might be opened; and the said waterway was to be for the common use of all nations which would agree to regard the passage as neutral. It is to be noticed, however, that the United States were to acquire control over the route; for this purpose they intended to buy the islands in the Pacific which were near the terminus of the canal. Mr. Marcy, in giving instructions to the United States Minister at Bogota, explained that in the event of his government obtaining "control of the road it would at once take measures to satisfy foreign powers that it would be kept for their common use on fair terms, and they would be asked to become parties with the United States for a guarantee of the neutrality of that part of the Isthmus."'

It is evident that this proposal traversed the stipulations contained in the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. It was not necessary, however, that great Britain should protest, for New Granada soon perceived the extent of the proposal, and, as it amounted to an injury to her sovereignty, flatly declined to give it any serious consideration.

It is thus seen what the policy of the United States had been up to the time of the Civil War. In preventing a European power from holding the key to the transit they had been on the verge of war, and were finally driven to conclude a treaty in which the Monroe Doctrine was consciously disregarded in every line. A few exceptions to the rule of a canal free from any political control are to be found during this period, but they are insignificant and can be easily explained away. The treaty which the enthusiastic Hise concluded with Nicaragua in 1849 had been entered into without instructions from the Department of State, and his acts were finally disavowed. With regard 1 Compilation of Documents, vol. iii. pp. 1012 et seq.

to the proposal of Mr. Marcy, although the ostensible purpose was the protection of the railway from Colon to Panama which had just been opened, and which, unfortunately, immediately suffered some damage by reason of the so-called Panama Riots, it is difficult to think that his object was not much wider. But, at any rate, it proved abortive.

CHAPTER III

PROPOSED CONTROL OF THE CANAL

BY THE UNITED STATES

A more important phase of the problem is now reached. The United States no longer follow their original policy of a canal for the benefit of all the world, under equal terms and subject to no political control of any kind. The condition which they have advocated, in order that there should be freedom of transit and safety both for the works of the canal and the persons using it, is that the passage should be regarded as neutral. But in the period with which we are now going to deal the United States have striven hard to obtain a kind of supremacy, a sort of political control over the waterway-in other words, their desires have been to obtain the key to the passage, so that they might be able to allow or refuse passage according as they thought that such permission or refusal would affect their political interests for good or for evil. In their exertions to follow out this course of action they have been hindered by the fetters which the previous policy had imposed upon them. There have consequently followed supreme efforts to tear asunder these bonds. Their diplomacy in this direction has been as remarkable as it has been active. And although the arguments used have been more than once fallacious, yet the Department of State has issued documents of great plausibility and sometimes displaying extraordinary skill.

The new line of action came about as part of the broad