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Secretary Kissinger: All right. Let me-how should we therefore leave this? Just for our consideration. Should we talk about it again here, or should we leave it until the Foreign Minister comes to Washington?

General Secretary Brezhnev: I think we could take it up again while you are here.

Secretary Kissinger: All right. Our concern is to have some ceiling on land-based missiles and some ceiling on the heaviest missiles.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: MIRVed.
Secretary Kissinger: MIRVed. We are talking about MIRVed, yes.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Whenever a question is too challenging or difficult, the best thing is to put it in your briefcase and sleep on it. Then you will ask yourself what the fuss was about.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

General Secretary Brezhnev: So maybe we should discuss another question relating to this military sphere.

Secretary Kissinger: We could discuss MBFR—or did you mean the things the General Secretary mentioned this morning?3

General Secretary Brezhnev: This morning: Tridents, B-1, withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the Mediterranean, the ban on underground testing-all of these are important issues.

Secretary Kissinger: Of these issues, I am quite confident we can agree on the ABM proposal. No second ABM. I am quite sure we can

agree to that.

General Secretary Brezhnev: It is quite useless work anyway.

Secretary Kissinger: On B-1, I don't think we could stop work on it. But we could agree not to deploy it to operational units during the period of this agreement. And freeze the number of heavy bombers during the period of the agreement.

General Secretary Brezhnev: What about Trident submarines?

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to Trident submarines, I believe we would have to do it in terms of what the General Secretary saidthat is, if the agreement is extended, we would have to deploy three of those submarines.

General Secretary Brezhnev: During the period of the agreement?
Secretary Kissinger: In the last

year

of the agreement. General Secretary Brezhnev: In 1980.

Secretary Kissinger: In 1978. One in 1978, and the others in 1979. That is a delay; that is lower than otherwise ...

3 See Document 165.

General Secretary Brezhnev: So that would mean approximately an additional 75 MIRVed missiles.

Secretary Kissinger: Seventy-two.

Mr. Korniyenko: But instead of other submarines. Because if the agreement is prolonged, the figures will be kept.

Secretary Kissinger: But-we can discuss it—the agreement is basically for 44 submarines. We have an understanding that we will build only 41 during the period of the agreement, which is in a letter from the President.

General Secretary Brezhnev: True. But then we should be entitled to build new ones too.

Secretary Kissinger: New types or numbers?
General Secretary Brezhnev: Because Trident is a new type.
Secretary Kissinger: Within the 62 you can build new types.

General Secretary Brezhnev: But that surely is a departure from the agreement already entered into, and that again would mean prejudicing the basic principle of balance. Merely because of what somebody from the Pentagon tells you. We are being told things too.

Basically, we are building types of submarines you are familiar with, not building anything new. You are talking about having Trident, a product in hand, but wouldn't build them in the period of the agreement. But you would afterward.

Secretary Kissinger: No, we said we wouldn't have any of them operational or on sea trials during the period of the agreement.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Will not be commissioned.

Secretary Kissinger: That is correct. That is no disagreement. Our definition of "commissioned," which we all agreed to, with respect to when weapons have to be destroyed, is when a boat is put into the ocean. And we won't have any Tridents during the life of the Interim Agreement.

Ambassador Stoessel: They will be ready.

Secretary Kissinger: They will be ready, but they won't be tested during the life of the agreement. And then it takes six months of trials. Jan?

Mr. Lodal: More like a year. Thirteen months. They are launched, then after four months, there are 13 months for sea trials.

Secretary Kissinger: So 17 months?
Mr. Lodal: More like 16 or 17 months.

Secretary Kissinger: That is our program; it could be speeded up, I suppose.

[Secretary Kissinger looks over the schedule of Trident deployments and confers with Sonnenfeldt and Lodal.]

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No, it is thirteen months. This is the schedule of Trident.
They are criticizing me for giving away too much.
General Secretary Brezhnev: There are no secrets.

Secretary Kissinger: Our only protection is, so much is known that no one can tell the difference between what is true and what isn't.

General Secretary Brezhnev: On ABM, as I see it, we can reach agreement.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

General Secretary Brezhnev: What about the ending of underground nuclear tests, by way of a joint statement or agreement?

Secretary Kissinger: As I told your Ambassador, it is very difficult for us. But your idea today-that the end be put in some future period—is something new, which I hadn't heard.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: January 1, 1976.

Secretary Kissinger: So we would like to consider this a little further.

General Secretary Brezhnev: You are welcome.

There is another question, which I omitted to mention this morning, that is, an agreement banning activity modifying the environment for military purposes, detrimental to the well-being and health. That seems to us a very humane field of endeavor, which would benefit mankind.

