2. A conviction before a magistrate can be proved only by the production of the record of the conviction or an examined copy.-Hartley v. Hindmarsh, Law Rep. 1 C. P. 553. CORPORATION.

1. The plaintiff supplied coals to the defendants, a corporation, the guardians of a poor. law union, for the use of their workhouse, under a written agreement executed by the plaintiff, but not under the seal of the defendants. The defendants received the coals, used some of them, and offered to return the rest. In an action for goods sold and delivered, held, that as the coals had been supplied and accepted, and were such as must necessarily be supplied for the purposes for which the defendants were incorporated, the defendants were liable for all that they had received, though the contract was not under seal.-Nicholson v. Bradfield Union, Law Rep. 1 Q. B. 620.

2. Where the corporation of a city had been empowered by a statute to make certain public improvements, and for that purpose to take land compulsorily, to raise money on the credit of it, and to sell superfluous land to pay off the debt; such statute, though only impliedly authorizing the taking of more land than is absolutely necessary for the desired improvements, may be construed more favorably to them, being an existing public body, than it would be to persons on whom special powers had been conferred by Parliament for a particular purpose: lands so taken may be treated as taken "for the purposes of the statute;" and a contract made by the corporation with another person, to obtain lands under the statute and sell them to such person, as soon as the statute shall pass, is not illegal. -Galloway v. Mayor and Commonalty of London, Law Rep. 1 H. L.

34.

3. A corporation was instructed by statute to maintain certain public docks, to receive tolls for their use, and to appoint a harbormaster, who should have power of regulating the entry of vessels. Held, that the corporation was liable for damage caused by the negligence of its harbor-master, although the tolls were not applicable to the use of the corporators or corporation, but only to the maintenance of the docks. — Mersey Docks Trustees v. Gibbs, Law Rep. 1 H. L. 93.

4. The prospectus of a mining company described in favorable terms a mine, the purchase of which had been contracted for, and referred to the articles which empowered the directors to carry out or rescind any contract. The mine proving worthless, the directors rescinded

the contract, and agreed to purchase another. Held, that a shareholder who had subscribed on the faith of facts stated in the prospectus, which were false, and which the directors had no reasonable cause to suppose true, should have an injunction against an action for calls. -Smith v. Reese River Co., Law Rep. 2 Eq.

264.

5. A prospectus of a company stated that a certain invention, for working which the company was formed, had been tested, and that, according to experiments, the material could be produced at a specified cost, but that it was intended to test the invention further: the invention turned out worthless, but there had been some testing. Held, that there was not such misrepresentation as would enable a purchaser of shares to set aside the contract, especially where he had not sought redress in a reasonable time.-Denton v. Macneil, Law Rep. 2 Eq. 352.

6. A trading company can give a bill of sale as security for work done for them.-Shears v. Jacob, Law Rep. 1 C. P. 513.

See EQUITY PRACTICE, 6-7; PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS, 2; RAILWAY.

COVENANT.

The owner of Blackacre mutually covenanted with the owner of Whiteacre to bear the expense of repairing a way for their joint use, in proportion to the area of their said properties, by a deed containing a proviso, that the expense of such repair should be considered as a charge in equity, and, as far as circumstances would admit, at law also, on the owners for the time being of the said properties. Held, that this proviso did not create a charge on the lands, and therefore that, on the registration of Blackacre with an indefeasible title, under 25 & 26 Vic. c. 53, the owner of Blackacre was not entitled to have notice of the proviso recorded. -Drew's Estate, Law Rep. 2 Eq. 206.

See CONTRACT; LEASE.

CRIMINAL LAW.

The 2 & 3 Vic. c. 71, sec. 24, which enacts that any one brought before a magistrate, charged with having in his possession, or conveying in any manner, any thing which may be reasonably suspected of being stolen, and who shall not give an account to the magis trate's satisfaction of how he came by the same, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, is supplemental only to 2 & 3 Vic. c. 47, and the sections apply only to things in the streets, and not in a house. — Hadley v. Perks, Law Rep. 1 Q. B. 444.

See CONVICTION; EMBEZZLEMENT; LARCENY.

DAMAGES.

