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187. Memorandum of Conversation1

Moscow, June 28, 1974, 4-5:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU
Nikolay V. Podgornyy, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet
Aleksey N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR
Andrey A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR

Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the U.S.

Georgy M. Kornienko, Member of the Collegium, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Andrey M. Alexandrov, Assistant to the General Secretary

President Nixon

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

General Alexander M. Haig, USA (ret.), Assistant to the President

Amb. Walter J. Stoessel, U.S. Ambassador to the USSR

Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the State Department

William G. Hyland, Director, INR

Jan Lodal, NSC Senior Staff

SUBJECTS

ABM; Test Ban

Brezhnev: Mr. President, what is the first subject for discussion

today?

President: I think ABM. We want to make sure that Kissinger and Gromyko don't sign something that is not in our interest.

Brezhnev: Yes, that is very important. For my part, it is important and we are setting about a solution in the correct way. A certain time has passed and our scientists have concluded that we can spare this and I feel we should agree with their findings. Not only will we be saving money but we will also prove the direction we want to go is toward peace. It will be most expedient and significant in terms of increasing confidence between our two countries and, therefore, I feel sure that we will reach a unanimous decision in this field. And so we are prepared to sign an agreement tomorrow.

President: Good. Yes, we will then be limited to one ABM for each side but will have the right to exercise a change.

Brezhnev: Yes, at the option of that side. As far as the zone for ABM is concerned I only request that the area not be in the region where Dr. Kissinger lives.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 77, Country Files-Europe-USSR, Memcons, Moscow Summit, June 27-July 3, 1974. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held in St. Catherine's Hall at the Grand Kremlin Palace.

Kissinger: You see what understanding I have achieved in only two years.

Brezhnev: You see how solicitous we are of your health.

President: Considering our bureaucracy we could probably do without Washington easier than you could do without Moscow.

Brezhnev: The scientists show that ABM has little effect but let them have their one area and do what they want although we could get by without ABMs altogether. We feel people will take the correct view. They will regard it as another step to gain confidence. You always advance step by step and perhaps we can eliminate the one remaining site in the field.

Kosygin: The main thing to point out to the public is that we are removing and limiting ABMs not because we are technically unable to produce a new system but that we do not need it. There are two ways the public may react. There will be a feeling of concern that they are not adequately protected. But the other way will be the result of increased confidence on both sides.

Podgorny: In short, people will be more certain that neither side wants to attack the other.

Brezhnev: Good, shall we turn to the European Conference?

President: Either that or the threshold test ban. Since the threshold test ban relates to the same general subject we have been discussing maybe we should take it up and then go on to Europe.

Brezhnev: Good, let's do it. That question is basically agreed as Dr. Kissinger said. Why do you want to conduct any underground nuclear tests when we have already had so many tests. When will they stop? Kissinger: 1985.

Brezhnev: That long? What we should do is build on what we have achieved. The previous agreements limit strategic arms. The agreement provides that we will not develop cardinally new types of weapons. And suddenly against this background we will tell the people that we want to go ahead with nuclear testing. So reasoning logically, they will be bewildered: we agree to limit strategic arms but want to go ahead on testing-therein lie certain contradictions. People will ask about that. On the one hand we limit and on the other we conduct explosions. And this against the background of the limited test ban treaty, and they will question why are we conducting underground testing. Therefore, if one looks at another aspect of this matter the present situation enables other nations that signed the NPT also to test. This is a politically adverse aspect of this question. So we believe we should discuss the entire range in a friendly manner. We agree to move gradually forward step by step. This question if it remains without a solution will draw the at

tention of the people. That is why we must give earnest thought to the whole matter.

President: Regarding the argument the General Secretary raised with regard to the comprehensive test ban, we have heard this before, and also the points he made. While that might be an objective view, nevertheless, we consider it possible to go the step by step approach. That is why we suggested, as you know, a threshold of 100 kilotons. That gets around the problem and answers the verification problem. I think a step by step approach will have very great meaning. It is the testing of major weapons that causes the greatest concern. We believe we should take a step of this magnitude now to see how it works and it is possible we shall make further progress in the future. When I used the number 100 kilotons we are not totally tied to this but in that low magnitude. There are also other issues we have put on the table for discussion. In addition to the threshold magnitude of 100 kilotons you may have some other ideas on this. We feel from the point of view of promoting non proliferation of nuclear weapons our agreement can be a factor in encouraging others not to test and will show we are indeed fully determined to proceed along the path of détente and disarmament. Whichever way, whether favoring your or our point of view, there is disagreement. Therefore, logic speaks in favor of ending tests altogether and this will also have a great effect on others to refrain from testing because there is a gradual spread. In suggesting this we are not pursuing self-seeking goals. It is in the interests of both sides.

Kosygin: Mr. President, if we were to endorse publicly that we want to continue nuclear testing it will not convince anyone. We need to reach agreement as we did on the ABMS not to expand our effort. We are going to only one area and that is already disarmament limiting one type of weapon, that is disarmament. But we are continuing nuclear testing with the obvious aim of improving nuclear warheads. So what, in short, does a threshold test ban mean that we will be renouncing? We will not be taking the road of disarmament, but will be perfecting weapons. That will be the obvious tenor of the comments. I just heard today that 20 senators had come out in favor of ending tests.

