Brezhnev: It is an excellent idea, and we will suggest cooperating on the 162. [Laughter] Kissinger: But our most immediate objective is to get the trade legislation passed, which we hope to achieve in June or July. We believe that long-term trade between the United States and the Soviet Union is of mutual benefit and we will do our utmost to encourage it. It is not a unilateral thing we do for the Soviet Union, and we have never looked at it that way. Brezhnev: What are the real prospects? Do you have a strong conviction that something can be done by June? Kissinger: Speaking frankly, I believe if our political relations remain good as I believe they will-and if we can do something on the problems I discussed with Ambassador Dobrynin, that we now have the possibility in the Senate to bring about a compromise that will lead to the granting of MFN. Many Senators told me before I left for the Soviet Union that they were eager to work for a compromise-Senators that have supported Senator Jackson. So this is the immediate problem I shall have when I return. Brezhnev: I recently was told there was one Senator who deep down is against Jackson-and there are many Senators of that kind— but for the time being they are apprehensive about saying so. Kissinger: They must be given some excuse for doing it, but they are ready to do it. And we now have support from some groups who were behind this program. I had a meeting with Senator Ribicoff and Senator Jackson, and later with Senator Javits.14 And I believe it will be possible to bring about a solution. Not so much with Jackson but with the others. Brezhnev: As you know, Jackson is linking this matter with something that bears no relation to this entire matter.15 Kissinger: I agree. Brezhnev: Relating it to such questions of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union. Later I will give you an official communication on 14 Kissinger met with Senators Jackson and Ribicoff on March 15; see "Soviet Emigration Assurance, Trade Bill Linked," The New York Times, March 19, 1974, p. A12. The meeting with Senator Javits has not been identified. Kissinger wrote about his ongoing meetings with the three Senators about Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union in Years of Upheaval, pp. 992–995. 15 A March 12 memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger reporting on meetings with members of Senator Jackson's staff outlines Jackson's position on Jewish emigration. For the text, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXXI, Foreign Economic Policy, 1973-1976, Document 207. that score.16 I give you this not by way of accounting to anyone, but as gentlemen. I gave President Nixon assurances and I will give him official information. Kissinger: We don't consider this a proper subject of inquiry by the United States Government. 17 Brezhnev: We talked about that; it would indeed be tantamount to interference in our internal affairs. You remember I saw the Senators and read out official data.1 These were true figures that have been given. And I can now give you official figures relating to the true situation as of March 1 of this year. Our Patolichev has been a little unwell recently. But I trust our others-Alkhimov, Semichastny18-will do the work. I can tell you-[to Rodman:] this is not necessary for the record-at a recent meeting, my colleagues asked, “Are we interested in any change in our line toward the United States, economically or politically?" And the trade experts were there. And the unanimous judgment was no. I am charged with these negotiations and I can tell you we stand firmly by the line we have stated. Kissinger: I can tell you President Nixon has no higher goal than to establish firmly the course we have taken, including especially in the economic sphere. Brezhnev: I feel he is certainly quite right. So I trust by 1975 I will be in Washington again, unless you change policies. Kissinger: We won't change policies. Brezhnev: Then we should give earnest thought not only to this Summit but also to 1975. Because, I like to repeat, to govern means to foresee. Kissinger: In fact, when the General Secretary comes next time, we hope he will travel around the United States. Brezhnev: With pleasure. 16 A note was handed to Kissinger in Moscow on March 28 stating, "Since the emigration began in 1945 through March 1, 1974, 94 thousand persons (with children up to 16 years of age) left the USSR for permanent residence in Israel." The note explained the decrease in emigration numbers: "Following October 1973 (the period of military activities), the number of requests to emigrate to Israel dropped more than two-fold." "During 1973," the note continued, “the Soviet authorities received more than a thousand requests from former Soviet citizens who had departed for Israel for permission to return to the USSR. The decline in emigration and the rise in remigration has been influenced in the first instance by the irrational and aggressive policies of the Israeli Government, as well as social difficulties in that country.” (National Archives, RG 59, Lot 81 D 286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, 1955-1977, Box 8, Soviet Union-Secretary's Trip, March 1974) See also footnote 6, Document 162. Perhaps we can finish for today. Kissinger: All right. Brezhnev: I feel we are setting aside quite some time for discussions every day. Kissinger: Yes. Brezhnev: Our Defense Minister Grechko just returned from a trip. In the two days I have been discussing with you, I haven't met