1. In an action for fraudulently misrepresenting that a cow sold to the plaintiff was free from infectious disease, if the plaintiff has placed the cow with five others, who have caught the disease and died, the plaintiff can recover as damages the value of all the cows. -Mullett v. Mason, Law Rep. 1 C. P. 559.

2. One who for his own purposes brings, collects, and keeps on his land any thing likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and is prima facie answerable for all damage which is the natural result of its escape, without proof of negligence on his part. -Fletcher v. Rylands, Law Rep. 1 Ex. 265.

3. If the plaintiff fails to establish any agreement of which special performance can be directed, a court of equity cannot grant relief in damages under 21 & 22 Vic. c. 27.—Lewers v. Earl of Shaftesbury, Law Rep. 2 Eq. 270. See EASEMENT; ESCAPE; LEASE, 1; LIGHT, 2, 3; PLEADING, 2.

DEED.

By voluntary deed a settlor gave property to A.. B., C., and D., in equal shares. He provided, that, if any of the four should die in his lifetime, leaving issue, the share of her so dying should be in trust for her children; and that if any of the four should die in his lifetime, with out leaving issue, her share should go over and be added to the other shares. A. and B. were dead at the date of the deed, the former leaving issue, the latter without issue; but held, that the gifts over of their shares did not fail. -Barnes v. Jennings, Law Rep. 2 Eq. 448.

See COVENANT. DEPOSITION.-See COMMIS. TO EXAMINE WITNESSES. DESCENT.

A marriage in a foreign country by one who has been attainted of treason and escaped thither, and who was afterwards executed on the same attainder, is valid and the children legitimate; and, as the descent of property be. tween brothers is immediate, the descendants of one of the children can inherit property from the descendants of another.-Kynnaird v. Leslie, Law Rep. 1 C. P. 389. DETINUE.

A. deposited debentures with B. as security for the payment of a bill at maturity, on the agreement that B. might sell or otherwise dispose of the debentures, if the bill should not be paid when due. Before the maturity of the bill, B. deposited the debentures with C., to be kept as security till the repayment of a loan from C. to B. larger than the amount of the bill. The bill was dishonored; and, while it was still un

paid, A. brought detinue against C. for the debentures. Held (by Cockburn, C. J., Blackburn and Meller, JJ.; Shee, J., dissenting), that A. could not maintain detinue without having tendered the amount of the bill.-Donald v. Suckling, Law Rep. 1 Q. B. 585.

DEVISE.-See WILL; SEPARATE ESTATE, 2; VESTED INTEREST, 1.

DISCOVERY.-See PATENT, 2; PRODUCTION OF Docu

MENTS.

DOMICIL.-See EXECUTOR, 3; WILL, 13.
EASEMENT.

A. dug a well near B.'s land, which sank in consequence, and a building, erected on it within twenty years, fell. It was proved that if the building had not existed, the land would still have sunk, but the damage would have been inappreciable. Held, that B. had no cause of action against A.-Smith v. Thackerah, Law Rep. 1 C. P. 564.

See WATERCOURSE, EMBEZZLEMENT,

One employed to get orders and receive payment for goods, but who is at liberty to get the orders and receive the money where and when he thinks proper, and is paid by a commission on the goods sold, is not a clerk or servant within 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, § 68, against embezzlement.-The Queen v. Bowers, Law Rep. 1 C. C. 41.

EQUITY PLEADING.-See EQUITY PRACTICE.
EQUITY PRACTICE.

1. Under an order to amend by adding parties, the plaintiff cannot introduce allegations making a new case against the original defendants, though material as to the new defendants.-Barlow v. McMurray, Law Rep. 2 Eq.

420.

2. In an ex parte examination, the examiner ought not to refuse to allow questions to be put, unless on matters clearly and palpably not evidence. Surr v. Walmsley, Law Rep. 2 Eq. 439.

3. A defendant cannot add a new issue of fact, not in any way suggested by his answer to the issues already directed for trial.-Morgan v. Fuller (1), Law Rep. 2 Eq. 296.

