merchants, they took the invoice prices as the measure of the value, allowing upon it ten per cent. profit. Nor was this a solitary case; it was, as the Queen's advocate of that day said, "A question in which a great number of cases, and very "considerable amount of property, were involved " (o).

Lastly, there was in favour of this position the elaborate judgment of Sir William Grant, in the case of Pilkington v. The Commissioners for Claims on France (p). The circumstances of that case were, that the Revolutionary Government had confiscated the debts owing from the subjects of France to those of Great Britain. By the Treaty of 1814 compensation was to be made to the latter. Between the decree of confiscation and the repeal of it, the assignats in which the debts were to be paid had been depreciated in value: it was disputed whether or no the depreciation should be charged to the French. Sir William Grant, after touching upon the curious question of depreciated currency as affecting the relations of debtor and creditor, observes: "I have said it is unnecessary to consider whether the conclusion drawn by "Vinnius or the decision in Davis's Reports be the correct

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one, for we think this has no analogy to the case of "creditor and debtor. There is a wrong act done by the "French Government; then they are to undo that wrong act, "and to put the party into the same situation as if they never "had done it. It is assumed to be a wrong act, not only "in the Treaty, but in the repealing decree. They justify it "only with reference to that which, as to this country, has a "false foundation-namely, on the ground of what other "Governments had done towards them, they having confis"cated the property of French subjects; therefore they say, we thought ourselves justified at the time in retaliating upon the subjects of this country. That being destitute of "foundation as to this country, the Republic themselves, in "effect, confess that no such decree ought to have been

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(0) The Lucy, 3 Robinson's Adm. Rep. p. 210.
(p) Knapp, Privy Council Rep. p. 19.

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"made, as it affected the subjects of this country; therefore "it is not merely the case of a debtor paying a debt at the day it falls due, but it is the case of a wrong-doer who "must undo, and completely undo, the wrongful act he has "done; and if he has received the assignats at the value of "50d., he does not make compensation by returning an "assignat which is only worth 20d.-he must make up the "difference between the value of the assignat at different periods ****. If the act is to be undone, it must be completely undone, and the party is to be restored to the "situation in which he was at the time the act to be undone "took place."

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If in the case of the British merchants and the Chinese Government, the Treaty had not specified the sum of six millions for the compensation, but merely promised in general terms to restore the value of the opium seized-then the principles of International Law which govern the construction of Treaties (g), would have entitled the original possessors of the opium to demand the most favourable interpretation which could be put upon the term "value" (r).

The conclusion then to which we are led with respect to the case which has been discussed, from the application of the principles of International Law, derived from all the sources which have been enumerated, is this: That the British Government would have been justified by the Law of Nations in demanding the cost price of the opium from the Chinese Government, even if the depreciation in value of that article at the time of the conclusion of the Treaty had been the result of the usual fluctuations of commerce. It is obvious that this conclusion applied with increased force to a case where the diminished value was one of the consequences of the wrongful acts of that Government itself.

(q) Grotius, lib. ii. c. xiv.

(r) Vattel, t. ii. p. 33.

CHAPTER IX.

OBJECTION THAT THERE IS NO LAW BECAUSE NO SUPERIOR.

LX. IT is sometimes said that there can be no Law between Nations because they acknowledge no common superior authority, no International Executive capable of enforcing the precepts of International Law. This objection admits of various answers: First, it is a matter of fact that States and Nations recognize the existence and independence of each other; and out of a recognized society of Nations, as out of a society of individuals, Law must necessarily spring. The common rules of right approved by Nations as regulating their intercourse are of themselves, as has been shown, such a Law. Secondly, the contrary position confounds two distinct things; namely, the physical sanction which Law derives from being enforced by superior power, and the moral sanction conferred on it by the fundamental principle of Right; the error is similar in kind to that which has led Jurists to divide moral obligations into Perfect and Imperfect. All moral obligations are equally perfect, though the means of compelling their performance is, humanly speaking, more or less perfect, as they more or less fall under the cognizance of human laws (a). In like manner, International Justice would not be the less deserving of that appellation, if the sanctions of it were wholly incapable of being enforced.

(a) Kant, Rechtslehre, s. 54, req.—Warnkönig says, with much force and truth, "Nonne ex mutua inter sese invicem agnitione inter eas quædam constituitur societas, et probantur communes justi regulæ quæ verum jus efficiunt? miscet vir summus (i. e. Kant) juris sanctionem cum justi notione, eaque in re parum sibi constans esse videtur."-Doctrina Juris Philosophica, s. 147.

