milk, in a crowded or unhealthy place, or in a diseased condition, or feeds such cow or animal upon any food that produces impure or unwholesome milk, is punishable by a fine not less than fifty dollars, or imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both.

Derivation: Penal Code, § 662.

§ 193. Transporting animals for more than twenty-four consecutive hours without unloading.

A railway corporation, or an owner, agent, consignee, or person in charge of any horses, sheep, cattle, or swine, in the course of, or for transportation, who confines, or causes or suffers the same to be confined, in cars for a longer period than twenty-four consecutive hours, without unloading for rest, water and feeding, during ten consecutive hours, unless prevented by storm or inevitable accident, is guilty of a misdemeanor. In estimating such confinement, the time during which the animals have been confined, without rest, on connecting roads from which they are received, must be computed. If the owner, agent, consignee, or other person in charge of any such animals refuses or neglects upon demand to pay for the care or feed of the animals while so unloaded or rested, the railway company, or other carriers thereof, may charge the expense thereof to the owner or consignee and shall have a lien thereon for such expense.

Derivation: Penal Code, § 663.

Galloway v. Erie Railroad Co. (1907), 116 App. Div. 780, 102 N. Y. Supp. 25, 107 App. Div. 210, 214; Hastings v. New York, etc., R. Co., 6 N. Y. Supp. 837, 25 N. Y. St. 250.

§ 194. Running horses on highway.

A person driving any vehicle upon any plank road, turnpike or public highway, who unjustifiably runs the horses drawing the same, or causes, or permits them to run, is guilty of a misdemeanor.

Derivation: Penal Code, § 666, as amended L. 1902, ch. 266, § 1; L. 1904, ch. 539.

People v. Patterson (1902), 38 Misc. 79, 16 N. Y. Cr. 508, 77 N. Y. Supp. 155; Harrington v. City of New York (1903), 40 Misc. 166, 81 N. Y. Supp. 667; People v. Ellis (1903), 88 App. Div. 474, 85 N. Y. Supp. 120; Johnson v. City of New York (1905), 109 App. Div. 821, 825, 96 N. Y. Supp. 754.

§ 195. Leaving state to avoid provisions of this article.

A person who leaves this state with intent to elude any of the

provisions of this article or to commit any act out of this state which is prohibited by them, or who, being a resident of this state, does any act without this state, pursuant to such intent, which would be punishable under such provisions, if committed within this state, is punishable in the same manner as if such act had been committed within this state.

Derivation: Penal Code, § 667.

§ 196. To whom fines and penalties are to be paid.

All fines, penalties or forfeitures imposed or collected for a violation of the provisions of this article, or of any act for the prevention of cruelty to animals, now in force or hereafter passed, must be paid on demand to the American society for the prevention of cruelty to animals; except where the prosecution shall be instituted or conducted by a society for the prevention of cruelty to animals duly incorporated under the general laws of this state, in which case such fine, penalty or forfeiture must be paid on demand to such society. A constable or police officer must, and any agent or officer of any said societies may, arrest and bring before a court or magistrate having jurisdiction, any person offending against any of the provisions of this article. Any officer or agent of any of said societies may lawfully interfere to prevent the perpetration of any act of cruelty upon any animal in his presence. Any person who shall interfere with or obstruct any such officer or agent in the discharge of his duty shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. Any of said societies may prefer a complaint before any court, tribunal or magistrate having jurisdiction, for the violation. of any law relating to or affecting animals and may aid in presenting the law and facts before such court, tribunal or magistrate in any proceeding taken. The officers and agents of all duly incorporated societies for the prevention of cruelty to animals or children are hereby declared to be peace officers within the provisions of section one hundred and fifty-four of the code of criminal procedure.

Derivation: Penal Code, § 668, as amended L. 1888, chs. 144, 490.

Amer. Society v. City of Gloversville (1894), 78 Hun, 40, 4 N. Y. St. 808, 25 Week. Dig. 229, 29 N. Y. Supp. 257; Fox v. Mohawk, etc., Society (1897), 20 Misc. 467, 46 N. Y. Supp. 232, rev'd 25 App. Div. 30, 48 N. Y. Supp. 625, aff'd 165 N. Y. 517.

Building. Any house, vessel, or other structure, capable of affording shelter for human beings, or appurtenant to, or connected with a structure so adapted, is a building" within the meaning

of this article.

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Inhabited building. A building is deemed an "inhabited building" within the meaning of this article, any part of which has usually been occupied by a person lodging therein at night.

Night time. The words "night time," as used in this article, include the period between sunset and sunrise, and every building or structure, which shall have been usually occupied by persons lodging therein at night, is a dwelling house within the meaning of this article.

Derivation: Penal Code, §§ 492-494.

Building.-Rouse v. Catskill, etc., Steamboat Co. (1891), 59 Hun, 82, 35 N. Y. St. 493, 13 N. Y. Supp. 128; State v. Johnson, 48 Ga. 116, 51 Cal. 320, 34 id. 245, 12 Cox C. C. 106, 1 Metc. 258, 23 Upper Can. Q. B. 492, 1 Leach, 318, 2 Root, 516, 4 Gill & J. 402; State v. O'Toole, 29 Conn. 342, 5 Upper Can. Q. B. (O. S.) 522; Com. v. Barney, 10 Cush. 478.

