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office until after a settlement. And also by setting up the forums. Another difference between them and us was that we allegedly wanted to have all forums operate side by side, while they wanted to have everything settled with us before they opened the other forums.

I told Dobrynin that a number of things were based on a misunderstanding. We accepted the priority of the DRV-U.S. forum, but it seemed to me that they were working against their purposes if they waited until we could settle all their ten points.3 It would be close to the end of the election period, and in that case even if they opened the other forums it would be too late for us really significantly to affect them, so I felt they were being counterproductive. The difference between them and us was that we wanted to move each point as it was concluded into the other forums, while they wanted to have everything done. But since they had a veto over it, we would probably eventually yield on it.

Secondly, with respect to the political evolution, the real difference was that they wanted a guarantee of their takeover from us, while we wanted to start a political evolution-which as a historian I had to say they had a very good chance of winning but which they were not guaranteed to win, and in which they would have to engage in a contest. I knew this was a fine line and I knew that they might be reluctant to accept it, but nevertheless it was not a trivial approach. Thirdly, if we wanted to waste time we would follow their procedure, because as far as we were concerned domestically the only thing that mattered was a signing in principle.

Dobrynin asked whether we were willing to go into some detail. I said yes, but in the nature of things no matter how detailed our settlement with them was, there would have to be implementing negotiations. Dobrynin said that he thought they were extremely serious about wanting a settlement, but it took them a long time to make up their minds. However, they attempted to present their situation in Moscow as heading into very serious negotiations.

3 The DRV 10-point proposal was made at the August 1 meeting.

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On August 30, 1972, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Haig wrote Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Kissinger: "Earlier yesterday, I had talked to Len Gar

ment, Special Consultant to the President on Minorities and the Arts, about the problem of Soviet Jewry which is apparently growing and which McGovern hopes to exploit. This was complicated yesterday by a letter sent out of the Soviet Union by a group of Soviet Jewish leaders, a copy of which was furnished to McGovern." Referring to Senator George McGovern, the Democratic candidate for President, Haig wrote that he understood that “McGovern will try to exploit the letter." Haig had asked Garment to contact Senator Jacob Javits (R-NY) to discuss the matter. Haig informed Kissinger: "I insisted to Garment yesterday and again late last night to tell Javits to reaffirm strongly his conviction that the President and the White House are very concerned about the plight of the Soviet Jews, to reassure him that this matter was discussed during the summit and on his own to urge the Jewish leaders to understand that quiet diplomacy has accomplished far more than an extensive trumpeting so far. Javits, of course, can go much farther on this issue that can any White House official and especially the President.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 995, Alexander M. Haig Chronological Files)

On August 31, Haig forwarded Kissinger the text of a letter from Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir, received that day, in which she asked President Nixon to send "a direct confidential message to the people in the Kremlin expressing your reaction to the outrage" of the Soviet exit fees for emigrants. Haig wrote Kissinger in a covering memorandum: "Now that the Prime Minister has formally raised this issue in a direct communication with the President, we will have to consider very carefully the best means by which to proceed. Sometimes our Jewish friends know just what not to do at the right moment.” (Ibid.)

On September 6, Garment phoned Kissinger regarding the Soviet exit fee issue. He told Kissinger that "the Russian issue is flooding my desk and phone at this point and I need some guidance." The relevant portion of the transcript of their telephone conversation continues as follows:

"K[issinger]: Is there a more self-serving group of people than the Jewish community?

"G[arment]: None in the world.

"K: I have not seen it. What the hell do they think they are accomplishing?

"G: Well, I don't know.

"K: You can't even tell the bastards anything in confidence because they'll leak it to all their

"G: Right. Very briefly, what seems to be coming through just dozens of conversations is basically this, and there are political as well as some other dangers involved-that the intellectuals and Jewish com

munity in the Soviet Union are just saying that in a sense they will have their position compromised by the Soviets through a trick of timing and that the Russians feel secure until November in going ahead with the attacks because of the concern on our part of...

"K: They're dead wrong. After November they're even safer.

"G: That may well be. I think then in any event...

"K: You can say—well, what we are doing, we've talked in a low key way to Dobrynin. Next week, we'll call him into the State Department. If the Jewish community doesn't mind, after I've been in the Soviet Union and have done some national business, so we'll do it on Wednesday [September 13] or Thursday [September 14] next week. Don't tell them that.

"G: No, I won't tell them anything.

"K: But next Thursday, we'll call them in.

"G: And defer any meetings between any of our people and the Jewish groups until after Wednesday.

