Soviet Union, June 1972-August 1974
The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the United States Government.
This volume is part of a subseries of the Foreign Relations of the United States that documents the most significant foreign policy issues and major decisions of the administrations of Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford. Five volumes in this subseries, volumes XII through XVI, cover U.S. relations with the Soviet Union. This specific volume documents United States policy toward Soviet Union from June 1972 until August 1974, following closely the development of the administration's policy of Détente and culminating with President Nixon's resignation in August 1974.
This volume continues the practice of covering U.S.-Soviet relations in a global context, highlighting conflict and collaboration between the two superpowers in the era of Détente. Chronologically, it follows volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971- May 1972, which documents the May 1972 Moscow Summit between President Nixon and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev. This volume includes numerous direct personal communications between Nixon and Brezhnev covering a host of issues, including clarifying the practical application of the SALT I and ABM agreements signed in Moscow. Other major themes covered include the war in Indochina, arms control, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSE), commercial relations and most-favored-nation status, grain sales, the emigration of Soviet Jews, Jackson-Vanik legislation, and the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war.
Results 1-5 of 99
Concerned about this situation , DCI Walter Bedell Smith in early 1951 asked the NSC for enhanced policy guidance and a ruling on the proper " scope and magnitude " of CIA operations . The White House responded with two initiatives .
I pointed out that we had hoped to have it occur much later but that Peking was insistent and that they had made reference to the situation in Southeast Asia . Therefore , in the light of all these factors the President had decided to ...
... American side displays a broad realistic approach to the situation at hand and readiness to conduct really serious negotiations with the North Vietnamese side for the settlement of the war in Indochina on a basis , just for all .
... that now , taking everything we tell you into account , the American side would do a right thing if it proposed to the Vietnamese side a concrete date of the renewal of the talks and did not complicate the situation by bombings and ...
He stated that “ it would not be at all surprising if on one or two of these critical items , we will find ourselves in a situation in which decisions at the highest level of the two governments will be involved .