any of my own colleagues, even though I am home. So I would like to set aside a half hour, an hour, tomorrow morning to meet with them. I have to tell them about the critical remarks I have addressed to you. Kissinger: Maybe they will disagree with the critical remarks. Kissinger: At 11:00? It is up to you. Brezhnev: If by any chance there are any changes, I'll inform you. Kissinger: And we will discuss primarily strategic questions? Or what else? Brezhnev: According to my list: energy, the Four-Power agreement in West Berlin, which is not a big question. Kissinger: Yes, I agree we should discuss it. Brezhnev: And scientific and technical cooperation. Brezhnev: And perhaps we might have to return to some of the questions we have already discussed but agreed to think over. Maybe the Middle East, strategic arms; those are two items to which we might return. Kissinger: If we want to conclude an agreement on strategic arms at the Summit, we have to reach a decision fairly soon. Brezhnev: Of course. As I see it, it is indeed a fundamental issue. President Nixon singles it out for special attention in his message. Kissinger: Yes. Brezhnev: And it is certainly in the focus of public attention. And congratulations to your daughter tomorrow [on her 15th birthday]. Where are they? 169. Message From Secretary of State Kissinger to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)1 Moscow, March 26, 1974, 2010Z. Hakto 9. Please pass the following to the President: I had a largely inconclusive seven hours with Brezhnev today.2 During morning session, Brezhnev and Gromyko bitterly and at length, though calmly, gave vent to their resentment at Soviet exclusion from Middle East diplomacy. Discussion was one of most acid I have had with Brezhnev. It reflected I think not only resentment at US but at the Arabs and a certain recognition that despite their power Soviets have not been wanted as active participants in Middle East negotiations to date. I stressed the need to keep focus on the goal of a settlement rather than on formalities of negotiations to date. I agreed to meet with Gromyko periodically. Soviets dropped subject after some 3 hours along the lines of our meeting at the dacha,3 and they indicated they might come back to it. During rest of day there was some agreement that we would continue joint efforts to bring European Security Conference to conclusion but I withheld agreement to repeated Soviet urging that CSCE conclusion at summit occur before your Soviet visit. I think such timing would be undesirable from your standpoint and would also deny you leverage during Soviet visit. There was also agreement that US and Soviet technicians get together to examine a ban on underground tests above a certain threshold beginning January 1976. I made no final commitment and rejected an obviously anti-Chinese proviso that US and USSR appeal to others to join such a ban. On other topics, Soviets showed no inclination to negotiate on MBFR. They also, not unexpectedly, voiced disappointment at trade situation though I assured them that your position remained as you stated it most recently to Patolichev.1 In sum, major issues, i.e., SALT, Middle East and MBFR, have so far been inconclusive and there has been somewhat desultory quality to rest of Soviet performance. At the same time, Brezhnev has said that the leadership recently decided to continue on course with US. Also, 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 49, HAK Trip Files, HAK Trip-Bonn, Moscow, London, Memos, Misc. & State, March 24-28, 1974. Secret; Sensitive; Immediate. 2 See Documents 167 and 168. 3 Presumably Kissinger was referring to his meeting with Gromyko at Zavidovo on May 8, 1973; see Document 112. there is Politburo meeting scheduled Wednesday morning with Grechko, who has just returned from Iraq; this may produce some adjustment in Soviet SALT position. In any event, Brezhnev asked me to delay departure by one day. Because of my other commitments I agreed to delay by about 5 or 6 hours, permitting additional session. Thursday. Warm regards. 170. Memorandum of Conversation1 Moscow, March 27, 1974, 5:50-9:10 p.m. PARTICIPANTS Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the U.S. Andrei M. Aleksandrov, Assistant to the General Secretary Georgi M. Korniyenko, Member of the Collegium of Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Mikhail D. Sytenko, Member of the Collegium of Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Oleg Sokolov, USA Department Viktor Sukhodrev, USA Department (Interpreter) Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State, Assistant to the President for National Walter J. Stoessel, Jr. U.S. Ambassador to the USSR Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs William G. Hyland, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, State Department Jan M. Lodal, Senior Staff Member, NSC Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff SUBJECTS President's Visit; SALT; Middle East; Other Arms Control; Vietnam; Economic Brezhnev: I keep trying to learn this diplomatic language: I am having a hard time. I am an engineer by profession. It is an arduous but 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, HAK Office Files, Box 76, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Secretary Kissinger's Pre-Summit Trip to Moscow, Memcons & Reports, March 24-28, 1974. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in Brezhnev's office in the Council of Ministers building at the Kremlin. Brackets are in the original. |