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Moscow book) provided we get Peterson and Lynn to get the work done. As far as Dobrynin is concerned you may want at this session to tell him that you will be prepared to talk about economic problems, that they should do their homework since it will be necessary to deal with the issues in a comprehensive manner though in terms of principles rather than specific detail.
If you want to have Lynn to cover commercially, you should alert Dobrynin to the need to issue a visa, to have him met at Moscow airport and to house him-all of this will have to be done by the Soviets.
You should be aware that Commerce today is handing the visiting head of the American Department of the Soviet Foreign Trade Ministry our latest version of a trade agreement. This, too, will keep matters in a holding pattern pending your Moscow trip.
On gas, you may simply want to tell Dobrynin that we are continuing to work up our position and expect to have concrete ideas when you get to Moscow. 4. Jewish Emigration
There are newspaper stories that the US has been in touch with the Soviet Government to express its concern about the new Soviet law requiring an emigration fee for educated persons going to "Capitalist" countries. As best as I can determine this is not accurate; however, our consular section in Moscow has been trying to get the text of the new law, so far without success. The issue continues to figure quite prominently in diplomatic traffic between the US and interested Western countries and the Israelis are continuing to keep it alive.10 Dobrynin no doubt understands our problem though it may actually help him in reporting on it if you point out that forces hostile to US-Soviet rapprochement are using it against the Administration in this country.
8 See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971-May 1972, Document 125.
See Documents 24 and 29. On August 21, Kissinger discussed the gas issue in a telephone conversation with Peterson, who said: “You know that we don't need the gas and we can get it domestically." Kissinger replied: “But we want it for political reasons." Peterson then added "even for economic reasons," and "whatever happens in the United States we're going to need this gas desperately." Kissinger replied, “I don't give a damn." Peterson continued: “And my feeling is that even if we didn't need it, unless I am mistaken, the carrot here is of sufficient attractiveness that (it) would be worth a little dough." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Telephone Conversations (Telcons), Box 14, Chronological File)
10 In message Tohak 78, August 18, Haig informed Kissinger that Meir had publicly attacked the Soviets regarding the exit fee issue. (Ibid., Kissinger Office Files, Box 23, HAK Trip Files, HAK's Secret Paris Trip, Switzerland, Saigon, Tokyo, August 13–19, 1972, To/Frm 86971 & Backchannels)
5. Nuclear Use
The next text is at Tab D. By way of explanation you may simply want to say that (1) we have gone as far as we can in referring to the actual ban on use, (2) since this is obviously integrally related to political/ military relations, the rest of the document seeks to define the evolution in our relations that will make a ban feasible, (3) the issue is highly complicated (viz. the debate we are now being subjected to in the Senate on SALT) and we are going just as far as we can.
By way of background, you should be aware that Soviet propaganda-like the Brezhnev letter'?—is hitting hard on the bombing. So did Soviet coverage of Le Duc Tho's Moscow stopover, which was unusual in that a communiqué was issued at all. (Kirilenko and Katushevl2 saw him in the absence of more senior leaders.) 7. Middle East
You may want to deny any intention of seeing Heikallin Munich. (The Egyptians quite predictably are now busy telling the world that they hope to enlist our help both on hardware and diplomatically. This ought for now to be permitted to stand on its own without encouragement from us.)
Draft of the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear Warl4
Guided by the objectives of strengthening world peace and international security:
Conscious that nuclear war could have devastating consequences for mankind:
Proceeding from the desire to bring about conditions in which the the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war could be reduced and ultimately eliminated:
11 Document 26.
Andrei Kirilenko and Konstantin Katushev, members of the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee.
13 Mohammed Hassanein Heikal, editor of the newspaper Al Ahram and confidante of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat.
No classification marking.
Proceeding from the basic principles of relations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics signed in Moscow on May 29, 1972:
Proceeding from their obligations under the Charter of the United
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of
I. The United States and the Soviet Union declare that in their inter-
II. The two parties agree that the conditions referred to in the preceding paragraph presuppose the effective elimination of the threat or use of force by one party against the other, by one party against the allies of the other, and by either party against third countries in circumstances which may endanger international peace and security.
III. The two parties agree to develop their mutual relations in a way consistent with the above purposes. If at any time relations between states not parties to this declaration appear to involve the risk of a nuclear conflict, the two parties, acting in accordance with the terms of this declaration, will make every effort to avert this risk.
IV. Nothing in this declaration shall affect the obligations undertaken by the parties towards third countries, nor shall it impair the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations relating to the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security. In particular, nothing in this declaration shall affect the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense.
President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger met briefly with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin from 10:56 to 11:10 a.m. on the morning of August 21, 1972. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1967–76) Although no memorandum of conversation has been found, Kissinger discussed his meeting with Dobrynin in a telephone conversation with Nixon at 12:28 p.m. on August 21. He told Nixon that “Dobrynin was very fascinating about Vietnam-he said he wanted us to know that they (the So
viets) were real eager to get it settled." The transcript of their conversation continues:
"RN: Good, was he?
"HK: Heard that when Le Duc Tho came through Moscow, he did see a Politburo member but only number 5—that Brezhnev and the others, even though they were there, wouldn't see him. He said they are playing it very stupidly, they are still hoping we will make additional concessions.
“RN: The Russians are?
“RN: The Russians want the damn thing settled. I don't think they ever did until we went over there—but they do now.
“HK: They did ever since about April when they realized that it was really risking their relations with us.
“RN: Sure, that's what I mean. As long as it would irritate us without irritating their relations on bigger things, it was okay, but now it's that way around, and frankly, I think the Chinese think the same thing
"HK: No question about it. That's true about both of them.
"HK: Right, Mr. President." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Telephone Conversations (Telcons), Box 14, Chronological File)
their com a
Memorandum of Conversation
Washington, August 22, 1972.
Russian Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin
The meeting was to review outstanding issues prior to Dobrynin's
Dobrynin opened the meeting by reading me a long account of the report that Le Duc Tho had given summing up our three Paris meetings July 19, August 1, and August 14). It was on the whole a fair and correct report. According to Le Duc Tho, I had agreed to the fact that there were two governments and two and a half political forces in South Vietnam. I had indicated that we would move to some middle ground between their position and ours, but I had been too vague in my formulations. The North Vietnamese concern was that I was trying to get them into a position where they agreed on certain principles and would have to negotiate the details with the South Vietnamese, a process which might take forever. The North Vietnamese were also very much afraid that we would go back into South Vietnam after the election. Finally, they insisted that what we really wanted was for them to operate within the existing constitution-maybe without Thieu but at least with a structure which could survive without Thieu. All of these were matters that they found very hard to accept.
On the other hand, Dobrynin continued, they had reported in Moscow that we had been more flexible, and that they were on the whole more optimistic than they had been before I had given them credit for having made a concession with respect to Thieu's staying in
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 495, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 13. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The breakfast meeting took place in the White House Map Room. According to Kissinger's Record of Schedule, he met with Dobrynin from 9 to 10:40 a.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1967–76) In a subsequent telephone conversation at 1:13 p.m., Kissinger and Dobrynin discussed CSCE, MBFR, and the issue of opening Consulates in Leningrad and San Francisco. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Telephone Conversations (Telcons), Box 14, Chronological File) For the portions of the conversation dealing with CSCE and MBFR, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXXIX, European Security, Document 107.
2 See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume VIII, Vietnam, January 1972-October 1972, Documents 207, 225, and 246.