Soviet Union, June 1972-August 1974The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the United States Government.
This volume is part of a subseries of the Foreign Relations of the United States that documents the most significant foreign policy issues and major decisions of the administrations of Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford. Five volumes in this subseries, volumes XII through XVI, cover U.S. relations with the Soviet Union. This specific volume documents United States policy toward Soviet Union from June 1972 until August 1974, following closely the development of the administration's policy of Détente and culminating with President Nixon's resignation in August 1974.
This volume continues the practice of covering U.S.-Soviet relations in a global context, highlighting conflict and collaboration between the two superpowers in the era of Détente. Chronologically, it follows volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971- May 1972, which documents the May 1972 Moscow Summit between President Nixon and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev. This volume includes numerous direct personal communications between Nixon and Brezhnev covering a host of issues, including clarifying the practical application of the SALT I and ABM agreements signed in Moscow. Other major themes covered include the war in Indochina, arms control, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSE), commercial relations and most-favored-nation status, grain sales, the emigration of Soviet Jews, Jackson-Vanik legislation, and the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war. |
From inside the book
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Washington , June 8 , 1972 , 10 a.m. PARTICIPANTS Anatoli Dobrynin Dr. Henry A. Kissinger Dobrynin had just returned from Moscow and was effusive about the meeting . He had a message from Brezhnev to me personally commenting on my ...
I asked Dobrynin about the plan to send Podgorny to Hanoi . Dobrynin replied that Podgorny was still planning to go . They had sent a summary of the conversations with me to Hanoi but indicated that Podgorny stood ready to give a fuller ...
Dobrynin stated that he thought the group would be there three or four days and could not be sure precisely but that in any event the period would be so brief that it would not result in a major military implication for the U.S. I then ...
Breakfast is set up in the Map Room at 8:30 am tomorrow morning with Dobrynin . ( Omitted here is discussion of matters other than U.S. - Soviet relations . ) 3 . Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President's Assistant ...
He pointed out what Dobrynin considers to be three significant portions of the paragraph on Vietnam : ( a ) The fact ... ( I did not tell Dobrynin that we had had this information earlier from the North Vietnamese ) ( b ) The fact that ...