it not due to the cause of justice, to the feelings of the public, to the character of the soldiery, one of whom was accused of murder by this verdict, that an inquiry should take place? Such an inquiry indeed seemed peculiarly due to the vindication of the troops; for until the guilty individual was discovered, the whole body was liable to be implicated in the imputation that verdict conveyed; and why should not a proclamation be issued in order to facilitate that discovery? But it appeared from the statement of his noble friend, that there was an obvious facility towards that discovery, within the reach of ministers, without any proclamation whatever! Why should not such a facility then be immediately resorted to? Surely no minister would pretend to disregard the verdict of a coroner's inquest, to assume the right of a grand jury, or to prevent that case which a coroner's inquest pronounced to be wilful murder, from being referred to a jury for trial, It was clearly necessary that the inquiry should

be followed up on this business, for the satisfaction of the public and the soldiery. If it turned out, from that inquiry, that the statement of the right hon. secretary was well founded, that the conduct of the troops was in all instances marked by forbearance and moderation, and that several shots were fired from the place where this murder was alleged to have occurred, then the inquiry would be most satisfactory; but yet it could not be argued, that because the soldiery in general behaved well, the murder of an innocent man by one of those soldiers ought to be overlooked. Such an inference alone could warrant the disposition betrayed by the doctrine of the right honourable secretary, and therefore he feit himself irresistibly impelled at once to oppose it. Therefore indeed he was urged to that which he should be otherwise indisposed to do, if he was not so pressed.

A debate of some length ensued, and the motion was negatived with. out a division.

CHAP

ALTHOUGH we have already

given accounts of some discussions on the expedition to the Scheldt, yet we must not wholly omit the debate, which continued for four nights, on the resolutions moved by lord Porchester, and intended to criminate ministers. This expedition excited a great and almost general dissatisfaction in ⚫ every class of the people; and when notice was given of the inquiry into the causes of its failure, the public was naturally anxious to hear the justification which would be put in to the charges that had been made against the authors of that expedition: every ear was open, fully expecting to be gratified by the examination of witnesses continued from day to day in the house. Ministers had, however, in the instance of the duke of York learned by experience the consequences of admitting the public to hear discussions of general interest, and in which there was a probability of much to blame. Mr. Yorke, therefore, rose in his place, and, after professing much sorrow that the public had been admitted to hear the evidence of the charges against the commander in chief, moved that during the present investigation all strangers be excluded from the gallery of the house of commons. What effect this produced with respect to Gale Jones we have already seen, but with regard to the honourable member, it led to very

different consequences. A teller. ship of the exchequer, a very lucrative sinecure, falling vacant, it was instantly given to him as a reward of his important services: this office he could not accept without vacating the seat for Cambridgeshire and though he probably expected to be returned without opposition, he was disappointed; and public indignation ran so high, that it was doubted whether there was a borough in the whole kingdom, so mean as even to admit the mention of his name as a candidate.

The examination of witnesses being over, and the evidence printed, the members of the opposition were determined to make one grand effort in endeavouring to displace those from his majesty's councils who had been the cause of so much calamity, and so much bloodshed, without answering one good end.

It was accordingly agreed that lord Porchester should bring for ward the business in the house of commons, And on the 26th of March his lordship took a review of the whole business in a most masterly speech, of several hours in length, in the particulars of which we cannot pretend to follow him; but having gone through the greater part of the evidence, he said, I come now to the last, but not the least interesting, and per haps the most important part of the case. Knowing that there were already, on the 5th September, 8000

sick at Walcheren, the following details from sir Eyre Coote in succession, held out no hope of abatement. The force remaining fit for duty, in the event of an attack, rendered the defence of the island extremely precarious. He accordingly writes, asking that the blankets, and other warm clothes which had been left behind the army in England, should be sent to them. They had been put into hospitals without roofs: and if they had not met with supplies from the smugglers, they must actually have perished without medicine. I do not attribute all this to the ministers, but to that miserable subdivision of offices, having no control upon each other, but all of which ought to be under the control of the war minister. It was particularly the duty of ministers, however, to have been vigilant on this occasion, when they knew how divided among themselves, and how inefficient this corps actually was. It was their duty to have seen that soldiers, who by their act had been placed in this situation; who by their act, beyond any actual necessity, had been placed in such a situation of peril, were not left to perish. I cannot figure any excuse for such gross misconduct. I can conceive no excuse but this, that they themselves were at the time in a similar state of disunicn. I ask with what view they left those brave men to perish down to the 15th October, and why they did not at once destroy the fortifications, and remove the army, the moment the ulterior object was found to be impracticable. If they talk of a practicable defence of Walcheren, I answer, that all the opiuions and evidence on that point show that it could not be retained without a force of 20,000 or 30,000 men; and that no reliance could be

placed on our naval defences, in such a situation. All those acquainted with the navigation of the Scheldt know that we could not depend on our naval defences alone; that for three months of the year the fleet must go into Flushing: that the enemy can easily convert their schuyts into gun-boats, and attack our fleet; and it is also well known, that when once ships go into one branch of the Scheldt they cannot easily get into the other. We never could think of establishing that as a station of defence, without also keeping there a naval force equal to all the vessels and all the means of the enemy; and I ask, if this country has a population equal to the support of such an establishment? if there ever was a man who entertained the idea? But when ministers knew that this disease existed, and that there was no chance of its diminishing, but of its increasing, I confess myself utterly at a loss to conceive on what principle they could reconcile such a notion to their minds? So much had the malady increased, that at last general Don tells you, your army was completely cut up, and that there was the greatest apprehension that the hospitals might fall into the hands of the enemy should any accident befall your naval force. I ask, Why were the feelings of minis. ters so callous to the sufferings of the army, while the heart of every other Englishman in the kingdom was wrung with their sufferings? Why did they not recall their gal lant country men after the letter of the 8th September describing their calamitous situation, instead of consigning them to the same deplorable fate till November following? I will tell them why. It was not because they were anxious at the time for the retention of Walcheren,

but from an eagerness to retain their own offices. The heart-rending intelligence as to the state of our brave army, which united in sympathy and feeling the minds of every other man in the country, operated on them as a principle of disunion, serving to them as the signal to commence intestine feuds

