CHAPTER V. THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE.' The different courses of action in the policy of the United States in relation to the interoceanic communication have now been traced to their sources. It may be interesting, at this stage of our inquiry, to attempt to summarise the general principles, and, if possible, to ascertain the tendencies underlying that policy. There can be no doubt that the question well deserves examination, for, even if such principles do not directly help us to draw purely legal conclusions with regard to the position of the canal, they certainly throw as much light on the interpretation of the international agreements that are supposed to govern the status of the waterway as all the other argumentative analogies that may be brought forward in this connection. At the outset it is of importance to note that the principles contained in the Monroe Doctrine are supposed to rest, according to the view of certain American 1 Cp. Alvarez, "L'histoire diplomatique des Républiques américaines et la Conférence de Mexico," R.D.I.P., t. ix; Antokoletz, La doctrine de Monroë et l'Amérique latine: Delarüe de Beaumarchais, La doctrine de Monroë; Latané, Diplomatic Relations of the United States and Spanish America; Mérignhac. "La doctrine de Monroë a la fin du xixè siècle,“ Revue du droit public, 1896: Moye, “L'imperialisme américain et la doctrine de Monroë, R.D.I.P., t. xii.; Scott, "The United States and Latin America," The Times (South American Supplement), Nov. 29, 1910; leading article on the Monroe Doctrine in The Times (South American Supplement), Nov. 29. 1910. authorities, on the right of self-preservation—a right that subordinates itself to no other, and whose sphere the domain of law can never attempt to curtail. Those who hold this opinion seem to have merely noticed the original intention of President Monroe of preventing the powers that formed the Holy Alliance from restoring to Spain her lost colonies in the New World. It was under these circumstances that he declared that any attempt on their part in this direction would be "dangerous to the peace and safety" of the United States. It will be profitable to quote here the words of an American authority on the question of the Monroe Doctrine. Mr. Dana, in his edition of Wheaton's Elements of International Law, lays down the matter in this manner: "As a summary of this subject, it would seem that the following positions may be safely taken: I. The declarations upon which Mr. Monroe consulted Mr. Jefferson and his own cabinet related to the interposition of European powers in the affairs of American States. II. The kind of interposition declared against was that which may be made for the purpose of controlling their political affairs, or of extending to this hemisphere the system in operation upon the continent of Europe, by which the Great Powers exercise a control over the affairs of other European States. III. The declarations do not intimate any course of conduct to be pursued in case of such interpositions but merely say that they would be 'considered as dangerous to our peace and safety,' and as the manifestation of 'an unfriendly disposition towards the United States,' which it would be impossible for us to 'behold with indifference'; thus leaving the nation to act at all times as its opinion of its policy or duty might require. IV. The declarations are only the opinion of the administration of 1823, and have acquired no legal It will seem that the original idea was not entirely to exclude European influence from America, for, if this had been the case, it could never have been possible to secure the cordial assent of England to this principle. It must be remembered that it was Canning, England's Minister, who first attempted to put a check to the proposed policy of the allied powers. He saw that the endeavours of the Holy Alliance would amount to a death-blow to British traders, who were then advantageously speculating with the young republics. England had been invited by the powers to join them in their measures in favour of Spain, but Canning, instead of giving a ready answer, imparted the matter to the Representative of the United States at the court of St. James, suggesting at the same time that the two governments should unite in defending the liberty of the Spanish American States by issuing a clear and forcible joint statement of their policy. There was a considerable delay in the transmission of the proposal to the I Wheaton, Elements of International Law, Dana's edition (Boston, 1866), p. 112. Department of State, and therefore Canning, annoyed by failure to secure the co-operation of the North American Republic, decided to proceed alone. He at once made known to Prince Polignac, France's Ambassador at London, the determination of the British Government to oppose the interference of the Holy Alliance in Spanish America. It was only after England's declaration of policy that the famous statement in the message of Monroe was made public. It is only natural, therefore, to suppose that the powers engaged in behalf of Spain could perceive in the President's message the British determination, and the sanction of the Doctrine became, of course, more effective.' But the other principle contained in the message, relative to the prevention of future colonisation by any European power, had never been discussed between England and the United States. Its origin is due, as has been observed, to the exorbitant claims of Russia in order to appropriate to herself the vast extent of land and sea near Alaska. This proposition was not therefore favourably received in England. It follows from this that Monroe's dicta, in fact, had reference only to preventing the extension of monarchical rule to the New World, and in declaring that the American continents should not be considered as subjects for future colonisation by any European power. It was only natural, taking into account the ideas and practices of the time, to suppose that the extension of European dominions to America would imperil the peace and safety of the United States. From this point of view, therefore, it is correct to assert that the doctrine was a principle of self-preservation. But, 1 See Wheaton, Elements of International Law, Dana's edition, pp. 97 et seq. under the present state of affairs, it would be to stretch unduly the ordinary signification of terms if the same statement were made to apply to the actual condition of things. As emotions can only exist in the mind, they are difficult to fathom. The actions that may be taken in order to obtain self-preservation can only have their source in fear. To what extent this fear would be justified is not easy, indeed extremely difficult, to tell. But even then the line must be drawn somewhere. Nobody would attempt to suggest that there was not a potential danger for the security of the institutions of the United States when the Doctrine, as has been laid down, was enunciated. On the other hand, opinions must differ when it is intended to apply the same doctrine to the case of the treaty with New Granada of 1846. We have already pointed out that the clause whereby the United States promised to guarantee the neutrality of the Isthmus of Panama and the sovereignty of Colombia over that territory was due to a potential fear that Great Britain might have designs on that part of America.' Now, if this clause had its origin in the possibility of British intervention there, why should the United States themselves seek that very interference of Great Britain and France a few years later? Why should they attempt to obtain that privilege instead of warding it off by a clear expression of policy?? The Clayton-Bulwer treaty might be considered, from one point of view, to be a reassertion of the principles contained in the Monroe Doctrine, for its intent was to counteract the British progress in Central America. But 1 See supra. p.17. 2 See supra, p. 22. |