4. A decree dismissing a bill was by arrangement passed and entered at the registrar's office by the defendant's solicitor, acting, as the registrar knew, on behalf of the plaintiff. The defendant's solicitor afterwards obtained it from the office, and enrolled it. Held, that the decree ought not to have been delivered except to the plaintiff's solicitor; and, as the irregularity had delayed the plaintiff in appealing, the enrollment should be vacated.-Fryer v. Davies, Law Rep. 1 Ch. 390.

5. When a sole plaintiff dies, the suit may be revived after decree without bill filed.-Colyer v. Colyer, Law Rep. 1 Ch. 482.

6. A defendant, by putting in an answer, has not waived his right of calling on a plaintiff company to give security for costs, if, at the time of answer, he had not reason to believe that the plaintiff's assets were insufficient to pay costs; nor is he deprived of such right by having himself sued the plaintiffs, if the plaintiffs' bill is more than a mere defence to his bill. - Washoe Mining Co. v. Ferguson, Law Rep. 2 Eq. 371.

7. A limited company, when plaintiff in equity, may be required to give costs to an amount greater than £100.-Imperial Bank of China v. Bank of Hidustan, Law Rep. 1 Ch. 437.

See APPEAL, 1, 2; INTERROGATORIES, 3; PATENT; PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS; SERVICE OF PROCESS.

ESCAPE.

In an action for an escape, the jury, in estimating the value of the custody, may take into account not only the debtor's own means, but all reasonable chances, founded on his position in life and surrounding circumstances, that any part of the debt would have been paid had he remained in custody.-Macrae v. Clarke, Law Rep. 1 C. P. 403.

ESTATE BY IMPLICATION.-See TRUST.

ESTOPPEL-See HUSBAND AND WIFE; PATENT, 1. EVIDENCE.

1. In a case of collision, the books containing the entries made by the coast-guard, and sent to the coast-guard office, are admissible to show the state of the weather at the time of collision, without calling the person who made the entries.-The Catharina Maria, Law Rep. 1 Adm. & Ecc. 53.

2. A statute enacted that the court might make a certain order on production of a certificate signed by the speakar of the House of Commons. The standing orders of the House provide, that, in the unavoidable absence of the speaker, the deputy speaker may perform his duties and exercise his authority. Held, that the court would take notice of the standing orders of the House, and the order was made accordingly.-Stocksbridge v. Railway Bill, Law Rep. 2 Eq. 364.

See APPEAL, 5; COLLISION, 2, 3; COMMISSION TO EXAMINE WITNESSES; CONVICTION, 2; EQUITY PRACTICE, 4; INSURANCE, 3; INTERROGATORIES; JURISDICTION, 2; NEGLIGENCE, 4; PATENT, 2, 3; PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS; TRUSTEE; VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 4; WILL, 1.

EXECUTION.-See INTERPLEADER, 3; NEGLIGENCE, 3; PRACTICE (AT LAW), 3.

EXECUTOR.

1. A married-woman executrix, who has proved the will and survived her husband, is liable for a devastavit committed by him when alive.-Soady v. Turnbull, Law Rep. 1 Ch. 494.

2. A. died, leaving his wife B. sole executrix and residuary legatee. She proved the will, married, made a will under a power, appointing C., her daughter by the first husband, her sole executrix and residuary legatee, and died, leaving her second husband and C. surviving. C. took limited probate of her will, and afterwards, with the consent of B.'s husband, who had assigned her all his interest in the residue of his wife's estate, administration of the rest of her personal estate. Held, that C. was entitled to administration of the unadministered goods of A.-Goods of Richards, Law Rep. 1 P. & D. 156.

3. A testator, domiciled in the Isle of Man, by deed duly executed as a will, conveyed his property to a trustee, on trust, to pay the income to his widow for life, and on her death to divide it among his children. The ecclesiastical court of the Isle of Man granted probate of it to the trustee, as executor according to the tenor. The court of probate followed this grant so far as to admit the document to probate, without inquiring whether or not it was testamentary, but not so far as to make the grant to the trustee as executor according to the tenor. Being satisfied that the testator intended to deprive the widow, who was primarily entitled to the grant, of any control over the administration, the court decreed administration with the will annexed to the trustee, under 20 & 21 Vict. c. 77, § 73.-Goods of Cosnahan, Law Rep. 1 P. & D. 183.

