rassments, which would enter into the merchants' estimate, and endanger the preference of foreign bottoms not exposed, to them. And upon the whole this expedient does not fulfil our wish of a complete re-establishment of our commerce in that sea.

A second plan might be, to obtain peace by purchasing it. For this we have the example of rich and powerful nations, in this instance counting their interest more than their honour. If, conforming to their example, we determine to purchase a peace, it is proper to inquire what the peace may cost. This being merely a matter of conjecture, we can only compare together such opinions as have been obtained, and from them form one for ourselves.

Mr. Wolf, a respectable Irishman, who had resided very long at Algiers, thought a peace might be obtained from that regency, and the redemption of our captives included, for sixty or seventy thousand pounds sterling.* His character and opinion both merited respect. Yet his estimate being the lowest of all who have hazarded an opinion on this subject, one is apt to fear his judgment might have been biassed by the hope he entertained that the United States would charge him with this negotiation.

Captain O'Brien, one of our captives, who had been in Algiers four years and a half at the date of his last letter, a very sensible man, and to whom we are indebted for very minute information, supposes that peace alone, might be bought for that sum, that is to say, for three hundred and twenty-two thousand dollars.

The Tripoline ambassador, before mentioned, thought that peace could be made with the three smaller powers for ninety thousand pounds sterling, to which were to be added the expenses of the mission and other incidental expenses. But he could not answer for Algiers: they would demand more. The ministers plenipotentiary, who conferred with him, had judged that as much must be paid to Algiers as to the other three powers together; and consequently, that according to this measure, the peace of Algiers would cost from a hundred to a hundred and twenty-five thousand pounds sterling; or from four hundred and sixty to five hundred and seventy-five thousand dollars.

The latter sum seemed to meet the ideas of the count de Vergennes, who, from a very long residence at Constantinople, was a good judge of what related to the porte, or its dependencies.

* See No. 1 accompanying this report.

A person whose name is not free to be mentioned here, a native of the continent of Europe, who had long lived, and still lives at Algiers, with whom the minister plenipotentiary of the United States at Paris had many and long conversations, and found his information full, clear, and consistent, was of opinion the peace of Algiers could not be bought by the United States for less than one million of dollars. And when that is paid, all is not done. On the death of a dey (and the present one is between seventy and eighty years of age) respectable presents must be made to the successor, that he may recognise the treaty; and very often he takes the liberty of altering it. When a consul is sent or changed, new presents must be made. If these events leave a considerable interval, occasion must be made of renewing presents. And with all this they must see that we are in condition to chastise an infraction of the treaty; consequently some marine force must be exhibited in their harbour, from time to time.

The late peace of Spain with Algiers is said to have cost from three to five millions of dollars. Having received the money, they take the vessels of that nation on the most groundless pretexts; counting, that the same force, which bound Spain to so hard a treaty, may break it with impunity.

Their treaty with France, which had expired, was about two years ago renewed for fifty years. The sum given at the time of renewal is not known. But presents are to be repeated every ten years, and a tribute of one hundred thou sand dollars to be annually paid. Yet perceiving that France, embarrassed at home with her domestick affairs, was less capable of acting abroad, they took six vessels of that nation in the course of the last year, and retain the captives, forty-four in number, in slavery.

It is the opinion of captain O'Brien, that those nations are best treated who pay a smaller sum in the beginning, and an annual tribute afterwards. In this way he informs us that the Dutch, Danes, Swedes, and Venetians pay to Algiers, from twenty-four to thirty thousand dollars a year, each; the two first in naval stores, the two last chiefly in money. It is supposed, that the peace of the Barbary states Costs Great Britain about sixty thousand guineas or two bundred and eighty thousand dollars a year. But it must be noted that these facts cannot be authentically advanced; as from a principle of self condemnation, the governments keep them from the publick eye, as much as possible.

Nor must we omit finally to recollect, that the Algerines, attentive to reserve always a sufficient aliment for their pira cies, will never extend their peace beyond certain limits, and consequently that we may find ourselves in the case of those nations, to whom they refuse peace at any price.

The third expedient is to repel force by force. Several statements are hereto annexed of the naval force of Algiers, taken in 1785, 1786, 1787, 1788 and 1789, differing in small degrees, but concurring in the main. From these it results, that they have usually had about nine chebecks of from ten to thirty-six guns, and four galleys, which have been reduced by losses to six chebecks and four galleys. They have a forty gun frigate on the stocks, and expect two cruisers from the grand seignior. The character of their vessels is, that they are sharp built and swift, but so light as not to stand the broadside of a good frigate. Their guns are of different calibers, unskilfully pointed and worked. The vessels illy manoeuvred, but crowded with men, one third Turks, the rest Moors, of determined bravery, and resting their sole hopes on boarding. But two of these vessels belong to the government, the rest being private property. If they come out of harbour together, they sepa rate immediately in quest of prey; and it is said, they were never known to act together in any instance. Nor do they come out at all, when they know there are vessels cruising for them. They perform three cruises a year, between the middle of April and November, when they unrig and lay up for the winter. When not confined within the straits, they rove northwardly to the channel, and westwardly to the westward islands.

