Soviet Union, June 1972-August 1974The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the United States Government.
This volume is part of a subseries of the Foreign Relations of the United States that documents the most significant foreign policy issues and major decisions of the administrations of Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford. Five volumes in this subseries, volumes XII through XVI, cover U.S. relations with the Soviet Union. This specific volume documents United States policy toward Soviet Union from June 1972 until August 1974, following closely the development of the administration's policy of Détente and culminating with President Nixon's resignation in August 1974.
This volume continues the practice of covering U.S.-Soviet relations in a global context, highlighting conflict and collaboration between the two superpowers in the era of Détente. Chronologically, it follows volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971- May 1972, which documents the May 1972 Moscow Summit between President Nixon and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev. This volume includes numerous direct personal communications between Nixon and Brezhnev covering a host of issues, including clarifying the practical application of the SALT I and ABM agreements signed in Moscow. Other major themes covered include the war in Indochina, arms control, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSE), commercial relations and most-favored-nation status, grain sales, the emigration of Soviet Jews, Jackson-Vanik legislation, and the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war. |
From inside the book
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Haig stated that we have got just about all the diplomatic leverage we could hope for both with respect to Moscow and the PRC but that if we are expecting this leverage to do the trick at the negotiating table we may well be ...
American representatives are participating actively in this and I hope , as agreed in our final communiqué , that exchanges between governments can proceed without undue delay . I was especially gratified that our governments were able ...
Taft has expressed the specific hope to Timmons that the President will take this up with Ambassador Dobrynin . On July 15 , Jeanne Davis sent Timmons a proposed reply to Senator Taft on the Shapiro case ( Tab B ) , and it is possible ...
One would like to hope that those possibilities for political settlement that exist will not be lost . In this connection one cannot but feel serious concern about the incessant and even increasing bombing of the DRV territory by ...
Sonnenfeldt recommended three potential courses of action to Kissinger : " How to proceed : we can ( 1 ) accept the CSCE date , and hope to badger the Soviets into MBFR ; ( 2 ) send MBFR invitations and separately inform the Soviets ...