Brown's Philosophy of the Human Mind, vol. iv. pp. 396-7-8.

How far and by what means they are capable of being executed are questions which have been already alluded to, and which will be more fully discussed in a subsequent portion of this work, when the International Process of enforcing the execution of International Justice by Negotiation, Treaties, Reprisals, or War comes under consideration.

But, irrespectively of any such means of enforcement, the Law must remain (b). God has willed the society of States as He has willed the society of individuals. The dictates of the conscience of both may be violated on earth: but to the national, as to the individual conscience, the language of a profound philosopher is applicable: "Had it strength as it "had right, had it power as it has manifest authority, it "would absolutely govern the world " (c).

Thirdly, most, if not all, civilized countries have incorporated into their own Municipal Law a recognition of the principles of International Law.

The United States of North America, almost contemporaneously with the assertion of their independence (d), and the new Empire of Brazil in 1820, proclaimed their national adherence to International Law: in England it has always been considered as a part of the law of the land (e).

(b) Kaltenborn, Kritik des Völkerrechts, has a very good chapter on this head, entitled, Die Läugner des Völkerrechts, kap. vi. p. 306: “Mit Recht nennt Stein es einen kahlen und trostlosen Satz, das es kein Völkerrecht geben solle."-" Stahl (Rechtsphilosophie) erklärt, nicht alles Recht sei erzwingbar, unter Anderen nicht das Völkerrecht. Wenn man aber nur richtiger und allgemeiner Weise die Erzwingbarkeit als äussere Realisirbarkeit auffasst, so ist auch das Völkerrecht erzwingbar zu nennen," pp. 307, 309, n.

(c) Bishop Butler (Sermon III.), On Human Nature.

"Si les loix naturelles ont assez de force pour régner sur les Rois mêmes par la crainte de l'Auteur de ces loix, elles ne règnent pas moins entre les Rois qu' entre les différentes nations comparées les unes avec les autres. Elles sont le seul appui ordinaire de ce droit qui mérite proprement le nom de Droit des Gens; c'est-à-dire, de celui qui a lieu de Royaume à Royaume ou d'Etat à État.”—Institution du Droit public, xii. t. i. 498; Euvres d'Aguesseau.

(d) "According to the general usages of Europe."-Kent, Comm. i. p. 1.

(e) Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, book iv. c. v.

Lastly, it may be observed on this head, that the History of the World, and especially of modern times, has been but incuriously and unprofitably read by him, who has not perceived the certain nemesis which overtakes the transgressors of International Justice; for, to take but one instance, what an "Iliad of woes" (f) did the precedent of the first partition of Poland open to the kingdoms who participated in that grievous infraction of International Law! The Roman Law nobly expresses a great moral truth in the maxim—“ Jurisjurandi contempta religio satis Deum habet "ultorem" (g). The commentary of a wise and learned French jurist upon these words is remarkable, and may not inaptly close this first part of the work: "Paroles (he says) qu'on peut appliquer également à toute infraction des loix "naturelles. La justice de l'Auteur de ces loix n'est pas "moins armée contre ceux qui les transgressent, que contre "les violateurs du serment, qui n'ajoute rien à l'obligation "de les observer, ni à la force de nos engagements, et qui ne "sert qu'à nous rappeler le souvenir de cette justice in"exorable" (h).

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(f) Burke, Letters on a Regicide Peace.

(g) Cod. lib. iv. t. i. 2, De Reb. Cred. et de Jurejurando (Alexander Severus).

(h) D'Aguesseau, Ib. xiv. t. i. p. 500. See, too, p. 482.

"Auch ist die Erzwingbarkeit nicht der einzige Charakter des Rechts, auch nicht sein wesentlichster-Dieser besteht vielmehr darin, das es Norm und Ordnung für alle menschlichen Gemeinverhältnisse in allen Sphären und Dimensionen des privaten und des öffentlichen Lebens, mithin auch des socialen Verhältnisses der Völker und Staaten untereinander also Völkerrecht ist-Der Zwang geht nun aber von Gemeinschaft als solcher aus-Dies ist die Ordnung die aufrecht erhalten werden soll-Das Rechtsleben ist das Gemeinleben u. s. w."—Kaltenborn, 310, ib.