It goes without saying that we positively regard the fact that in Paris both official and unofficial meetings have been resumed and that some forward movement has begun to show in the course of the meetings, which took place. As it has been confirmed by your remarks as well, the efforts taken by us contributed to the progress at the meetings in Paris.

Now an especially responsible moment has come in the Vietnamese affairs—in fact, a question is being decided whether it will be possible to put the Vietnam problem on reliable rails of political settlement or the war there will still continue for an indefinitely long time with all insuing consequences. One would like to hope that those possibilities for political settlement that exist will not be lost.

In this connection one cannot but feel serious concern about the incessant and even increasing bombing of the DRV territory by American air force and other military actions by the United States against the DRV. Information coming from Vietnam shows that the actions there of the US armed forces have the nature of genuine terror against the population of that country and of systematic destruction of its economy.

Besides the fact that the increasing of bombing and other military actions against the DRV in no way can promote the search for mutually acceptable decisions at the table of negotiations, the following point is important here. In these circumstances an opportunity is being restricted, if not to say more for rendering assistance to political settlement of the conflict on the part of those who would like to do it.

We have already informed you, Mr. President, about our willingness to receive Dr. Kissinger on September 11 in Moscow in order to discuss the course of implementation of the agreements reached during the meeting in May, as well as to continue the search for ways of settlement of those problems which still complicate our relations.

In conclusion, I would like to tell you once again that we highly value and consider it very important and useful the established practice of confidential exchange of views between us. Especially important is that frankness which is notable for this exchange of views. In our opinion, only such approach can secure a basis for mutual trust so necessary for genuine improvement of Soviet-American relations which we are sincerely striving for.

Sincerely,

"Printed from a copy with this typed signature.

L. Brezhnev

27.

Backchannel Message From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) in Saigon1

Washington, August 17, 1972, 2325Z.

WHS 2136/Tohak 63. Press stories from Moscow that Soviets instituting new system of exit fees ranging from $5000 to $25,000 for educated Jews wishing to emigrate to Israel has stirred up storm among Jewish community. Previously, there had been general $1000 exit fee.

In response to numerous calls, Rogers has agreed to meet with three co-chairmen of Conference on Soviet Jewry Friday.2 They are Stein, Maass and Max Fisher.3 Although in that meeting, Rogers expects only to listen to Jewish leaders he is seeking authority to call in Dobrynin to caution him that if true the above reports will cause major political problem for President. I understand John Mitchell and Colson favor such démarche.5 There are also indications that Democrats on Hill may attempt to get some sort of resolution condemning Soviet

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 23, HAK Trip Files, HAK's Secret Paris Trip, Switzerland, Saigon, Tokyo, August 13-19, 1972, To/Frm 86971 & Backchannels. Secret; Eyes Only; Flash. A stamped notation on the message indicates it was received in the White House Situation Room at 8:23 p.m. on August 17.

2 August 18. At 6:45 p.m. on August 17, Haig spoke by telephone with Rogers, who warned that the Soviet position on the educational fee could "blow up in a problem for the President quickly," and promised when meeting the Jewish leaders "to try and cool them off." (Ibid., Box 998, Alexander M. Haig Chronological Files, Haig Telcons, 1972, [1 of 2])

3 Jacob Stein, Richard Maass, and Max Fisher.

4 Rogers checked with Haig during their August 17 telephone conversation about calling in Dobrynin privately. Haig thought the President "will go along, but I think we had better check with him simply because he has been so adamant about this subject." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 998, Alexander M. Haig Chronological Files, Haig Telcons, 1972, [1 of 2])

5 Colson wrote Haig regarding the Soviet exit fees on August 17: "All of our Jewish experts say that we are about to lose all of the important ground that we have gained with the Jewish vote over the present brouhaha with the Soviets. Is there no end to what has to be done to keep their vote solid? I am sorry to bother you with this one, but our Jewish polls tell us we have real problems." Haig replied in a memorandum to Colson on August 19: "I can assure you that we are wrestling intensively with this issue. However, for far more important reasons than the Jewish vote, it is essential that there be absolutely nothing said on this subject by any White House officials. I will keep you posted on how this explosive issue evolves." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 995, Alexander M. Haig Chronological Files, Haig Chron Aug 10-24, 1972)

measures and criticizing President for insensitivity. Situation is of course exacerbated by Rockefeller episode.?

Rogers has been trying to reach President on this but so far has not apparently succeeded. I believe in the circumstances a low-key talk to Dobrynin by Rogers is proper course. Would appreciate your urgent reaction.

Recommend the following:

I call Dobrynin in your behest and tell him that this matter could stir terrible domestic political crisis since liberal Democrats are already moving fast to establish barriers against further U.S./Soviet relations, trade, etc. Following this call we could then give Rogers authority to talk to Dobrynin and I will alert Dobrynin that Rogers will formally contact him so that we can publicly confirm that we have discussed with Soviets. Should Dobrynin have some contrary information, we can set the Democrats up for subsequent criticism for over reaction and at the same time not disturb our relations with the Soviets.