They are at peace at present, with France, Spain, England, Venice, the United Netherlands, Sweden, and Denmark; and at war with Russia, Austria, Portugal, Naples, Sardinia, Genoa and Malta.

Should the United States propose to vindicate their commerce by arms, they would perhaps, think it prudent to possess a force equal to the whole of that which may be opposed to them. What that equal force would be will belong to another department to say.

At the same time it might never be necessary to draw out the whole at once, nor perhaps any proportion of it, but for a small part of the year; as it is reasonable to presume, that a concert of operation might be arranged among the powers at war with the Barbary states, so as that, each performing a tour of a given duration, and in given order, a constant cruise

during the eight temperate months of every year, may be kept up before the harbour of Algiers, till the object of such operations be completely obtained. Portugal has singly, for several years past, kept up such a cruise before the straits of Gibraltar, and by that means has confined the Algerines closely within. But two of their vessels have been out of the straits in the last five years. Should Portugal effect a peace with them, as has been apprehended for some time, the Atlantick will immediately become the principal scene of their piracies; their peace with Spain having reduced the profits of their Mediterranean cruises below the expenses of equipment.

Upon the whole, it rests with Congress to decide between war, tribute, and ransom, as the means of re-establishing our Mediterranean commerce. If war, they will consider how far our own resources shall be called forth, and how far they will enable the Executive to engage, in the forms of the constitution, the co-operation of other powers. If tribute or ransom, it will rest with them to limit and provide the amount; and with the Executive, observing the same constitutional forms, to take arrangements for employing it to the best advantage.

THOMAS JEFFERSON, Sec'y of State.

No. 1.

Extract of a Letter from Richard O'Brien, one of the American captives at Algiers, to Congress. Algiers, December 26,

1789.

"IT was the opinion of Mr. John Wolf, who resided many years in this city, that the United States of America may obtain a peace for one hundred years with this regency, for the sum of sixty or seventy thousand pounds sterling, and the redemption of fifteen Americans included. Mr. Wolf was the British charge des affaires in Algiers, and was much the friend of America, but he is no more.

"I have now been four years and a half in captivity, and I have much reason to think, that America may obtain a peace with Algiers for the sum of sixty-five or seventy thousand pounds, considering the present state of Algiers. That this regency would find it their interest to take two or three American cruisers in part payment for making a peace; and also would take masts, yards, plank, scantling, tar, pitch and turpentine, and Philadelphia iron, as a part payment: all to be regulated at a certain fixed price by treaty."

No. 2.

Extract of a Letter from the Honourable John Adams, Minister Plenipotentiary for the United States at London, to the Honourable John Jay, Secretary for Foreign Affairs. London, February 22, 1786.

"ON Monday evening another conference was held with the Tripolitan ambassador. When he began to explain himself concerning his demands, he said they would be different according to the duration of the treaty. If that were perpetual, they would be greater; if for a term of years, less; his advice was, that it should be perpetual. Once signed by the bashaw, dey and other officers, it would be indissoluble and binding for ever upon all their successors. But if a temporary treaty were made, it might be difficult and expensive to revive it. For a perpetual treaty, such as they had now with Spain, a sum of thirty thousand guineas must be paid upon the delivery of the articles signed by the dey and other officers. If it were agreed to, he would send his secretary by land to Marseilles, and from thence by water to Tripoli, who should bring it back by the same route, signed by the dey, &c. He had proposed so small a sum, in consideration of the circumstances, but declared it was not half of what had been lately paid them by Spain. If we chose to treat upon a different plan, he would make a treaty perpetual, upon the payment of twelve thousand five hundred guineas for the first year, and three thousand guineas, annually, until the thirty thousand guineas were paid. It was observed that these were large sums, and vastly beyond expectation; but his excellency answered, that they never made a treaty for less. Upon the arrival of a prize, the dey and the other officers are entitled, by their laws, to large shares by which they might make greater profits than those sums amounted to, and they never would give up this advantage for less.

"He was told, that although there was full power to treat, the American ministers were limited to a much smaller sum; so that it would be impossible to do any thing, until we could write to Congress and know their pleasure. Colonel Smith was present at this, as he had been at the last conference, and agreed to go to Paris to communicate all to Mr. Jefferson, and persuade him to come here, that we may join in farther conferences, and transmit the result to Congress.

"The ambassador believed that Tunis and Morocco would treat upon the same terms, but could not answer for Algiers.