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2. If, in an action on a bill of lading for loss of goods, a replication has alleged that the collision by which the goods were lost occurred through the “gross negligence" of the defendants, it is not a misdirection to leave it to the jury to say whether the defendants exercised “due care and skill." – Grill v. General Iron Screw Collier Co., Law Rep. 1 C. P. 600.

3. A sheriff is liable to an execution debtor for his officer's negligence in not properly lotting at a sale the goods seized under a fi. fa., though the debtor has persuaded the officer not to advertise the sale, has induced him to postpone the sale to a later hour, and has directed him to sell also for a writ lodged with him on that day, under which he could not otherwise have them sold.— Wright v. Child, Law Rep. 1 Ex. 358.

4. The plaintiff having suffered injury from the negligence of persons in charge of a ship laid ap in a public dock, under the care of a ship-keeper, sued the defendant. At the trial it did not appear by whom the ship-keeper was appointed. Held (MELLOR, J., dissenting), that the jury might, in the absence of other evidence, infer from the ship's register, on which the defendant's name appeared as owner, that the persons in charge of the ship were employed by the defendant.--Hibbs v. Ross, Law Rep. 1 Q. B. 634.


A highway board will be enjoined from allowing any fresh communications to be made with a sewer constructed by their predecessors, which occasions a nuisance to the inhabitants of an adjoining parish, though, from the limited nature of the powers of the board, no order can be made against them which will compel them to close the sewer altogether. - AttorneyGeneral v. Richmond, Law Rep. 2 Eq. 306.


1. C. agreed with R. that R. should buy and sell goods on C.'s behalf, the business to be carried on as R. & Co., and R. to receive a salary, and a percentage on profits. R. managed the business, but C. had bought goods for it. Each become bankrupt. Held, that the book debts and stock in trade of R. & Co. were joint estate.-In re Rowland, Law Rep. 1 Ch. 421.

2. Partnership articles between A. and B. provided that they should carry on business "for the mutual and common benefit of the partners, and risk of profit and loss in equal shares." A.'s capital to be £750, B.'s £1,500; the capital of each to carry interest at £5 per

cent., to be allowed yearly, before making up accounts. Sums brought in by either, above those amounts, to bear interest at the same rate, payable before any other interest, and to be withdrawable at three months' notice. The partners were to be at liberty to draw certain sums on account of their shares of profits; the remainder of each partner's share of profits to be added to his capital, and bear interest at £5 per cent., to be paid before division of net profits. On dissolution, after payment of debts, “the remaining capital, stock, moneys and credits belonging to the partnership, shall be divided, or received, or taken by the partners according to their respective shares or interests therein.” On dissolution, the capital standing to A.'s credit was not much increased ; that of B. greatly so, partly by accumulation of profits, and partly by cash brought in by him. After paying debts, the assets were insufficient to replace the capitals in full. Held, that B. should be repaid with interest the additional capital brought in by him in cash, and the residue should be divided between the partners in proportion to their capital.- Wood v. Scholes, Law

Rep. 1 Ch. 369. PATENT,

1. The defendant, in a suit to restrain the infringement of a patent, may dispute its validity, though the plaintiff has obtained a judg. ment against another person establishing its validity; but, till he has proved its invalidity, he will be restrained from infringing it.- Bovill v. Goodier (2), Law Rep. 2 Eq. 195.

2. The plaintiff, in a suit to restrain an infringement of a patent, contested on the ground of anticipation by prior user, is not entitled to discovery in answer to a general interrogatory as to the instances of prior user on which he relies.—Bovill v. Smith, Law Rep. 2 Eq. 459.

3. On the trial of issues in a patent case, the plaintiff may call evidence in reply to rebut a case of prior user set up by the defendant. But, after the defendant's evidence has been summed up, the defendant cannot adduce fur. ther evidence in answer to that given by the plaintiff in reply.-Penn v. Jack, Law Rep. 2 Eq. 314.

