrynin said that Brezhnev was very eager for it to come off. I told him sketchily of my conversation with the British.2 They had been appalled at the whole idea. I was now asking them to redraft an acceptable first clause without having shown them the Soviet text. Dobrynin replied that he had expected this reaction but Britain should be reassured by Article III. I pointed out that this should be introduced only after the principle of an agreement was established. Dobrynin indicated continued great concern. I said that I would try to have a draft by August 18. Middle East Dobrynin next produced a letter from Brezhnev (attached)3 urging a resumption of bilateral Middle East negotiations. He hoped I would have a concrete scheme in September. I indicated that it would be difficult to come up with a comprehensive scheme given all the other pressures on me. Dobrynin suggested that some concrete proposal regarding what we meant by security zones would advance matters. He eschewed the pretense that the Soviet withdrawal represented an ad 2 Kissinger wrote in his memoirs: "At the end of July 1972, I had used the regular visit to Washington by Sir Burke Trend, the British Cabinet Secretary to show him the Soviet draft of July 21 [see Document 17]. I asked for British advice, and indicated that we would proceed only in tandem with London. On August 10 the Foreign Office sent its Soviet expert, Sir Thomas Brimelow, and a small group of advisers to Washington to review the project in detail." Kissinger continued, "In his [Brimelow's] view, the Soviets wanted to reduce the margin of their own uncertainty while seeking to magnify allied inhibitions against the use of nuclear weapons. Our course must thwart those designs. Brimelow, as did we, judged existing Soviet drafts unacceptable. I outlined a possible strategy of seeking to transform the Soviet approach into a statement of principles of political restraint proscribing the threat of force, nuclear or conventional." (Years of Upheaval, p. 278) 3 Attached but not printed. VANCE payment on the offer of last October. He said it was important not to permit small countries to dominate great powers. Sadat had miscalculated. He had thought the request to leave would produce negotiations. Instead the Soviet Union had pulled everybody out. When the Egyptian military realized the implications for maintainence and overall combat effectiveness it might turn out that the chapter was not yet closed. Korea Dobrynin pointed out that my suggestion to avoid a UN debate on Korea in return for the disbandment of UNCURK during the year had been transmitted to Pyongyang. No reply had as yet been received. Vietnam Dobrynin then turned to Vietnam. His impression was that the North Vietnamese were still counting on our Presidential elections— not in the sense of counting on a McGovern victory but because they thought we would make concessions under the pressures of a campaign. I asked him what he thought. He said Hanoi had proved its lack of concern by launching an offensive so close to the summit." Dobrynin thought that if the President was still far ahead in late September a break might come. Dobrynin did not think much of Hanoi's last proposal which he described as an offer to Thieu to negotiate his own demise. Other Bilateral Matters Dobrynin asked about when he would receive the bail for Markelov and Ivanov and I reassured him that it would be soon. Dobrynin then asked informally whether I could use my influence with Time-Life to prevent the showing of the film on Khrushchev's life. He said it would be most appreciated in Moscow. I told him I would talk to Donovan.8 We agreed to meet again on August 18 at the White House. 4 See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971-May 1972, Document 5. 5 A reference to the Easter Offensive, March 30-October 22. "See Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, volume VIII, Vietnam, January 1972-October 1972, Document 228. 7 See footnote 6, Document 23. 8 In a telephone conversation on August 28 at 3:42 p.m., Kissinger told Dobrynin that he had spoken with Hedley Donovan, Editor-in-Chief of Time, Inc. Kissinger reported that Donovan had said "they have not yet sold that film" and that "at least they won't do it this year." Kissinger continued: "I would assume that we will have announced the Brezhnev visit some time early next year, and then we can delay it again until after that." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Telephone Conversations (Telcons), Box 14, Chronological File) 26. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Moscow, August 16, 1972. Dear Mr. President, In addition to our recent exchange of letters on the Middle East? I would like to express now some considerations on a wider range of questions in connection with your letter of July 183 and your conversation with our Ambassador in San Clemente.4 Development of events during the period of time since the meeting in Moscow confirms, in our view, that this meeting and its results favorably influence the relations between our two countries and also have broader international impact. It is of course important that well-started work on implementation of the agreements and arrangements achieved in Moscow should be continued further on. We have underway, as in the United States, the process of ratification of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and everything necessary is being done that this Treaty and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms enter into force in the possible nearest time. It is necessary, however, that meanwhile no steps or statements are made which would cast a shadow on the big work done in achieving these agreements. We are contemplating now the questions to be concentrated upon during the forthcoming second stage of negotiations on further limitation of strategic offensive arms. We will be prepared to exchange opinions with you on these questions-using for this purpose, in particular, Dr. Kissinger's visit to Moscow in September-in order to give then appropriate instructions to our delegations at the negotiations. We are gratified to note the progress already achieved by appropriate Soviet and American authorities in implementation of the agree 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 495, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 13. Top Secret. A handwritten notation at the top of the letter reads: "Handed to General Haig by Amb. Dobrynin at 12:30 pm on 8/17/ 72." The text of the letter was forwarded to Kissinger in Saigon on August 17 in message Tohak 72. (Ibid.) Kissinger was on a secret trip to Paris, Switzerland, Saigon, and Tokyo. He visited Saigon from August 17 to 19. 2 Brezhnev's letter to Nixon of August 8 on the Middle East is ibid. Dobrynin gave it to Kissinger on August 11; see Document 25. For Nixon's letter to Brezhnev of July 27 on the Middle East, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1969-1972. 3 Document 10. 4 See Document 8. ments signed in Moscow on cooperation between the USSR and the US in the fields of science and technology, research in outer space, medical science and public health. There is some movement forward also in the commercial and economic field. We have come [far?] in particular for concluding an agreement on purchases in the United States during a number of years of a big quantity of grain. You attached as I remember great importance to the achievement of such an agreement. At the same time it should be put straight that the main questions, solution of which is necessary for a sharp increase in the commercial and economic field-and first of all the questions of the most favored nation treatment, credits and debt-payments on the lend-lease-remain still unsettled. As I have already told your Secretary of Commerce Mr. Peterson we expect that more understanding of the political aspects of these questions will be displayed by the US side. For example, it would be hardly right to apply purely commercial approach to the solution of the problem of payment of interest in connection with the debt for the lend-lease supplies, having in mind the circumstances of this debt's origin. In the European affairs the questions of preparing and convening the All-European Conference are now moving to the forefront and demand practical solution. We believe the time has come to fix a concrete date of beginning the multilateral preparatory consultations. This would give more purposefulness to the preparatory work. With due account also of the considerations of the American side it appears to be possible to take up such consultations in any case not later than November 1972 with a view that a meeting itself, as we have agreed with you, should be convened without undue delay. Now a few words on the question of reduction of armed forces and armaments in Europe. We together with our allies have always attached importance to this problem, have undertaken appropriate initiatives and at the present time continue to contemplate the most appropriate ways of its solution. However, the question of reduction of armaments in Europe should in no way,-and as we believe, this is the essence of the understanding reached between us in Moscow on this question,-be used for delaying and complicating the multilateral consultations on preparing and carrying out the All-European Conference. Unfortunately, Mr. President, the continuing war in Vietnam remains to be a source of negative influence on international relations in general and, it should be put straight, on the relations between our two countries. 5 See Document 21. |