See ADMINISTRATION; MARSHALLING OF ASSETS;
WILL, 3, 10.

FORGERY.-See BILLS AND NOTES, 1; VENDOR AND
PURCHASER OF REAL ESTATE, 2.

is returned." Held, that the invoice and note constituted a sufficient memorandum to satisfy the Statute of Frauds.-Wilkinson v. Evans, Law Rep. 1 C. P. 407.

3. The following memorandum, “A. agrees to buy the marble purchased by B., now lying at L., at 1s. per foot," does not bind A.; because, in a valid memorandum of a contract for sale under the Statute of Frauds, § 17, the names of the parties to the contract must appear as such parties, and B. is not here mentioned as a seller.- Vandenbergh v. Spooner, Law Rep. 1 Ex. 316.

FREIGHT.

Goods were shipped on the plaintiff's account under a charter-party between M. and the owner of the vessel, whereby and by the bill of lading they were deliverable to A., "to order or assigns," on payment of freight as per charter-party. The charter-party provided: "The freight to be paid on delivery, less advances in cash; one-half of the freight to be advanced by freighter's acceptance at three months, on signing bills of lading; owner to insure the amount, and deposit with charterer the club policy, and to guarantee same." M. gave his acceptance at three months' date for one-half of the freight to the ship-owner, who indorsed on the bill of lading: "Received on account of the within freight, 3007., as per charter-party." M. indorsed the bill of lading in blank, and forwarded it to the plaintiff at A., who, on the ship's arrival before the expiration of the three months, demanded the goods on payment of the balance of the freight; but the master having learned of the bankruptcy of M., refused to deliver the goods unless a guarantee was given for the payment of the full freight. Such guarantee was given, and the full freight finally paid under protest. Held, that the shipowner had no lien on the cargo for the halffreight represented by M.'s acceptance, and that the plaintiff could recover back the money paid by him.-Tamvaco v. Simpson, Law Rep. 1 C. P. 363.

GUARDIAN.

Three applications were made for the guardianship of infants, one for the appointment of H., their maternal grandmother; another for the appointment of A. and B., their paternal aunts, both married women; the third for the appointment of C., a friend of the family. Held, discharging an order of Stuart, V. C., appoint. ing B. sole guardian, that, though the discretion of a judge appointing a guardian ought not to be interfered with, except on very strong grounds, yet H. and C. should be appointed

guardians, because (1) the appointment of a married woman to be sole guardian was impro per; (2) the vice-chancellor had not approved of A., who was acting with B.; (3) the father had shown great confidence in H., and allowed the children, who had very little intercourse with his relations, to live much with her; and (4) their mother, though she had no power to appoint guardians, had made a will purporting to appoint H. and C. guardians.—In re Kaye Law Rep. 1 Ch. 387.

HIGHWAY.

A certificate of justices under 5 & 6 Wm. IV. c. 50, 85, for diverting a highway, is valid, though it alleges that a new highway is more commodious, without alleging that it is nearer, and though it states that the old highway “will be" unnecessary when the proposed alterations are completed; and the addition of land to an old highway, so as to widen it and make it more commodious, is a sufficient substitution of a new highway.-The Queen v. Phillips, Law Rep. 1 Q. B. 648.

See TURNPIKE.

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE.

Our Law Reports and Reporters.

TO THE EDITORS OF THE LAW JOURNAL. GENTLEMEN,-The Benchers having taken the matter of the Law Reporting into their especial care, the profession naturally expected such changes as would conduce to perfecting the system of reporting, ensure promptness in placing the reports in their hands, and leave little, if any, room for complaints or faultfinding. It is to be regretted that such a result has not ensued. Before a Chancery Chamber Reporter was specially appointed by the Society we did receive with moderate promptitude, and with most creditable accuracy, reports of Chamber decisions, edited and conducted by the Chancery Reporter, Mr. Grant, and a most valuable volume such decisions have made. The only complaint then was, that they were not produced with sufficient rapidity-the value of a decision affecting the practice of our courts, is to have it promulgated as quickly as possible.