4. An objection to the validity of a patent, on the ground that a foreign patent tor the same invention has expired, cannot be taken at the hearing of a suit to restrain infringement, unless raised by the answer.-]

:-Bovill y, Goodier (2), Law Rep. 2 Eq. 195. PLEADING.

1. A plea to the further maintenance of an action needs no formal commencement, if it dis

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close on its face matter which arose since the commencement of the action.-Brooks v Jennings, Law Rep. 1 C. P. 476.

2. To a declaration for false representation, whereby the plaintiff was induced to pay .£2,000 and “sustained loss, and was adjudicated bankrupt, and suffered personal annoyance, and was put to trouble and injured in character and credit,” the defendant, except as to the claim in respect of the adjudication in bankruptcy, and the remainder of the personal damage alleged, pleaded that, before action, the plaintiff had been adjudicated bankrupt, that the loss sustained was pecuniary, and that the right to sue for it passed to the assignees. Held, that the plea was a good answer to the whole declaration, and might so have been pleaded.Hodgson V. Sidney, Law Rep. 1 Ex, 313.


1. Under a conveyance to trustees of land, together with the mines thereunder (the land containing both opened and unopened mines), and a power to grant leases for fourteen years without mentioning mines, none of the leases to be made dispunishable of waste, the trustees have no power to grant leases of unopened mines.-Clegg v. Rowland, Law Rep. 2 Eq. 160.

2. A. gave personal estate to trustees, on on trust for L. for life, and, on her death, for the benefit of the heirs of the body of L., to educate the said heirs, and to pay to the said heirs said estate at their respective ages of twenty-one, in such proportions as L. might by deed or will appoint. Held, that the objects of the power were such of the statutory next of kin of L. as were descended from her.

L. by will appointed £100 to a stranger to the power, and the balance of the fund (after payment of legacies to objects of the power), amounting to £260, to pay her debts; and " should any surplus remain,” she gave it to E., an object of the power. Held, that the £100 was unappointed, and did not pass to E., but that the £260 went to E., free from the charge of debts, which was invalid.—Jeaffreson's Trusts, Law Rep. 2 Eq. 276.

3. When the court of probate is satisfied that a bona fide question, whether a married woman's will is an execution of a power, is intended to be raised, it will grant limited probate of such a will, to enable the question to be determined in chancery.--Paglar v. Tongue, Law Rep. 1 P. & D. 158.

Sce SEPARATE ESTATE, 1; Trust; WILL, 18.


1. The venue of an information filed by the attorney-general to the Prince of Wales, to recover dues payable in Devon to the Prince as Duke of Cornwall, was laid in Middlesex. It appeared that all the witnesses to facts resided in Devon; but that, as the defendant disputed the Prince's right to the dues, the records of the Duchy in London would have to be produced at the trial; on these facts, and on the ground that the Crown could allege an interest and claim a trial at bar, an application by the defendant to change the venue to Devon was refused.- Attorney-General to the Prince of Wales v. Crossman, Law Rep. 1 Ex, 381.

2. If a defendant has a day's time to plead after an event, and the event happens on Friday, he can plead at any time before the opening of the judgment office on Monday; the rule ordering that service of pleadings, made after 2 P.M. on Saturday, shall be deemed made on Monday, not being intended to affect the rights of parties, but only to relieve the clerks.- Connelly v. Bremner, Law Rep. 1 C. P. 567.

3. The court will not, on the motion of the defendant, interfere with the discretion of a judge at chambers, who, on a summons to set aside an execution for irregularity, with costs has made the order as prayed, on condition that the defendant bring no action.-Bartlett v. Stinson, Law Rep. 1 C. P. 483.




1. The defendant authorized an insurance broker at L. to underwrite policies in his name, not exceeding £100 on any one risk. The broker, without defendant's knowledge, underwrote a policy for the plaintiff for £150. The plaintiff did not know the limitation on the broker's authority; but it is notorious in L. that there is, in nearly all cases, a limit of some sort imposed on brokers which is not disclosed to third persons. In an action on the policy, held, that the defendant was not liable even to the extent of £100.—Baines v. Ering, Law Rep. 1 Ex. 320.

