Soviet Union, June 1972-August 1974The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the United States Government.
This volume is part of a subseries of the Foreign Relations of the United States that documents the most significant foreign policy issues and major decisions of the administrations of Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford. Five volumes in this subseries, volumes XII through XVI, cover U.S. relations with the Soviet Union. This specific volume documents United States policy toward Soviet Union from June 1972 until August 1974, following closely the development of the administration's policy of Détente and culminating with President Nixon's resignation in August 1974.
This volume continues the practice of covering U.S.-Soviet relations in a global context, highlighting conflict and collaboration between the two superpowers in the era of Détente. Chronologically, it follows volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971- May 1972, which documents the May 1972 Moscow Summit between President Nixon and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev. This volume includes numerous direct personal communications between Nixon and Brezhnev covering a host of issues, including clarifying the practical application of the SALT I and ABM agreements signed in Moscow. Other major themes covered include the war in Indochina, arms control, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSE), commercial relations and most-favored-nation status, grain sales, the emigration of Soviet Jews, Jackson-Vanik legislation, and the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war. |
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Concerned about this situation , DCI Walter Bedell Smith in early 1951 asked the NSC for enhanced policy guidance and a ruling on the proper " scope and magnitude " of CIA operations . The White House responded with two initiatives .
I asked Dobrynin about the plan to send Podgorny to Hanoi . Dobrynin replied that Podgorny was still planning to go . They had sent a summary of the conversations with me to Hanoi but indicated that Podgorny stood ready to give a fuller ...
... major military implication for the U.S. I then told Dobrynin that you had asked me to see him urgently and inform him that during the February visit to Peking it had been agreed that you would make a subsequent visit to that capitol ...
Bu hear it My Trip to China Dobrynin then asked me about the Chinese trip — what had been most significant . I followed the strategy of telling him things which , if they got leaked back to the Chinese , would appear like a provocation ...
I asked him why Podgorny's trip was delayed so long . He said the North Vietnamese had been extremely difficult . They claimed that the Politburo members were out of town and that therefore they could not receive him for two weeks after ...