Inhabited Building.-People v. Cotteral, 18 Johns. 115; Smith v. State, 23 Tex. App. 357, 59 Am. Rep. 773.

$221. Arson in first degree.

A person who wilfully burns, or sets on fire, in the night time: 1. A dwelling-house in which there is, at the time, a human being; or,

2. A car, vessel, or other vehicle, or a structure or building other

than a dwelling-house, wherein, to the knowledge of the offender, there is, at the time, a human being,

Is guilty of arson in the first degree.

Derivation: Penal Code, § 486.

Woodford v. People (1874), 62 N. Y. 117, 3 Hun, 310; Levy v. People (1880), 80 N. Y. 327, aff'g 19 Hun, 383; People v. Fanshawe (1893), 137 N. Y. 68, 47 N. Y. St. 335, 65 Hun, 83, 19 N. Y. Supp. 865; McKelvey v. Marsh (1901), 63 App. Div. 396, 71 N. Y. Supp. 541; People v. Wagner (1904), 180 N. Y. 58; see also People v. Henderson, 1 Park, 560; People v. Orcut, 1 Park, 252; Hennessy v. People, 21 How. Pr. 239; People v. Butler, 16 Johns. 203.

1. Commits an act of burning in the day time, which, if committed in the night time, would be arson in the first degree; or,

2. Wilfully burns, or sets on fire, in the night time, a dwellinghouse, wherein, at the time, there is no human being; or,

3. Wilfully burns, or sets on fire, in the night time, a building not inhabited, but adjoining or within the curtilage of an inhabited building, in which there is, at the time, a human being, so that the inhabited building is endangered, even though it is not in fact injured by the burning; or,

4. Wilfully burns, or sets on fire, in the night time, a car, vessel, or other vehicle, or a structure or building, ordinarily occupied at night by a human being, although no person is within it at the time,

Is guilty of arson in the second degree.

Derivation: Penal Code, § 487.

People v. Burton (1894), 77 Hun, 498, 28 N. Y. Supp. 1081; People v. Fitzgerald (1897), 20 App. Div. 140, 46 N. Y. Supp. 1020, 12 N. Y. Cr. 524; People v. Smith (1899), 37 App. Div. 280, 55 N. Y. Supp. 932, 14 N. Y. Cr. 83; see also People v. Durkin, 5 Park, 243; Peverelley v. People, 3 Park. 59; Isaac's Case, 2 East P. C. 1031; State v. McLaughlin, 8 Jones, 354; People v. Taylor, 2 Mich. 250; Roberts' Case, 2 East P. C. 1030; Rex v. Peltey, Leach C. C. 277; Rex v. Fletcher, 2 Car & K. 215, 2 Russ. 550.

§ 223. Arson in third degree.

A person who wilfully burns, or sets on fire:

1. A vessel, car, or other vehicle, or a building, structure, or other erection, which is at the time insured against loss or damage by fire, with intent to prejudice the insurer thereof; or,

2. A vessel, car, or other vehicle, or a building, structure, or

other erection, under circumstances not amounting to arson in the first or second degree,

Is guilty of arson in the third degree.

Derivation: Penal Code, § 488.

Shepherd v. People (1859), 19 N. Y. 537; Greenfield v. People (1881), 85 N. Y. 75, aff'g 23 Hun, 154; Carncross v. People (1883), 1 N. Y. Cr. 518; People v. Newton (1885), 3 N. Y. Cr. 406; People v. O'Neil (1889), 112 N. Y. 355, aff'g 49 Hun, 422, 4 N. Y. Supp. 119; People v. Fanshawe (1893), 137 N. Y. 68, aff'g 65 Hun, 77, 19 N. Y. Supp. 865; People v. Butler (1901), 62 App. Div. 508, 71 N. Y. Supp. 129, 15 N. Y. Cr. 508; People v. Brown (1906), 110 App. Div. 490, 96 N. Y. Supp. 957; see also People v. Henderson, 1 Park, 560.

§ 224. Punishment for arson. Arson is punishable as follows:

1. In the first degree, by imprisonment for a term not exceeding forty years.

2. In the second degree, by imprisonment for a term not exceeding twenty-five years.

3. In the third degree, by imprisonment for a term not excceding fifteen years.

Derivation: Penal Code, § 489, as amended L. 1892, ch. 662, § 12; L. 1895, ch. 902, § 1; L. 1897, ch. 549, § 1.

225. Intent to destroy building requisite.

The burning of a building under circumstances which show beyond a reasonable doubt that there was no intent to destroy it, is not arson.

Derivation: Penal Code, § 490.

People v. Fanshawe (1893), 137 N. Y. 68, aff'g 65 Hun, 77, 19 N. Y. Supp. 865; see also People v. Jones, 2 Edm. Sel. Cas. 86; People v. Long, 2 Edm. Sel. Cas. 129.

$226. Contiguous buildings.

Where an appurtenance to a building is so situated with reference to such building, or where any building is so situated with reference to another building that the burning of the one will manifestly endanger the other, a burning of the one is deemed a burning of the other, within the foregoing provisions, against any person actually participating in the original setting on fire, as of the