"K: That's right. After Wednesday you'll be able to say that the issue has been raised both with Dobrynin and with the Minister.

"G: I think between now and November a certain amount of theater is needed to keep the lid on. That's basically what seems to come through to me. After that I just don't know; there are various people that are talking about forming committees to raise the money and doing a variety of things.

"K: They ought to remember what this Administration has done...

"G: Yes, all of that can be pointed out, but nevertheless, here they are subject to presses [pressures?] of this sort and I'm simply asking. "K: No, no, you've been great on it.

"G: Well, I'm doing a job and all I want to know is how to handle it. "K: Our game plan is that we cannot possibly make a formal protest while I'm on the way to Russia.

"G: Right. I understand that.” (Ibid., Kissinger Telephone Conversations (Telcons), Box 14, Chronological File)

Secretary of Commerce Peterson also raised the issue of Jewish emigration with Kissinger during a telephone conversation on September 7. He told Kissinger that he had heard "from three different sources that there's a strong movement on the Hill to tie the Soviet Jewry issue with anything that has anything to do with the Soviet Union." The relevant portion of the transcript of their telephone conversation continues as follows:

"K[issinger]: But that won't be effective until after the election.

"P[eterson]: Well there's strong pressure in this one group that I met with that's been confirmed since then to submit MFN legislation, but to tie the issue to that and then to use the submission of the bill to get extremely vocal about it. Javits and a number of others are very active on it.

"K: Yeah, but they'll subside after the election.

"P: Yeah, now I don't know how much it hurts you, however, to do it prior to the election because that's what they're going to do. Okay, I just wanted you to know about it.

"K: No, I didn't know about it; it will hurt me but... It will hurt, but what can we do? There's no sense; you can't make a deal with Javits on things like this. Don't you think?

"P: Well, you know him much better than I do. I don't know what he'd... he's got great respect for you. I don't know. I'll tell you what I can do if we can be helpful. I can find out who the Senators and Congressmen are beside him, and if in your absence, you want anybody to try to pacify them so they don't get out on the floor and create problems for you while you're over there, that might help. Or I can drop it, whatever you wish.

"K: No, if you could find out in a way that doesn't draw too much attention to it, that would be very helpful.

"P: All right, you'll get it in the morning.” (Ibid.)


Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, September 5, 1972, 8 p.m.


Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador

The meeting began with an exchange of pleasantries in which we talked to each other about each other's vacations. Dobrynin said he never had a chance to see Brezhnev who was traveling around the country, but that they had had an extensive phone conversation.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 495, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 13. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The dinner meeting took place at the Soviet Embassy.

Kissinger Visit

Brezhnev was looking forward very much to receiving me and intended to conduct the two days of conversations himself. In fact Brezhnev had called a meeting of the Politburo for the earliest time that Dobrynin could get back in order to go over the positions.

Dobrynin asked a number of questions. First, with respect to the length of my stay, he proposed the 11th and 12th in Moscow, then leaving on the 13th for Leningrad and on the 14th we could leave directly from Leningrad to our destination. I asked, what if we did not finish our work? He said in that case it would be better if we stayed the morning of the 13th in Moscow. It was clear that the Soviets were not eager to have us in Moscow on the 13th, from which I assumed that perhaps Le Duc Tho was coming through.

Dobrynin then raised some social questions, such as whether I wanted to see Giselle at the Bolshoi. I told him it was one of my favorite ballets.

Nuclear Understanding

He then reviewed the list of subjects. He said, first of all there is the nuclear understanding. He said the Soviet side had the impression that the nuclear understanding as we had drafted it was primarily useful as a justification to go to nuclear war, not as a way of avoiding it. Had we really lost interest in the subject? I said no, we had not lost interest but we had major difficulty with the Soviet proposition. Dobrynin asked whether we would be prepared to pursue explorations with a view to coming to a conclusion. I said yes, but of course conclusions could never be guaranteed. Dobrynin said that it would be very helpful if I could prepare something in writing that reflected our concerns, so that they could perhaps come back with a counterproposal to keep the conversations going. I told Dobrynin that I would do that.

I pointed out that for us the important paragraph was paragraph 2 of our declaration. Dobrynin said that might be handleable if paragraph 1 could be strengthened. I said we would have to continue working at it.


He then asked about SALT. What did we think? Could the Provisional Agreement3 be made permanent? I said, in principle, yes, but the numbers would have to be modified. He asked whether we had done

2 See Tab D, Document 30.

3 Presumably a reference to the Interim Agreement.

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