2. A trader doing business as M. & Co. ordered goods of the plaintiff, and before their delivery executed a composition deed, of which the defendants were inspectors. The plaintiff afterwards wrote to the debtor, informing him that the goods were ready for delivery; and the defendants replied, requesting him to send the goods, and signing for M. & Co. The goods were sent, but not paid for. The deed allowed

Digest of English REPORTS.

the debtor to carry on his business for six months, under control of the inspectors, who had power to put an end to the deed, and who were to receive all the proceeds, pay current expenses, and out of the surplus pay dividends to the creditors, but who had no share in the profits, and no power to manage the business to the exclusion of the debtor. Held, that the defendants were not liable as principals, and that the plaintiff must look for payment to the firm of M. & Co., and to the trust in the deed for payment of current expenses.— Redpath v. Whig, Law Rep. 1 Ex. 335.


1. The creditor of a debtor who had made a registered deed, not passing any property, but containing a covenant to pay debts by instalments, is entitled to an order for another creditor to produce a mortgage deed which he holds on property of the debtor.-In re Marks' Trust Deed, Law Rep. 1 Ch. 429.

2. To an order for production of documents, directors are bound to give all information in their power as to documents in the possession of their company, though not in their own exclusive possession. - Clinch v. Financial Corporation, Law Rep. 2 Eq. 271.

3. The state of the originals of engineering plans being material in a cause, and the defendant deposing that he had no engineering knowledge, and that an inspection of the plans would be useless to him without the aid of an engineer, the order for their production was extended to the defendant's surveyor. ---Swansea

Vale Railway Co. v. Budd, Law Rep. 2 Eq. 274. PROXIMATE CAUSE.

On the trial of an action for a reward offered by the defendant "to any person who will give such information as shall lead to the apprehension and conviction of the thieves” who had stolen watches and jewellery from his shop, it appeared that about a week after the theft, R. having brought one of the stolen watches to the plaintiff's shop, the plaintiff gave information, and R. was apprehended the same day; that after two or three days, R., being in custody, told where some of the thieves would be found; that there they were apprehended a week afterwards; that they were subsequently convicted of the theft, and that R. was convicted as receiver. Held (by Mellor and Shee, JJ.; Blackburn, J., doubting), that the judge had properly left the evidence to the jury, pointing out the remoteness of the information; and that a ver. dict for the plaintiff ought not to be set aside.Tarner v. Walker, Law Rep. 1 Q. B. 641.


A person is disqualified from being relator of a quo warranto against one who has been elected to an office on the ground that, the voting papers being blank, the election was void, if said person has himself voted with a blank voting paper at the election in question, and also at previous elections, and has been himself previously so elected.—The Queen v. Lofthouse,

Law Rep. 1 Q. B. 433.


If, after delivery, but while the purchaser is in default, the vendor takes the property from the purchaser's possession, and resells it, the purchaser may maintain trover, but cannot regard the contract as rescinded, so as to recover back a deposit, or resist paying any balance still due.- Page v. Cowasjee Eduljee, Law Rep.


1. Property settled to the separate use of a married woman for life, with a power to appoint the reversion by deed or will, which she exercises by will, is not liable after her death to the payment of her debts.

Semble, the separate property of a married woman is not liable after her death to her general engagements. - Shattock v. Shattock, Law Rep. 2 Eq. 182.

2. A testator seized of trust 'estate, after recit. ing that he was or might be seized or entitled to real and personal estate, devised all his said real and personal estate to H. (a feme sole), her heirs, executors, administrators and assigns, for her and their own sole and absolute use and benefit. Held, that the devise to H. included the trust estate, but that it was not made separate estate; and that on her marriage her husband became trustee.-Lewis v. Mathews, Law

Rep. 2 Eq. 177.

The court of chancery has, under general orders, jurisdiction to order service of process abroad.-Drummond v. Drummond, Law Rep.