In consequence of the present arrangement Mr. Grant has ceased to report Chamber decisions, and Mr. Cooper, the gentleman. appointed three months since, has not commenced (at any rate the profession have nothing as the result of his labours). The profession

THE MUNICIPAL MANUAL FOR UPPER CANADA. By Robert A. Harrison, D.C.L., Barrister-atLaw. Second edition. Toronto: W. C. Chewett & Co.

(From the Leader, May 11, 1867.)

We acknowledge with pleasure the receipt of the above, containing as the title inform us, “The new Municipal and assessment act, with notes of all decided cases, some additional statutes and a full index."

As compared with the learned editor's first manual, the present is much more complete and valuable, in the first place from the more consolidated form in which the legislation affecting municipal matters, has been put under the new act; in the next place from the number of doubts as to construction and interpretation which have been removed by the court, and which have been carefully collected and noted; and again from the increased experience of the editor and the greater thought and research displayed, and lastly owing to the improved appearance and "get up," so to speak of the volume before us.

The subject of contested elections is treated in an exhaustive manner and the experience of the editor, being constantly retained in cases of contested elections, renders his notes and collection of cases on this subject all the more useful.

Our readers can perhaps better judge of the value of the work by a few extracts taken at random; for example-section 73 as amended by chapter 52 of the same section, regulates the subject of disqualification of candidates for municipal honors, enacting amongst other things that no person interested in a contract with a corporation shall be qualified as a member of such corporation. In one of the notes to this section, he says:

"The object of this part of the section, like that of sec. 28 of the English Mun. Cor. Act of 5 & 6 Wm. IV. cap. 76, is clearly to prevent all dealings on the part of the Council with any of its members in their private capacity, or, in other words, to prevent a member of the

Council, who stands in the situation of a trustee for the public, from taking any share or benefit out of the trust fund, or in any contract in the making of which he, as one of the Council, ought to exercise a superintendence. (Rawlinson's Mun. Man. 53.) The evil contemplated being evident, and the words used all cases which come within the mischief ingeneral, they will be construed to extend to tended to be guarded against, and which can fairly be brought within the words, 16. The words of our enactment are that "no person having by himself or his partner an interest in any contract with or on behalf of the corporation shall be qualified, &c. ;" and the words in the English Act are that "no person shall be qualified, &c., who shall directly or indirectly, by himself or his partner, any share or interest in any contract or employment with, by, on or behalf of such Council, &c. " The difference deserves to be noticed. Under an old act, of which the section here annotated is a re-enactment, it was held that a person who had executed a mortgage to the corporation containing covenants for the payment of money, was disqualified. The Queen ex rel. Lutz v. Williamson, 1 U. C. Prac. Rep. 91. Where defendant, before the election, had tendered for some painting and glazing required for the city hospital, and his tender having been accepted, he had done a portion of the work, for which he had not been paid, but afterwards refused to execute a written contract prepared by the City Solicitor, and informed the Mayor of the city that he did not intend to go on with the work, he was notwithstanding held to be disqualified. The Queen ex rel Moore v. Miller, 11 U. C. Q. B. 465. So where the person elected had tendered for the supply of wood and coal to the corporation. The Queen ex rel Rollo v. Beard, 1 U. C. L. J., N. S. 123. In such a case it is immaterial whether there is or is not a contract binding on the corporation, 16. So where it was shown that the candidate elected was at the time of the election surety for the Treasurer of the Town and acting as the Solicitor of the Corporation, he was held to be disqualified. The Queen ex rel. Coleman v. O'Hare, 2 U. C. Prac. Rep. 18. So a surety in any sense to the Corporation. The Queen ex rel. McLean v. Wilson, 1 U. C. L. J., N. S, 71. Whether the contract be in the name of the party himself or another, is immaterial, at all events in equity. Collins v. Swindle, 6 Grant, 282; see also City of Toronto v. Bowes, 4 Grant, 489, S. C. 6 Grant 1. But an agent of an insurance company paid by salary or commission, who both before and since the election, had, on behalf of his company, effected insurances on several public buildings the property of the corporation, and who at the time of the election had rented two tenements of his own to the Board of School Trustees, for Common School purposes, was held not to be disqalified. The Queen ex rel. Bugg v. Smith, 1 U. C .L. J., N. S., 129.