(President: 37.)2

Kosygin: So what do you think is easier? To justify the need for continuing or the need for stopping. We believe it is easier to justify the need to stop. We believe it is very hard to prove the need to continue nuclear testing. We can prove the value of ending tests to the Congress but the very fact that we don't reach agreement on ending tests will re

2 In a June 25 letter to President Nixon, 37 Senators, including Mansfield and Fulbright, urged Nixon to negotiate an agreement that would lead to a total ban on nuclear testing. (The New York Times, June 26, 1974, p. 16)

duce the significance of questions we are also agreeing to. Speaking frankly, everyone will say we are making concessions to your Pentagon and to judge by the statements of your Secretary of Defense this may be seen as some kind of support of the line taken by the Pentagon. That is, to step up military preparations. Whatever way we decide to discuss, in fact, people will agree that it is a severe blow to our general cause. Also of late, there is on the part of the US a line of general thought-Israel and Egypt for example received reactors—and all big things start with such little things and therefore for us it is very important to find a solution to this issue and to solve it on a long term basis. If we reach a solution this will be welcomed by all people everywhere.

President: We discussed this issue in very great depth before I came. It is true some in our Senate favor a comprehensive test ban. At the other end of the spectrum there are equal numbers who favor no ban at all having in mind the problem of verification. We have tried to take a very significant step to restrain both sides by setting a low threshold. Having taken such a step we will get the support of the majority of our Congress. It is true as Premier Kosygin has said that we will not be going all the way. I will speak very candidly in terms of the limit to our negotiations. We cannot go to a total test ban and we think the threshold we are suggesting will be considered a very significant step. Obviously, we have a difference of opinion as I indicated in my opening remarks. I do not want to give the impression that I am not giving consideration to the remarks of the General Secretary and his colleagues. But I also do not want to leave any impression that I simply do what the Pentagon wants to do.

Kosygin: I don't have that impression.

President: If so, I wouldn't be here at all. In our system the decision is taken at my level. If there are differences in our system those in our bureaucracy will disagree publicly rather than as in a more responsible government limit their remarks to private meetings. We have surveyed this question very carefully, not only in our NSC but also with the Congress, and I have reached the conclusion that the proposition we have made to you for discussion is the step we can take but we cannot go further. We have prepared our own people for a threshold test ban. We are prepared to discuss the specifics and to negotiate but not for a comprehensive test ban at this time.

Kosygin: But then you will be coming out in favor of continuing nuclear testing.

President: No, the fact is that we are coming out in favor of limiting nuclear testing.

Kosygin: Yes, but those who oppose testing and come out in favor of a comprehensive test ban want to see more progress.

President: That may seem to be the case.

Kosygin: In fact, they will be right because then we will have to come out in favor or continuing testing. We cannot claim to interpret the internal aspects of the US; you are the best judge of that. But we feel the broader approach is more correct.

President: We recognize that there has been a lively debate over the years on this issue.

Kosygin: There is throughout the world.

President: But the point we have in mind is the one the General Secretary recognized. We have got to take these things on a step by step basis. For example, the most progressive point of view would be to ban all nuclear weapons and destroy all of them. Yet neither of us is in a position to go that far at this point. In this field we feel an obligation for our security and also to consider verification. Taking account of public opinion this will still be the biggest step we can have taken in that the threshold will be very low-in the neighborhood of 100 kilotons. That, of course, is a matter for negotiation.

Brezhnev: While discussing this the question arises: why do we need tests at all. This is the toughest question. It must be taken into account. Under the previous agreement you have tested all you can and we have tested all we can. We favor the non-proliferation treaty and so do you. And yet, nonetheless, we want to go on testing. Why do we leave this loophole? We can vouch for everybody here so let us understand what is the real reason. Who are we acting for? Who are we trying to please by continuing testing? I am perplexed; we are not pleased with continued testing. We are not pleasing the people, but maybe the top echelon of the Pentagon. So the question does arise why continue testing. I don't know. Maybe because of a group of senators, maybe because of Jackson. But we care ourselves in the interests of our people. In terms of world opinion, if we continue, if our two countries cannot cease testing, this will become a decisive factor in terms of others who wish to continue testing. The step we want would have beneficial influence on the entire international situation. It would favorably affect the French public and opinion in China. Several of them would in this situation be in complete isolation. Otherwise, they say the US and USSR are still testing. Let's join in and test with them. But this is not much in line with the expression of world opinion today.

Kosygin: Every correspondent will ask did we discuss limiting nuclear testing. What happens when we say we discussed continuing testing? What will you say? It will not be a pleasant burden. I would not wish to carry thus unpleasant task. We want to take another step more beneficial in strengthening the line of cooperation. Otherwise, when we are asked who wanted to continue testing and we have to say it was not the Soviet Union, and in our draft as we suggest it is specifically addressed to others. We merely call on them to accede. If this has no ef

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