1. Jf the partner of a bankrupt trading firm was also one of a firm of solicitors, whom the



The word “survive," in a will, imports that the person who is to survive must be living at the time of the event he is to survive. Therefore, a gift over in default of children, or remoter issue of A., who should survive A., is pot void for remoteness. Gee v. Liddell, Law Rep. 2 Eq. 341.

See WILL, 6. Taxes.

The exemption in 38 Geo. III., c. 5, § 25, rendered perpetual by 38 Geo. III., c. 60, § 1), from land tax of "any hospital,” applies only to institutions existing when the act was made perpetual ; and land previously chargeable is not exempted by becoming crown property

Colchester v. Kewney, Law Rep. 1 Ex. 368.

An offer to pay under protest is a good tender.- Scott v. Uxbridge & Rickmansworth Rail. way Co., Law Rep. 1 C. P. 596.


trading firm had employed in the conduct of suits pending at the time of bankruptcy, the assignees in bankruptcy are not entitled to a delivery up to them of the papers in the solicitor's possession, subject to their existing lien.In re Moss, Law Rep. 2 Eq. 345.

2. The 23 & 24 Vict, c. 127, § 10, provides, that no one articled to an attorney shall hold any office, or engage in any employment whatever, other than the employment of clerk to such attorney. Held, that an articled clerk had not violated this provision by having been steward of a manor in which his family and himself were interested, the duties being performed by a deputy (with whom he divided the fees), and the clerk having thrice only, during two or three years, with his principal's consent, absented himself to hold courts.-In re Peppercorn, Law Rep. 1 C. P. 473.




On July 12th, W. sold P. eleven skips of cotton twist, then lying at the defendants' station at S., to be delivered for P. at B. station. Three of the skips were delivered on July 22nd, but P., objecting to the weight and quality, declined to take any more. On August 17th, four more were sent to B. station, and an invoice of the eight sent to P., with word that four had been forwarded, and that the other four were at S. station, waiting his orders. P. immediately returned the invoice, and wrote to W. declining to take any more. On September 1st, W. Rent an order to S. station, for the defendants to deliver the remaining four skips to P. These were accordingly forwarded to B. station, and taken by P.'s carman to his mill, but were immediately returned by P.'s orders, and the whole eight sent back by him to S. station, to the order of W. They were again returned by W. to B. station; but, P. refusing to have any. thing to do with them, they remained there till P.'s bankruptcy on October 19th, when W. claimed them. Held, on a special case, stated in an action of trover by P.'s assignee against the defendants, in which the court were to draw inferences of fact, that W. had a right of stoppage in transitu. Bolton v. Lancashire and

Yorkshire Railway Co., Law Rep. 1 C. P. 431. SUPPORT.-See EASEMENT. SURETY — See BoxD.


1. By a post-nuptial settlement, land was con veyed to trustees on trust to pay the rents to W. and his wife during their lives, and, on the death of the survivor, to sell and divide the proceeds amongst all and every the children of W., in such shares and proportions as he should by will appoint. There were seven children living at the date of the settlement, one of whom died before W., who died without executing the power. Held, that the property was vested in all the children liable to be divested by the execution of the power, and that the representatives of the deceased child were entitled to his share.—Lambert v. Thwaites, Law Rep. 2 Eq. 151. 2. An order by the master of the rolls,

appointing as trustee, under a will, a person of unexceptionable capacity and character, was discharged on the ground that his appointment would be contrary to the wishes of the testator as deduced from the will, and that he was proposed for and has accepted the office with a view of acting in the interests of some only of the objects of the trust, and not as an independent trustee for the benefit of them all; and the purchase of such proposal and acceptance of the trust may be proved by facts which have occurred since the date of the order.-In re T'empest, Law Rep. 1 Ch. 485. See SEPARATE Estate, 2; VENDOR AND PUR



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A., a contractor for supplying forage to the army, delivered to B. hay to be carried to a government store, in performance of A.'s con. tract, by the terms of which the commissary had a right to reject it on its arrival, if of inferior quality. Held, that the waggon in which B. conveyed the hay was within 3 Geo. IV. c. 126, § 32, exempting from toll any waggon conveying commissariat stores for the use of the army.—London & S. W. Railway Co. v.