Validas in viscera vertere vires,

The noble lord proceeded to notice the call on this country, in the letter from Mr. Bathurst, for continued operations; whereas, when they were in full strength, there was not a person to be found in those very countries we were aiding, who would throw a stone in our behalf. How, the noble lord asked, could we believe, that to bring a British army to perish in Walcheren was serving the cause of Austria? Such an offer was made to Austria last war, and the question put in return was, "Where is the island of Walcheren?" It was not in Holland, but in the North of Germany that we could have made any thing like a diversion. He had gone through the principal parts of the great mass of evidence which had been adduced in the inquiry to this expedition. He could wish to turn away his eyes from a campaign planned in ignorance, conducted in impotence, and which had ended in immolating some thousands of the finest troops of this country. His lordship concluded by moving two different sets of resolutions the one on the policy and conduct of the campaign, the other on the retention of Walcheren after the ulterior object was found impracticable. The noble lord being exhausted, the resolutions were read by earl Temple, and are as follow:

No. I.-1st. "That on the 28th of July last, and subsequent days, an armament, consisting of 39,000 land

1

forces, 37 sail of the line, 2 ships of 50, 3 of 44 guns, 24 frigates, 31 sloops, 5 bomb vessels, 23 gun-brigs, sailed on the late expedition to the Scheldt, having for its object the capture or destruction of the enemy's ships, either building at Antwerp or Flushing, or afloat on the Scheldt, the destruction of the arsenals and dockyards at Antwerp, Torneaux and Flushing, the feduction of the island of Wacheren, and the rendering, if possible, the Scheldt no longer navigable for ships of war.

2d. "That Flushing surrendered on the 15th of August, whereby the reduction of the island of Walcheren was completed; and that on the 27th of August all attempt upon the fleet and arsenals of the enemy at Antwerp was, by the unanimous opinion of the lieutenantgenerals, declare to be impractica ble, and was abandoned.

3d. "That the destruction of the basin, dock-yard, arsenal, magazines, and naval store-houses, of the town of Flushing, and of such part of the sea defences as it was found proper to destroy; having been effected on the 11th of December, the Island of Walcheren was on the 23d of December evacuated by his majesty's forces, and the expedition ended.

4th. “That it does not appear to this house, that the failure of the expedition is imputable to the conduct of the army or the navy in the execution of their instructions, rela-' tive to the military and naval operations in the Scheldt.

5th." That on the 19th of August a malignant disorder showed itself amongst his majesty's troops; and that on the 8th of September the number of sick amounted to upwards of 10,948 men.

6th. "That it appears by the report of the physician appointed to

investigate the nature and causes of the malady to which his majesty's troops were thus exposed, that the disease is one which prevails periodically in the islands of Zealand, and is of peculiar malignity there, and which constantly follows a law of season appearing towards the end of summer, becoming more severe in the autumnal months, declining in October, and nearly ceasing in November. That perfect recoveries are rare, convalescence never secure, and that the recurrence of fever quickly lays the foundation of complaints which render a large proportion of the sufferers inefficient for future military purposes.

7th."That of the army which embarked for service in the Scheldt, 60 officers and 3,900 men, exclusive of those killed by the enemy, had died before the 1st of February last, and on that day 217 officers and 11,296 men were reported sick.

8th. "That the expedition to the Scheldt was undertaken under circumstances which afforded no rational hope of adequate success, and at the precise season of the year when the malignant disease, which has proved so fatal to his majesty's brave troops, was known to be most prevalent; and that the advisers of this ill-judged enterprise are, in the opinion of this house, deeply responsible for the heavy calamities. with which its failure has been attended.

No. II.-1st." That lieutenantgeneral sir Eyre Coote, having on the 9th of September been left in the command of Walcheren with an army of about 15,000 men, did on that day make an official report on the state of the island, the extent of force required effectually to guard it, the nature and condition of its defences, and the number of men then sick and unfit for duty;

representing that, after such his exposition, his majesty's ministers would be the best judges of the propriety or possibility of keeping the island; and adding, that the advantages must be great indeed which could compensate the loss of lives and treasure which the retention must necessarily occasion.

2d. "That on the 23d of September sir Eyre Coote stated to his majesty's ministers, that the alarming progress of disease was such, that if it should continue in the same proportion for three weeks longer (as he added there was every probability that it would), our possession of the island must become very precarious.

3d. "That on the 6th of October sir Eyre Coote, after stating that the number of sick was increasing, and that the effective force was thereby rendered so trivial as to make the defence of the island, if it should be attacked, extremely precarious, did express his anxiety to be informed of the intentions of his majesty's government as to the future state of Walcheren.

4th. "That notwithstanding these, and many other pressing representations, in the alarming condition of the troops, and the danger to which they were exposed, his majesty's ministers did neglect to come to any decision until the 4th of November, and that the final evacuation of Walcheren did not take place until the 23d of December.

5th. "That on the 10th of September the number of sick in the island of Walcheren was, exclusive of offi cers, 6,938; and that the total number of sick embarked for England, between the 15th of September and the 16th of November, was 11,199, making in that period an increase of sick of 4,268.