Secretary Kissinger: I told your Ambassador we actually have a study on this, which it will take some weeks to complete. Maybe we will get some ideas while I am here.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Well, we could try and set out our views on this matter.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

General Secretary Brezhnev: There is also the question I did mention this morning, the withdrawal of American and Soviet atomic submarines carrying nuclear missiles and aircraft carriers carrying nuclear weapons from the Mediterranean—in short, all nuclear weapons.

Secretary Kissinger: That I believe would be more difficult.
General Secretary Brezhnev: Why?

Secretary Kissinger: Because our aircraft carriers are there not only in connection with our relationship but also in connection with our relationships in the Mediterranean.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Since we both agreed to be very frank in our dealings with each other, let me say I don't find that argument at

I

4 See footnote 9, Document 174.

all convincing. I mean, for instance, what would you say if we introduced atomic weapons into all socialist countries and said it had nothing to do with our relations but came from our relationships with socialist countries and that is that?

Secretary Kissinger: But our impression is you do have nuclear weapons in socialist countries.

General Secretary Brezhnev: We have no atomic weapons anywhere and don't give atomic weapons to anyone.

Secretary Kissinger: We don't give them to anyone but these aircraft carriers are related to the situation in the Middle East.

General Secretary Brezhnev: That would be tantamount to our giving surface-to-surface missiles to Egypt and Syria and saying .

Secretary Kissinger: That is different, Mr. General Secretary. Aircraft carriers are under American control.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Egypt and Syria would be only too happy to have surface-to-surface missiles.

Secretary Kissinger: The Egyptians told us you gave them surface-to-surface missiles. And Arabs never tell an untruth.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Sadat was offended at us for not allowing him to fire surface-to-surface missiles even without nuclear warheads.

Secretary Kissinger: One (was fired) on the last day of the war.

General Secretary Brezhnev: They were under our control the whole time.

Secretary Kissinger: We thought it was a very constructive move. But we haven't given surface-to-surface missiles to the Israelis.

General Secretary Brezhnev: That may be true, but I am talking about the situation as it stands. Incidentally, Egypt tells you one thing and us another.

Secretary Kissinger: I find it hard to believe Arabs wouldn't tell you the exact truth. [Brezhnev and Gromyko smile; Kissinger laughs.]

General Secretary Brezhnev: I think my smile says enough.

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, I am sure some countries in the Middle East are telling you one thing and us another, and would like nothing better than to have us quarrel because of them. Relationships in that area are even more temporary than elsewhere. So we have no illusions.

General Secretary Brezhnev: We have some information that Libya is about to unite with America. Or Libya wants America to join it, under the aegis of Qaddafi.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: But you can't have two Presidents!

Secretary Kissinger: That is why I thought they would unite with

I Saudi Arabia. But it is an interesting idea. Soon they will have more dollars than we do.

Ambassador Dobrynin: It is true.

General Secretary Brezhnev: It would certainly look good if you and we could agree to withdraw nuclear weapons from the Mediterranean. Surely that would be welcomed throughout the world. We would thereby certainly show the world's public that we are earnest and serious partners. For after all, what reason is there for us or you to swim in that basin? And surely all of the countries of that region would welcome that agreement.

Well, I don't want to believe that question is over and done with, because I know Dr. Kissinger so well that I am sure he will think it over and come up with something tomorrow.

Secretary Kissinger: Maybe not tomorrow.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Maybe after lunch. Taking account of an eight-hour difference in time, it will be the day after tomorrow.

One other question I didn't list: a possible agreement to ban chemical weapons.

Secretary Kissinger: To ban the use of chemical weapons, or production?

General Secretary Brezhnev: Both production and use. Now you see the kind of important documents we can sign by the time of the meeting

Secretary Kissinger: Ban the use—that we can almost certainly do. I want to be specific. Banning the use will be no problem; I mean it can be done. On banning production, the argument will be made that there is no way to inspect it. Our production is not very great.

Ambassador Dobrynin: Some chemical weapons are lethal.

Secretary Kissinger: You propose the end of production of lethal ones?

Ambassador Dobrynin: Yes.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Up to now, you and the British and the French have been in favor only of a partial ban on the use, not on production. So no forward progress has been made. What we are suggesting is that you and we enter into an arrangement that can be the basis of an international arrangement. Because it can be solved only on an international basis.

Secretary Kissinger: What is the exact attribute?
Ambassador Dobrynin: The most lethal.
Secretary Kissinger: Less lethal are okay?

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