Reeves, Law Rep. 1 C. P. 5$0. VENDOR AND PURCHASER.

1. On a sale by the court of real estate vested in trustees, whose receipt was declared to be a good discharge, in order to divide the proceeds among the beneficiaries, the beneficiaries are not bound to covenant for title.-Cottrell v. Cottrell, Law Rep. 2 Eq. 330.

2. A., one of three trustees, assigned leasehold property held jointly by them to a purchaser, forging the signatures of his co-trustees. A. was a solicitor, and acted for the purchaser. Held, that circumstances affected the purchaser with notice of some trust, and also that he had constructive notice through the knowledge of A.; and further, that he had the legal interest in one-third, but no beneficial interest, and a re-conveyance was ordered.Boursot v. Savage, Law Rep. 2 Eq. 134.

3. The mere assertion by the vendor that he has a good title, on the faith of which the purchaser relies, is not necessarily such a misrepresentation as precludes the vendor's enforcing the contract.-Hume v. Pocock, Law Rep. 1 Ch. 379.

4. The plaintiff agreed to sell the defendant all his estate, right and interest in certain lands, the plaintiff to produce a title from B. (the last owner) to himself. The defendant knew that B. was one of four supposed owners, and was anxious to buy his title, in order to get rid of his opposition to a bill in Parliament. Held, that the defendant could not show, aliunde, that B. had no title, and that specific performance should be decreed.-Hume v. Pocock, Law Rep. 1 Ch. 379.

5. A woman, entitled in fee to a mortgaged estate, proposed to her nephew that she should live with him, and that he should move to a larger house for the purpose, she contributing a yearly sum towards the housekeeping. The nephew agreed, if she would settle the estate, limiting it to him after her death. She agreed, and a settlement was accordingly made, by which the nephew covenanted to indemnify her from all liability under the mortgage, except

the payment of interest during her life. He moved to a larger house, and they lived together for some time. She afterwards ceased to live with him, and agreed to sell the estate to a purchaser, who filed a bill against aunt and nephew for specific performance. Held, that the nephew's covenant and his expenses incur. red on the faith of the settlement were severally sufficient to support the settlement as made for value, and not voluntary. Semble, that, had the settlement been voluntary, and so void against a purchaser, the nephew would have been a proper party, but could have made ont no claim to the purchase-money.--Townsend v. Toker, Law Rep. 1 Ch. 446.

6. A purchaser of land contracted to pay interest on the purchase-money at four per cent. from the time of taking possession till the day appointed for the payment; after that day at five per cent., if the money should not then be paid; and after six months from that day at eight per cent., with a proviso that this should not give the purchaser the right to delay pay. ment on paying such higher interest. The purchaser took possession, but the purchase was not completed for several years, though the delay was not caused by misconduct or negligence of the vendor. Held, that the stipulation for paying higher interest was not a penalty to secure punctual payment, but a separate and distinct contract, which the purchaser was bound to perform. Herbert v. Salisbury & Yeovil Railway Co., Law Rep. 2 Eq. 221.


1. The testator devised real estate to his widow for life, and after her death directed the executors to sell, and divide the proceeds equally between his children, the shares of his sons to be vested in them respectively when they attained twenty-one, and the shares of the daughters to be vested interests when they attained twenty-one or were married. During the minorities of the children, their shares were to be invested and applied for their maintenance. If one or more of the children should die, leaving issue,"before the share of each child or children shall become due and payable,” the share was to be equally divided " amongst all the issue of such child or children, when such issue shall attain twenty-one,” the interest of such child's share to be applied for the maintenance of such issue during minority. A daughter of the testator married and died in the widow's lifetime, leaving an infant child, and having assigned her share. Held, that the

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