❝ Rogers also told Haig during their August 17 phone conversation that the Democrats wanted the grain deal with the Soviet Union called off unless the Soviets voided their ruling on the educational fee. Rogers suggested that “it could have a serious effect on our relations with the Soviet Union and have a serious effect on the President's political..." (Ibid., Box 998, Alexander M. Haig Chronological Files, Haig Telcons, 1972, [1 of 2]) 7 In a message to Kissinger on August 14, Haig wrote: "We have had exciting 24 hours, with Governor Rockefeller announcing in Israel that you had told him that an agreement had been worked out in Moscow at the time of the Summit which would provide for 35,000 Jews to emigrate each year. Without the benefit of talking to the Governor, I pulled back gently from that position and gave Ziegler the following guidance: (1) The U.S. position on the right of emigration is clear; and (2) up to June of this year there have been over 15,000 Jews who emigrated. At this rate, there will be between 30,000–35,000 by the end of the year. We have nothing more to add other than to confirm in a Question and Answer that the subject was discussed in Moscow." (Ibid., Kissinger Office Files, Box 23, HAK Trip Files, HAK's Secret Paris Trip, Switzerland, Saigon, Tokyo, August 13-19, 1972, To/Frm 86971 & Backchannels)

28. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) and Secretary of State Rogers1

R: Hello, Al.

Washington, August 18, 1972, 8:45 a.m.

H: Good morning. sir. The President called down. I passed that word up on the Jewish problem.

R: OK.

H: Haldeman says the President does not want any démarches yet.
R: OK.

H: With the Soviets. And hoped that we could keep the meeting today2 which he recognizes is a real tough one for you, with the minimum possible profile.

R: Yeh, well we'll try to keep it without any profile. (Laughter)

H: OK. I don't know how long this is going to hold, but he [Nixon] said he'd just rather wait because he thinks the other side is gonna overreact and the Soviets are fairly subtle too. They've got some things in the fire.

R: Yeah. Well that's fine with me. I think we had to see them though.

H: Oh, yeah.

R: I mean see the Jewish leaders. So I think by talking to them they'll recognize the better thing is not to do it all publicly. But I'm going to try to convince them to let us just handle it the way we handle a lot of these other things and don't-keep the lid on and don't get out and...

H: But he hopes there won't be any promise, you know, that we're going to hit the, you know, that they won't...

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 998, Alexander M. Haig Chronological Files, Haig Telcons, 1972 [1 of 2]. No classification marking. In message Tohak 78, August 18, Haig informed Kissinger that he had carried out the instructions regarding Rogers' proposed meeting with Dobrynin over the exit fee issue. Haig wrote that "I have brutalized Rogers after clearing it with the President, and there will be no contacts whatsoever with the Soviets." He continued: "The meeting with Rogers and the Jewish leaders will proceed without press in the most low-keyed way this afternoon. I have talked to Rogers about it personally, and he understands and will comply. There will be no public statement by the White House or State. Ron [Ziegler] will defer to State." (Ibid., Kissinger Office Files, Box 23, HAK Trip Files, HAK's Secret Paris Trip, Switzerland, Saigon, Tokyo, August 13-19, 1972, To/Frm 86971 & Backchannels)

2 A reference to Rogers' meeting with the co-chairmen of the Conference on Soviet Jewry. No record of the meeting was found, but the three Jewish leaders briefed the press after the meeting. See "U.S. Is Said to Tell Soviet of Its Concern Over Jews," The New York Times, August 19, 1972, p. 1.

R: Oh, I won't make any promise, hell no. I don't think there's anything we can do. All I want to do is just welcome them in and keep them quiet.

H: Keep them quiet.

R: OK, fine Al.

H: Thank you sir.

29.

Memorandum From Secretary of Commerce Peterson to the
President's Assistant for National Security Affairs

(Kissinger) and the Executive Director of the Council for
International Economic Policy (Flanigan)1

Washington, August 19, 1972.

SUBJECT

Meeting of Peterson and Lynn with Dobrynin (August 15, 1972)

Dobrynin stated that Patolichev's heart spasm suffered at the airport when we left was quite serious; he had gone to the hospital but was now home recovering.

Peterson gave his favorable impressions of Brezhnev, and Dobrynin indicated his longtime close relationship with Brezhnev. Dobrynin wants copies of our pictures of the Brezhnev meeting.

Peterson went through the press clippings offsetting Schwartz article which claimed that we are tying progress on trade to assistance by the Soviets on Vietnam.2 Also, Peterson indicated how he is emphasizing big joint gas and raw material deals. Dobrynin seemed satisfied.

Peterson spoke frankly on our real impression of the Moscow trade talks—that notwithstanding what we considered to be a forthcoming package proposal to Patolichev in our private sessions, they had not moved, and in fact had taken a couple steps backward. He pointed out we had said this candidly to Patolichev the day before we left and had then pointed out that if their lack of movement was by reason of an impression the President needed agreement before the

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 67, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Map Room, Aug. 1972–May 31, 1973 [3 of 3]. Secret.

2 A reference to Moscow correspondent Harry Schwartz' op-ed article in The New York Times on August 7 entitled "Moscow Smiles."